by Tadahiko FURUSAWA
Member of Researcher Committee, DRC
1. Introduction
Headlines like “Chinese Vessels Increase Ocean Activities” are often seen in recent media reports. In the begging of 1990, China has increased its survey activities in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). China claims that all its activities are the ones of “academic and scientific research” specified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. But it has been conducting unauthorized activities by the treaty such as surveying for seabed resources since around 1995. Recently, it is obviously collecting oceanographic data for submarine warfare, and it has conducted a major exercise with 12 ships in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands in May 1995.
These increasing ocean activities of China seem to be coincided with the progress of its modernization policy, which arose from the change of leader to Deng Xiaoping.
The Chinese are likely to be regarded as continental people, and unfamiliar with the sea. However, historically and ethnically, they are challenging to the sea, and to be consider here is relationship between the Chinese and the sea, focusing on their interest and understanding to the Sea.
2. Transformation from Continental State to Ocean State
(1) Theory of the Land versus Theory of the Sea
Countries of Russia, Central Europe, East Europe and Mongolia are ethnic states. Starting with hunting and nomadism as a way of living, peoples in this region continuously had struggles chasing the grass. In the process of pursuing a stable zone to live, there were struggles and antagonism continuously between nomadism and agriculture. Looking over the Chinese history, it is subject to the theory of the land such as territory expansion and enclosure of land, hard and strong political power and securing self-supportive zone.
The theory of the sea has been dominated in the South-East Asia and the coastal region along the Mediterranean, where countries of “city states” have prospered. In these regions territorial states had hardly been established but forms of city-states, in which they had a harbor as a core, had long lasted. This pattern is now seen in Asian countries, where port cities are connected with communication lines on the sea, forming economical and social network, and enabling free travels or movements going over boundaries of nation.
As described above, the theory of the sea has a free, open and global minded political system in its fundamentals. This is also a conception to have the sea as common resources, and has excluded the idea of enclosing the sea by a strong state or a strong authority.
(2) From Inland China to Coastal China
Chinese history has begun when states were formed in Northern and Middle China. These states are kind of inland culture. They build a capital with full of dignity so that Emperor’s dignity and virtue infiltrated into administration strongly and extensively, gaining obedience and respect to the idea of Middle Kingdom, then made surrounding nations and people submit to themselves, and maintained order and prosperity by tribute and a political system called sakuho which gives feudal lords a title.
However, the empires of Middle Kingdom were also fortress states. Because of carrying a vast territory, they had to spend huge political and military power to preserve their boundaries.
The concern over the sea grew gradually when the economic center moved from Northern China to Middle and Southern China. Despite of carrying out a strict closed-sea policy intended to monopolize wealth brought out from tribute trade, they could never stop growing network of demand and supply. Coastal cities in China enjoyed smuggling and prospered. In 19th century, western powers approached to the Chinese coastal region. In those days, it was the most important issue to keep the region prosper by stabilizing foreign trade for local administrative officials and the common people as well. Even opium trade used to be handled cautiously and quietly to avoid full-scale confrontation with English merchants. There was a perceptional estrangement between central government or the Imperial Court and those coastal cities around Guongdong in Southern China.
During 100 years from the Opium war to the Mao Tse-tung era, China’s policy emphasized internal affairs because of wars and domestic disorders. But with the Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open policy in the late 1980s, Chinese coastal cities rapidly developed its energy as if the floodgates suddenly broke out. Development in economy is the first priority for the modernization; it all depends on development of coastal region and trade over the sea. The speed of development of the coastal region in the last 20 years, including Shanghai, Talien, Chuwanchou, Guangchou and the Hainan Island, seems to exceed of the last one hundred years. The area of the sea off the China coast is filled with resources and wealth; it means it has values and possibilities, which are becoming indispensable elements for China’s growth.
Though China have directed its attention to the sea, as described above, it only could contain and control the sea with the theory of the land, and would still be a fortress state from the historical and political viewpoint
3. Territorial Sea for the Chinese
(1) The Sea as a Possession
a. Ethnical and Historical Sentiment (Monopoly of the sea as Middle Kingdom)
For the Chinese, the world is a sphere where the influence of the emperor affects: it means they have no boundary idea as of Europeans. The Chinese believe that the world is originally composed of the empire of Chunkuo or the Middle Kingdom and the unenlightened Land of Huowai, which consists of four (east, south, west and north) yidi or barbarians. The ancient China assimilated and absorbed these regions with political, cultural and military powers, and expanded their territory to the extent of today, and further, it spread its influence over the surrounding countries, establishing Middle Kingdom world.
On the East Asian area, the Chinese controlled big junks through Chinese coast and the China sea as if they were their own sea, and traded special products of various places; it was in the 12th through 13th century. The back ground of these are; ①The Southern Song and the Yuon dynasty took a policy to encourage foreign trade, in addition, the center of economy, society and culture had moved from Northern China to Middle and Southern China; ②The Chinese acquired the ability to build and control big junks, because by then in the Tang era, they had learned shipbuilding and navigation from Arab.
At the begging of the 15th century, the era of Emperor Eiraku of the Ming dynasty, the fleet of Zeng He was dispatched seven times for the purpose of stimulating tribute trade. It was a large scale sailing extended from South East Asia to the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula and east coast of Africa. Through these sailing, information about these regions, both sea and land, were firmly accumulated. These information made smugglers stir their challenging spirit even after the fleet dispatch ceased. The trade had big mutual benefit for the people along the coastal cities and surrounding countries, and hardly could go in the frame of tribute trade. Therefore, smuggling prospered in the local regions. The sentiment on the sea of the central government in Beijing was considerably different from the ones of local coastal cities.
The difference between “land sentiment” and “sea sentiment” raised the idea of enclosing the sea as a prolonged land in late 19th century. Traditional Chinese governing rule is based on, ①Infiltration of Emperor’s dignity and virtue, ②Enlightenment by coercion with national power such as political, military, economical and cultural powers, ③Master-servant relationship with neighboring countries with tribute trade. Living space for the people who adore and gather before the virtue of the emperor, and the survival space for the people of subjected countries that surrender or submit to the dignity of the emperor, were the territory reigned over by the emperor. The territory means the virtue-infiltrated-area; it varies with the height of his virtue or dignity. Countries or people that did not receive his virtue or dignity were avoided and ignored as huowai or outer barbarians. Described above was the traditional Chinese concept of boundaries and territories.
Until the late 19th century, the Qing dynasty had expanded and reinforced its navy. By enclosing the sea with the navy, as well as enclosing land, the Qing tried to change the strategy to secure its territory. And came to think to contain not only its own territory but dependencies including Korea and the Chinese society in the south region such as Vietnam and Singapore, and the sea as well, so that to build up Chinese sphere. This is an idea to cut off a piece of the sea as a prolonged part of the land, and contain the piece to make it its territorial water or territories. It is the exact opposite of the ocean state idea. Western countries and Japan, the ocean states, think that the sea, the place where resources and value added goods are transported, is an aggregate of communication lines, and is a high density collection of lines: that is an essential resource to sustain free trade.
When the Incident at the Sea Agreement was talked between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Navy, the continent state, proposed not to approach within 500 to 1,000 meters to the ships in exercise. The US Navy opposed that it was enough to apply the law for preventing collision at sea, and settled on this line. Another example: China has issued a warning not to approach within 1,500 meters to its oilrigs maintained on the high sea in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. The idea of securing the monopolized plane on the sea, as the Soviet (Russia) and China have done, are exactly the theory of the land to secure monopolized land.
b. Strategic Boundary
The idea of Middle Kingdom or Sinocentrism has been brought up for thousands years by political powers in China. No matter how the political system changed, China’s neighboring countries and people were dependencies or were enclosed in its ideological, cultural and political sphere. They used to be under China’s influence, and China thinks it has given them the influence. This way of thinking has not been changed still in the days of the People’s Republic of China.
Since the Opium War in 1840, China has felt humiliation. Therefore the sphere ruled by the most prosperous time of the Qing dynasty is the proper Chinese territory: this is the fundamental historical view for the Chinese, and taking back the lost land in the last 100 years is a task as well for the China Communist Party.
Derived from Middle Kingdom and “retake land”, the People’s Liberation Army had a discussion on “Defense Development Strategy” in late 1980. This was a strategic discussion advocated by Deng Xiaoping when he tried to promote modernization of the PLA. In the discussion, proposed was a concept of “strategic boundary” opposed to “geographic boundary”. While geographic boundary limits the territorial land, water and air space, strategic boundary is defined as “a limit of geographic area which is related to the national interests actually controlled by the state’s military power”. Geographic boundary has an international approval, and relative stability and reliability; while strategic boundary are not restricted to territorial land, sea and air space, it varies according to changes of the general national power.
The strategic boundary will expand and contract with the increase and decrease of the general national power, and when the strategic boundary was smaller than the geographic one and did not concurred with for a long time, the geographic boundary would retreat to the line of the strategic boundary: it means to lost land. On the contrary, going out of the geographic boundary, and sustained the strategic boundary for some amount of time, the geographic one could be enlarged. The strategic boundary will decide the “survival space for the state and its people”.
What is needed to expand strategic boundary? That is a military power and general national power on the back. If the general national power is strong, then the strategic boundary will go over the geographic boundary.
In the Western Regions, the geographic boundaries have been regained to the line before the Opium War, through repeated war after the revolution and with the mediation between the countries; and correspond with the strategic ones. In the Eastern Coastal Regions, expansion of the strategic boundaries is needed over the geographical ones. Lost “300 square kilometers Ocean Jurisdiction ” since the Opium War, that is the “proper Chinese sea” of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea, must be retook so that the geographic boundary could be established with the strategic boundary: this is the theory for the Chinese.
The China Navy has been expanded and reinforced for the purpose of retaking the Chinese sea and expanding the strategic boundaries. It shows the clear intention that whoever exercises a state sovereignty in the “China sea”, infringing China’s sovereignty, China will assert its viewpoint, and will use its military power without hesitation depending on the situation. There is a hard and strong consciousness of Great Country and Middle Kingdom, together with a nationalism brewed by a historical humiliation.
(2) The Territorial Water Law
February 1992, China established the Territorial Water Law. The new law specifies that its territorial islands include the Senkaku Islands, Taiwan, the Penghu islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and islands scattered in the South China Sea.
China has tried to establish a favorable international relationship for itself citing theories such as “prolonged continental shelf”. China is enthusiastic to study international law. It is not to abide by the international law, but to utilize those rules as favorable reasons as they could be, also to interpret or manipulate unclear parts or gap of international law for creating its own order. It means China intends to create a new international order to suit its own convenience, not to participate in an order made by Europeans and Americans.
Maps published in China shows its territorial water, which includes almost all the South China Sea, Taiwan, Senkaku Islands and whole areas of the East China Sea stretching to off the Ryukyu Islands. The Territorial Water Law is a domestic law established on the assumption of developing and utilizing resources in its vicinity waters. The South China Sea and the East China Sea are both the high seas where international law is dominant. But China interprets the both China-Seas as inherent Chinese waters, so it says it has the authority to rule the seas.
The Law specifies clearly that the Chinese Navy and the Air Force are authorized to evict foreign naval ships entering without permission into “the territorial waters and the connected waters of China”. In the law, China expressed its decision that it will use its military power to eliminate whatever invades its territorial water, and that it will not only defense those islands including the Senkaku but will defense and preserve resources and interests in China’ s sea. China explains its waters under the sovereignty is approximately 300 square kilometers according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and that it is in name and in reality an Ocean State.
About the South China Sea, China had declared territorial sovereignty of those islands there in 1951. In 80s it had conducted oceanographic survey. In 1987, it deployed naval ships and conducted exercises to show presence; while it made fishermen land on those islands, built a sovereignty monument and deployed escort ships. In 1988, it stationed naval forces, built military facilities, so that presenting the actual control of these islands domestically and internationally. While conducting these activities, conflicts with Vietnam and others occurred, but repelled with effective and through counter attacks declaring defensive act, and eventually secured the possession. In July 1979, China established four no-fly zones over the east part of the Hainan island and the Sihsha (Paracel) Islands, that the civil air lines between Hong Kong and Bangkok had to close its route over the south of the Hainan and to take a detour route far around over east of the Paracel. This is exactly a theory of possession to gain an actual control of not only the sea but an air space.
In the East China Sea, China declared territorial sovereignty on the Senkaku Islands in 1971. In 1980s, it increased survey activities. After establishing the Territorial Water Law in 1992, it has deployed naval ships, conducted exercises and showed its presence. Lately, China is surveying seabed resources in Japan’s EEZ, also increasing the oceanographic in the vicinity of Japan. It seems that China is heading to gaining an actual control of the East China Sea by building up faits accomplis. China wants to get a complete control of the East China Sea, and for this purpose, it would assert a suzerain like claims as if it still had dependencies or tribute countries in this area. It also seems that China, an original continental state, has a sentiment of a big country and an ethos of Middle Kingdom or Sinocentrism.
4. Situation in the East China Sea
(1) Steps to
Possessing the East China Sea
a. Strategic Value of the East China Sea
In this section, the value of the East China Sea will be analyzed from the viewpoint of securing resources, national security and Taiwan problem.
China changed into an oil importing country in 1993. It is obvious that the oil resources contained in the East China Sea would have a tremendous value, which is indispensable for China to be developed in economy. Also the rich mineral and biological resources would help greatly to sustain the growing population of China.
For the national security, the East China Sea is important in an aspect of having a long rearch. In 19th century, the Chinese built their industrial facilities in the deep inland area with a viewpoint of national defense. Now that China has an enough national power to expand its strategic boundary, the Chinese might want to feel more secure by putting it as far off as they could from the coast.
Moreover, the East China Sea is a valuable area to deploy SSBN nuclear forces, while US Navy can be restricted from deploying in this area when China enables attacks from its vast and wide land.
Taiwan problem is the most important issue for the 21st century China. When China uses armed forces against Taiwan, encircling it with the East and South China Sea will be one of effective military measures. If it had a controlling power of this area, the way to resort to force, which is next to impossible only with modernization of PLA, would increase a chance of success, though it is a premise to have a militarily power effective to control territorial waters. Also it means it could cut the relationship among Taiwan, the United States and Japan.
Father more, controlling and monopolize the East China Sea means it will be possible to threaten major communication lines of Japan: it is to acquire a diplomatic card not only effective to Japan and the United States but also to the Korea Peninsula and Russia.
b. Steps to Possessing the East China Sea
For possessing the South China Sea, China has used a careful and well-planned strategy.
While for the East China Sea, it has utilized a tricky and strong diplomacy. First, China abruptly claimed territorial rights of the Senkaku Islands, then shelved the issue, and then proposed a joint development. Though there had originally been no territorial dispute between Japan and China, it presented the Senkaku as if it was an unsettled diplomatic problem by taking up a series of claims and proposals on discussion. To add to this success, now it is conducting oceanographic survey actively. The 92’s Territorial Water Law is a declaration that China is going to develop and expand into the sea, and that it will exclude any obstacles to this movement with its force.
There are some evidence that oceanographic survey has increased, navy ships deployment has increased, and navy exercises have been conducted frequently. It is escalating oceanographic survey as to conduct openly in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) and with not only ships belonged to the Maritime Transporting Bureau but also with Navy ships. It is confirmed that these activities is collecting oceanographic data for submarine operations that is far over from mere scientific research.
China’s expected next aggressions will be keeping seabed resources investigation followed by expanding oilrig building, so that it can cross over the middle line between Japan and China with fact building approach. And it will make fishermen or fishermen disguised soldiers land the Senkaku to build facilities or housing for the “fishermen”, so that to sound diplomatic or military response of Japan. When the response was slow, or unguarded or careless, China would decide the “campaign” is easy to go, and would build military facilities one by one, increase stationing force by unit, and conduct scout and supply operation periodically. Then mining platforms would be built across the mid-line between Japan and China. In this way, possession of the East China Sea and the Senkaku Islands as well could be certain and positive.
The China Communist Party has educated people that the territorial land and waters in 1840s are China’s proper territories. So the Chinese naively believe that the East China Sea and the Senkaku are their inherent land and sea, and these are still occupied by the Japanese. The education works big. “Retake the lost land and the lost sea”; under this simple nationalism, when people or soldiers begun to move, the movement would grow to a big power.
From now, Chinese navy ships move more actively, and will probably set exercise areas or airspace “willingly without an adequate adjustment” with Japan for conducting those fact build exercises. How to respond would be a turning point for Japan whether China will get a lead on the next step or will be careful.
(2) Forming the New International Order
Forming the “New International Order” which is putting China in its center were directed by Deng-Xiaoping in late 1980s. China has completed its strategic nuclear arms to gain a nuclear deterrent. In the next step, it will pay efforts to make them smaller and lighter to complete intercontinental, middle range and short range ballistic missiles. After gaining this as a background, it will proceed to build a new world around China, saying “Rebuild the Middle Kingdom”, the purpose of the New International Order.
China does not fear isolation. While struggling against interference from Western Countries on the matter such as democratization, human rights, nuclear test, arms transfer, etc, China makes steady progress toward economic development. China, who intends to grow to a big power, is trying to form a new international order around China, by shaking hands with Russia and countries in the Central Asia, taking North Korea in and having closer ties with Muslim countries in the Middle East. On this background it has repeated “threatening or Sinohegemonic” behavior to make advance into the Taiwan Straight, the South China Sea and also the East China Sea. Upon this success, it seams that China aims to reform the Western made international order into a China-lead new order.
The major target has been the South China Sea, and from now on it will be the East China Sea. While Japan proposed to divide its EEZ in the East China Sea on the middle line, China asserted to draw line with a ratio of the population of coastal areas. It first declared territorial rights of the Senkaku Islands, the Japanese soil, then proposed to shelve the issue immediate after the declaration; and succeeded in impressing the world that the Senkaku is an unsettled, undetermined soil.
Furthermore, concerning its survey of seabed resources, it asserts a prolonged continental shelf theory to legitimize its activities in areas that expands to the Japanese soil including the Senkaku and yet to the Okinawa Trough. With an exhaustive study of international law, Chinese way interpretation of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea and a military force background, China will certainly expand its strategic boundaries.
5. Conclusion
The Chinese say 21st century is the century of the sea. The Chinese historically have sea-oriented characteristics. Together with the original Sinocentrism, this sea-oriented character, nationalism led by the China Communist Party and military forces, China is trying to create a classical international relationship where surrounding countries could be obedient under China’s authority. Also it is going to utilize the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the purpose of securing its interest on the sea, and to show presence aggressively in the inter-country framework to build a new order.
It is positive that China will accelerate its advance into the East China Sea. And it will be more frequent to show military presence against Japan including drills of missile launching, anti-submarine operation and landing; together with reinforcement of the Navy. And will plunge into the diplomatic gap derived from philosophy-lacked Japanese diplomacy, represented with words such as “no-war vow”, “history understanding” and “Japan-China friendship”, China will posses the East China Sea by building up facts steadily. The Senkaku will be easily occupied by China at this moment. This is exactly “No wars, Enemy yield” of Sunzi.
Japan has brought up defense capacity called the Self-Defense Force for 50 years. But close cooperation between diplomacy and military are not exist, which ordinal countries should have. Execution of diplomacy with the background of military force is not necessarily approved. This is the gap that China would plunge into.
Four modernization, since Deng-Xiaoping, has an object to build the “Chungkuo Empire/Middle Kingdom” with sea hegemony; it means to jump from Inland China to Coastal China, from Coastal China to Chungkuo Empire with new international order. If this situation is not interrupted, Japan and its neighboring region will be forced to do tribute diplomacy as once they were as if they are some of those East, South, West and North Barbarians.
Reference
1. “Maritime Strategy of China”, HIRAMATSU, Shigeo. Keiso Shobo
2. “Military Force of China”, HIRAMATSU, Shigeo. Bungei-Shunju sha
3. “Asia of Sea”, HAMAMOTO, Takesi & others. Iwanami Shoten
4. “How Is Ecological View of History of Culture”, UMESAWA, Tadao. Chuou-Kouron sha
