The Importance of the Principle of War (2)
by Mutsuyoshi GOMI
Member of Research Committee, DRC
Foreword
The US Navy doctrine describes that the success at war depends on the proper implementation of the principle of war including the commander's intention, center of gravity, vital vulnerability, focal point of the efforts and so on. Moreover, in order to complete the mission, we should properly apply the basic doctrine or the principle of war which was acquired from the bitter experience at the violent battle in the past. And following nine items are listed as the " the Principle of War", that is to say, @Objectives, AMass, BManeuver, COffensive, DEconomy of Force, EUnity of Command, FSimplicity, GSurprise, HSecurity. Regarding to @~C, I described in the last annual report. So, I try to underline the importance of the Principle of War regarding to D`H extracting examples of The Pacific War.
5. Economy of Force
(1) US Navy Doctrine
Expression
"Employ all combat power available in the most effective way possible, allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. With many more available targets than assets, each unit must focus its attention on the primary objectives. A successfully coordinated naval strike at an enemy's critical vulnerability-for example, knocking specific command-and-control nodes out of communication can have far more significance than an attempt to destroy the entire command-control system."
(2) Example 5-The Japanese Imperial Navy Battle Ship Force at Midway Sea Battle
a. Situation
The Comparison of Japan-US Naval Force at the Midway Battle is as following Table-1. The US Navy decoded the Japanese Navy code and grasped the Japanese Navy's intention. Then US navy gathered naval forces as far as possible at that time. The force list shown in this Table-1 was the maximum US Navy available force. The Japanese Navy estimation regarding the US naval Forces at the Midway Area is not clear, any way, Japanese Naval Forces deployed to the Midway area was tremendous huge.
b. Study
Regarding the concentration of Japanese Naval forces, no argument exists. The problem was how to use the Forces, that is, force organization. The Japanese Navy operational concept was to entice away and to destroy US Naval Forces at the sea off the Midway Island. So the central force of the Japanese Fleet should have been the Carrier Battle Group. Taking into account that no battle ship was included in US Fleet, it should be estimated the Battle off the Midway should be the type of Carrier vs Carrier. Notwithstanding, only two destroyers were allocated to the Carrier Battle Group and 9 battle ships cruised several hundreds miles behind the Carrier Battle Group. The battle Ship Group did no contribution to the Carrier Battle Group Operation and no mission was ordered to contribute to the Carrier Group. It is very much strange from the effective force employment point of view.
Table-1 The Japanese Navy and US Navy Force Comparison at the Battle of Midway
|
CV
|
BB
|
CG
|
LG
|
DD
|
Sb. Craft
|
Lb.Craft
|
|
|
Japan |
6
|
11
|
10
|
7
|
53
|
261
|
0
|
|
US |
3 |
0 |
7
|
1
|
14
|
233
|
119
|
6. Unity of Command
(1) US Navy Doctrine
Expression
"Ensure unity of effort for every objective under one responsible commander. Whether the scope of responsibility involves a single, independent ship at sea or the conduct of an amphibious landing, we achieve unity in forces by assigning a single commander. After he expresses his intent and provides an overall focus, he permits subordinate commander to make timely, critical decisions and maintain a high tempo in pursuit of a unified objective. The result is success, generated by unity in purpose, unit cohesion, and flexibility to the uncertainties of combat."
(2) Example6-Command Relation between Ozawa and Kurita Fleet
a. Situation
At the Leyte Sea Battle, both of Kurita fleet and Ozawa fleet were under direct command of Commander in Chief of the General Fleet and Shima Fleet was under command of the South-West Regional Fleet. The reason why Adm. Ozawa did not take unit command of all of these fleets was due to the strong objection of Adm. Ozawa himself. Adm. Ozawa strongly objected to Adm. Toyota who was the CINC of General Fleet and insisted Adm. Ozawa's unified command of these fleets. Adm. Ozawa insisted that Ozawa's fleet capability, mainly being composed by aircraft carriers, was not enough to smoothly conduct this Battle operation and the main player of this Battle operation should be Adm. Kurita and never conceded to Adm. Toyota.
b. Study
The very much close coordination and adequate information exchange was indispensable for the success of the Leyte Battle Operation. Reviewing the Battle of Leyte, the most disappointed issue is that the precious information reporting the Adm. Ozawa's success of trapping Adm. Halsey and hooking up his Fleet to the North was not received by Adm. Kurita. If Adm. Kurita had received it, he would have not misunderstood the escort carrier group which he encountered off the Samar Island as normal type aircraft carrier group and would not have been misled by the false message showing the enemy main force position from the South-West Regional Fleet that was a trigger of the Mysterious Return. In the message log of the Adm. Kurita's Flag Ship, Battle Ship Yamato was recorded only one message from Adm. Ozawa saying "Change Flag Ship to Ohyodo. Conducting operation at 1100". However there was no indication of asking from Adm. Kurita to Adm. Ozawa about the Adm. Ozawa's operational situation. Such unbelievable fact that no close coordination and information exchange existed happened means how difficult it is to conduct the operation under coordinated command relation. The Battle of Leyte was the Japanese Imperial Navy's true final organizational operation conducted after being completely defeated at the Battle off Mariana and should have been conducted by all remaining fleet of the Japanese Imperial General Fleet. So, Adm. Toyota, CINC of The General Fleet, must have raised commanding flag on the flagship of the fleet instead of Adm. Kurita and taken unified command at the head of all participating forces. If so, information exchange and reporting each other should have been conducted adequately and the possibility of success of this Battle have arisen.
7. Simplicity
(1) US Navy Doctrine
Expression
"Avoid unnecessary complexity in preparing, planning and conducting military operations. The implementing orders for some of the most influential naval battles ever fought have been little more than a paragraph. Broad guidance rather than detailed and involved instructions promote flexibility and simplicity. Simple plans and clear direction promote understanding and minimize confusion. Operation order 91-001 dated 17 January 1991 summarized the allied objectives for the Desert Storm Campaign into a single sentence. "Attack Iraqi political-military leadership and command and control; sever Iraqi supply lines; destroy chemical and nuclear capability; destroy Republican Guard forces in the Kuwaiti Theater; liberate Kuwait." These objectives were succinct, tangible, and limited."
(2) Example7-Succinct but Misunderstood Adm. Nimitz Order
a. Situation
US Forces proceeding operation to the Leyte were implemented by Adm. Halseyfs Middle Pacific Forces and Gen. MacArthur's South West Pacific Forces. Tactical General Commander in this theater was not assigned. Adm. Halsey as the Commander of Third Fleet was under command of Adm. Nimitz and Adm. Kinkaid, Commander Seventh Fleet, was under command of General MacArthur. So the command relation of these two Admirals was independent each other. Adm. Kinkaid judged that his mission was to make landing force land and maintain safely the landing force at the coastal beachhead. The order from Adm. Nimitz to Adm. Halsey was very short, that is, "Protect South West Pacific Forces and support them". Therefore, Adm. Kinkaid assumed that protecting amphibious forces is due to Adm. Halsey's mission and ordered ammo-condition for land supporting operation. On the other hand, Adm. Nimitz directed: "In case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offer or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task." From this Adm. Halsey concluded that the mission of the Third Fleet was offensive, not defensive. "It was not my job to protect the Seventh Fleet."
b. Study
Receiving the information that the Japanese mobile force was detected in northward, due to this conclusion, Adm. Halsey decided the defense of the Leyte Gulf front was not his mission and rushed to the north. So only Adm. Kinkaid's Force with ammunition for gun fire support for landing force remain as the protecting force for landing force at Leyte Gulf and the possibility of the success of the Japanese Fleet operation raised As well known, due to the Adm. Kurita's retirement, US forces succeeded the landing operation without any damage. Although Adm. Nimitz order was simple and short, due to the further direction, Adm. Halsey was misled. It means how difficult it is to transfer commander's intention properly to the subordinate commander. Recently CINCPACFLT summons his subordinate commanders to his office at Pearl Harbor for the purpose of making them understand his idea clearly. Even though VTC (Video Tele Conference) has been popular, the face-to-face communication is superior to any other method and it shows the indication how well recognized it is important to make subordinates understand thoroughly commanderfs intention.
8. Surprise
(1) US Navy Doctrine
Expression
"Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Catching the enemy off guard immediately puts him on the defensive, allowing us to drive events. The element of surprise is desirable, but it is not essential that the enemy be taken completely unaware only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively. Concealing our capabilities and intentions by using covert techniques and deceptions gives us the opportunity to strike the enemy when he is not ready."
(2) Example8-Unexpected US Aircraft Carriers
a. Situation
The raid to the Pearl Harbor is the most typical example of the surprise attack. Here I try to study about "Surprise" in case of the Battle of Midway. Japanese General Fleet operational concept regarding the Battle of Midway was as follows, that is to say, if Japan conducted the surprise attack to the Midway Island and occupied it, US Navy main force would proceed to this area to defend or win back it from Japan. Japanese side would detect and destroy US forces and give deadly blow to the US Pacific Fleet. In order to deceive operational intention, Japanese fleet planed and implemented the Aleutian Capture Operation. However, in real case, the US side had decoded the Japanese code and recognized the Japanese intention preliminary. So the Midway Island had been changed to the unsinkable aircraft carrier. Therefore, the Japanese side had to change its operation from the surprise attack to the raid attack and when the US carriers detected at that time when Japanese carrier group was conducting air raid to the Midway Island, the surprise element of the Japanese operation concept had completely disappeared. Japanese aircraft carrier group being composed by the premise of the success of surprise attack became the short of anti air capability and had been completely defeated by the US Fleet as well known. At the Midway Battle, it is very much questionable that Japanese Fleet implemented the surprise operation with the broad area disperse of its force.
b. Study
Adm. Nimitz said "surprise is extremely important in naval and military operations and ought to be exploited whenever possible. Very often the weaker force has no alternative but rely on surprise to achieve its ends. But the Japanese made the mistake of planning a major operation so that it depends on surprise when there was no necessity for their doing so. Even with the most complete warning by decoding, it is inconceivable that the three US carriers could by any combination of luck and skill have defeated and turned back the 8 carriers, 11 battle ships, and immense number supporting vessels which the Japanese committed to this action had the Japanese fleet been concentrated." The Japanese should not conduct the surprise operation but conduct the raid operation concentrating all available forces with concealment of its intention. Because the Japanese Navy had enough capability to gain the victory at the Battle of Midway by the orthodox raid operation.
9. Security
(1) US Navy Doctrine Expression
"Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage. Protecting the force increase our combat power. The alert watch stander, advanced picket, or such measures as electronic emission control all promote our freedom of action by reducing our vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Tools such as gaming and simulation allow us to look at ourselves from the enemy's perspective. We enhance our security by a thorough understanding of the enemy's strategy, doctrine, and tactics."
(2) Example9-The Japanese Submarine Preliminary Deployment at the Battle of Midway
a. Situation
Due to the false preoccupation that before the attack to the Midway Island, the US fleet would never get underway from Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Submarines had not yet completed the deployment to the disposition line by 1st of June, 1942. When the Japanese Submarines completed to arrive at assigned patrol area, US carriers had already passed that disposition line.
b. Study
Adm. Nimitz described that the Japanese biggest false at the Battle of Midway was this submarine usage and if the Japanese Submarine had deployed to the disposition line before US Fleet getting underway from Pearl Harbor, Japanese Fleet would not have received the surprise attack from the US fleet and the result of the Battle would have been completely different. It is extremely regrettable that being put a spell of very much subjective preoccupation, that is, the US carriers would not emerge and forgetting doctrine to think the combat as time sequence, Japanese side did not pay attention properly to the surveillance and reconnaissance which is the most important issue of the war.
Afterword
I analyzed the Battle at sea during the Pacific War between the Japanese Navy and US navy from the Principle of War point of view. It is not clear how much and deep the battle planner of the Japanese Navy understood the principle of war. However, if they had implemented the operation taking into account or underlining these principle a little bit more, it seems that Japanese Navy would have been received higher reputation in the world sea battle history.
Especially, taking into account that at the Battle of the Midway many things were conducted successively not in accordance with the principle at all phases such as estimation, planning and implementation and led the Japan to tragic result, strongly recognized that the commander and staff have to study through the history of war how to apply these principles appropriately and timely and have to make sound military decision without self-righteous.
Reference:
1. "Sea Power", E. B. Potter and C. W. Nimitz
2. "History of the Pacific War", Saburou Toyama
3. "Kill Japs", E.B. Potter
4. "Why Japanese Imperial Navy Defeated", Syunniti Mita
5. "Strategy of Catastrophe", Tadao Morimoto
6. "Japan-US Sea Battle History", Syouzou Tamura
7. "The Pacific War", Jyo Kojima
8. "Japan and US Battle off Leyte", Kazunasa Satou
