IT Revolution and Defense Policies
by Kazumasa KOBAYASHI
Member of Defense Research Center, DRC
Introduction
In line with the IT revolution currently taking place throughout the world, the government of Japan has established the IT Strategic Headquarters. Changes in the environment are being further accelerated. Under this situation, can we afford to adhere to conventional defense policies and capabilities in the face of such revolutionary movements, even though their speed may not always be visibly high?
The “Platform of the Defense Plan in 1996 and Onwards” is considered a document reflecting the defense policies and positions of Japan. This platform, however, was compiled in the wake of the demise of the cold war, and therefore one could reasonably pose a question as to the extent to which consideration was given to the rapid development of IT revolution. This paper is intended to address challenges and issues calling for special attention, as well as the facets of the changes and moves which are particularly noteworthy.
1. In View of
Specific Threats
(1) Perception of Threats
In forming a defense policy , it is essential to closely analyze every possible threat that may do harm to national interest, without looking to tendentious approaches, whilst taking into account the actual and potential levels of national defense capability and mid- and long-term perspectives of conditions under which the country will be placed. In examining such threats, one should not be swayed by the perception of threats declared by the governments of other countries, since they tend to primarily focus on security strategies in international society and so place more emphasis on the propagandistic aspects of their policies.
In the United States, defense strategies are being reviewed under the mandate of Mr. Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense, envisioning diverse threats that range from extensive damage caused by weapons and missiles of mass destruction to a localized terror attack by a hostile nation. Japan on the other hand still predicates its policies on the assumption that large-scale military forces with nuclear capability will not cease to exist and that many countries will continue to expand and modernize their armed forces. In the area surrounding Japan, says the “Platform of the Defense Plan in 1996 and Onwards”, the Far East Forces of Russia may cut back on their war-fighting capability and downsize their military organizations, but the tension in the Korean Peninsula is likely to persist in the years to come. And yet, along with such unpredictable and uncertain factors, Japan sees a move towards harmonious and collaborative relationships between countries, as well as initiatives to enhance regional security through bilateral dialogues. According to the platform, the U.S.-Japan security arrangements will further reinforce the ties of the two countries and contribute to the security of Japan and international society.
(2) IT Revolution and Perception of Threats
The recent quickening of the IT revolution has been significantly affecting all types of activities, making for quick information sharing and dissemination in every area of our life. The aforesaid platform takes no account of threats that may arise out of this, as the emergence of today’s IT society was beyond prediction when it was compiled. For gaining a clear insight into threats this country may plausibly face in the near future, in-depth analysis and investigation is required with regard to changes in the situation that are now taking place in and around Japan due to the revolutionary movement of the IT. In the following pages, the author attempts to discuss changes in the nature of the threats that will take place in the wake of the IT revolution.
First, overall military threats, including nuclear weapons, are being relatively abated, in contrast to the growing threats of information warfare. Some critics say that the cold war was brought to an end due, partly, to the breakneck progress in IT and its far-flung effects on the public and private life of people. They are right in pointing out that wide and quick information sharing deters the occurrence of international conflicts, as it helps provide means for averting wars. Because the general public are now well aware of what is happening at home and elsewhere in the world, the national government alone cannot make a unilateral decision to make a war or otherwise operate their military forces but need to seek national consensus or international agreement. In Japan, too, where people have been benefiting from the advance of technology and enjoying economic well-being, the government has to be very careful in handling its defense capabilities, even though some of its neighbors are not likely to stop their military buildup. For a country where information is promptly and almost equably disseminated among the public, a primary concern is not so much the level of military power but an ability to support decision-making related to the military, an ability to support military operations, and an ability to counter threats that may disrupt the life of the people. While it is true that armed forces of neighboring countries will remain a threat, the probability of deploying and employing a military force is becoming lower because of wider information sharing. Accordingly, emphasis should be shifted to capability to handle potential threats originating from the power and misuse of information.
The second point to be noted with respect to the changes in the nature of threats pertains to the increase in attacks perpetrated by smaller organizations and groups and individuals, in addition to hostile nations. Today most industrialized countries do not consider it necessary to demonstrate their strength in terms of military capabilities. Instead, they now perceive the mounting necessity of making countermoves to terrorist strikes by extreme or fanatic religious sects and the violence of some NGO groups, such as those who went on a rampage in Venice against the G8 Summit last year. Like rogue countries that are developing and producing NCB weapons, these terrorists and militants aim to attack the economic and industrial infrastructures and prominent persons of target nations. This trend is expected to further intensify through global systems for information transmission and collection. Considering that Japan is heavily dependent on other countries for its economic subsistence, and also because its people are not alert to possible man-made disasters despite the relatively high level of usage and application of IT, the country may be even more vulnerable to the new types of threats. It should also be noted that Japan is ill-prepared to combat a threat posed by a smaller, less conspicuous organization.
The third point that needs attention is the immense variety of threats, which appears to be growing without limitation. With the remarkable advancement of IT, the means of attack have been extended from nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction to small-sized or intangible tools, including UAV and computer viruses. Targets of aggression are also being diversified from the national-level to the individual. Furthermore: information readily available through media can also be used as a tool of assault, constituting what is known as “asymmetrical threat”. The virtual lack of a nationally consolidated system in Japan to cope with such a variety of threats, combined with the unrestricted flow of information among its people, makes the challenge for this country formidable.
The fourth noteworthy change is the increased speed at which situations change once a threat is recognized. Being able to gather and analyze information much more quickly and accurately than before, troops equipped with C4ISR systems can not only wield weapons for precision attacks and thwarting an enemy but also turn to cyber warfare, doing damage to the enemy before combat begins. This type of war-fighting causes a situation to change very quickly on a global scale. If the level of IT used in a country is lower than that in its neighbors, their superior ability to utilize information should also be regarded as a threat to the country.
(3) Considerations Required in Formulating Defense Policies
Given the above-mentioned changes in the types and natures of threats, what considerations are required in the process of forming defense policies in Japan? First of all, procedures for analyzing threats should be in place. These include the preparation of multiple plausible scenarios revolving around a variety of threats that take into account the decision-making process of the subject countries, in addition to their war-fighting capability. Although some people advocate a method of starting analysis with a clean slate to prepare a full-scale war, this approach does not seem to be valid for dealing with present-day troops armed with advanced IT. Analytical studies, after all, are carried out for the purpose of identifying possible measures to grapple with likely contingencies.
Secondly, policy makers should not be directly involved in the analysis of threats, for they tend to be more interested in using the threats for a propaganda purposes coming to conclusions that serve their own political ends. In this respect, Japan should learn from the United States, where multiple research institutes are, at the behest of the DoD, engaged in the analysis to provide policy-makers with the results of objective, unbiased investigations to helping them make objective decisions about an adequate level of defense capability.
Consideration should also be
given to the reinforcement of measures for enhancing the capability to handle
information in line with increasingly diversified threats. In order to take quick action by consolidating national power in recognition
of the position of Japan in a complex and unstable international environment,
it is crucial to collect all relevant information and process them properly.
While progress in IT has been facilitating the collection of data and
information, much remains to be done in the development of human resources that
are capable of analyzing raw data and re-organizing it as information, as well
as discerning how the development of IT is related to emerging threats.
2. In Response
to National Strategies of the U.S.
(1) Current State of U.S.-Japan Relations
In December 1999, the U.S. President’s Office announced its “National Security Strategy Towards the New Century”, putting forward as national objectives ① maintaining international leadership, ②expanding the functions of democracy through active involvement and constructing a community of those having the same views, ③ mutual cooperation against common threats, ④ promoting economic development through free trade, ⑤ supporting the dignity of law, and ⑥ protecting human rights, to orient the efforts of American citizens.
As for Japan’s fundamental position concerning national security, Defense White Paper 2001 states that the peace and security of Japan can never be attained merely by wishing for them; they are achievable only through the implementation of comprehensive policies and measures for building its own defense capability and maintaining the U.S. -Japan security programs, as well as diplomatic undertakings to establish an internationally stable and peaceful environment as a basis for security.
Such stance is more specifically described in the U.S.-Japan Security Joint Declaration, which stresses the significance of the bilateral security arrangement by reiterating that ① the most effective framework for the defense of Japan is provided by close cooperation between the United States and Japan based on a combination of the adequate defense capability of the JSDF and bilateral security agreements, as Japan continues to rely on the U.S. deterrent pursuant to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, ② in order for Japan to retain the U.S. commitment, the current force structure consisting approximately of 100,000 troops for forward deployment should be maintained in the relevant areas, and ③ Japan should continue to provide facilities, areas and other types of support to the United States in accordance with the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
(2) Considerations in Forming Policies and Strategies
The primary consideration for Japan is related to the interoperability with the U.S. systems which feature the application of the most up-to-date IT. As the first step to ensure information sharing and the common perception and awareness of situations between the two countries, which are prerequisites for their effectively working together, issues regarding interoperability need to be identified and resolved. This task may be facilitated through, for instance, the participation of JSDF members in JWID, which serves to test and confirm the interoperability between the resources of the two countries. It should also be recognized that the interconnectivity of the systems of the U.S. Forces and the JDA to share “facts”, not “intelligence”, does not infringe the law that regulates the use of collective defense rights.
The second point to be considered is the acceleration of the decision-making process for operating the military capability of Japan, in view of the speed at which U.S. forces are deployed and employed today. This calls for the promotion of the development of the C4ISR, as well as a review of the current national organization for security. Efforts on the part of the JDA include the integration of the multiple command systems of the JSDF centering on the NCCS, with a view to performing prompt and appropriate operations jointly with the U.S. Forces according to the types of missions required.
Thirdly, the escalation of information warfare makes it imperative for Japan to form system security policies that are unified and consistent with those of the United States. Further progress in networking systems and closer linkage of the systems between the two countries gives rise to the necessity of more and more stringent security measures. Hackers today are ubiquitous, looking for opportunities to exploit security holes and vulnerability leading to the destruction of all systems. Therefore, bilateral efforts are required for the development of functions to constantly monitor the health of systems and to authenticate individual users, along with the establishment of common policies, operation manuals, and interface standards.
The fourth consideration is
connected to the perception that the peace of the whole world supported by the
U.S.-Japan security programs is crucial, particularly to Japan, as its
prosperity can be maintained for the most part through its economic and
financial activities deployed in overseas countries. In other words, the
security and well-being of its people is heavily dependent on the commitment of
the United States, which, after the implosion of the Soviet Union, has become
the only superpower that can afford to hold sway over the global situation. In
this context, the Japanese government should strive to have the United States
and other major countries recognize Japan’s specific contribution to world
peace through its defense capability.
The active use of a variety of media available today, including the
Internet, as well as activities and public relations at national level, would
lend itself to the creation and dissemination of a positive image of Japan.
3. National
Strategies and Defense Policies Widely Accepted by the Public
Lately the author was given an opportunity to study the process of developing U.S. national strategies. The study was then extended to investigation into comparable processes adopted in the U.K. and France and their documentation systems. Through this experience, the author learned that the general public in these countries are highly interested in, and well informed of, national defense strategies and policies. Many factors are believed to be contributing to such public awareness; people have better accessibility to information related national strategies by virtue of modern IT, which in turn allows the public to voice their views; politicians and administrators, who desire to win the support of citizens in their political campaigns, clearly express their views on national strategies; and they are also cognizant of the necessity to be fully aware of both domestic and international public opinion (CNN factors). In the United States, the President must announce the national strategies he advocates within 150 days of taking office, and ideas about strategies presidential candidates put forth during the election campaign have significant effect on the result of the election. Furthermore, unlike Japanese documents associated with strategies, ones publicized by the U.S. government are unclassified, and so any American citizen can readily access to them. On visiting one of the centers to train the commanders of large numbers of U.S. troops, the author heard that the trainees learn to make decisions in anticipation of reactions from many parts of the world, for the results of operations they command come to be globally known at an unprecedented speed through TV and other media. Japan should also realize the fact that today’s IT has virtually invalidated censorship or other types of restrictions on news media.
In such rapidly changing
circumstances, discernment and the ability to correctly interpret information
on the part of the general public is essential for the successful
implementation of measures for national security. The extensive use of Internet
causes the inundation of information reflecting the immense divergence of views
that challenge the official statement of the government. In the latest election
of the House of Council members, there was a sharp increase in the votes of
young people enthusiastically supporting Prime Minister Koizumi.
4.Developing
Defense Capability by the Functions
(1) Current Issues
The development of information and communications technology is also influencing the way of building a defense capability. To date, procedures for procuring equipment are such that the staff offices of the MSDF, ASDF and GSDF respectively make separate arrangements for requesting budgets; the requests are then reviewed by the relevant section of JDA for generating a preliminary request as the Agency, which further undergoes a series of reviews by the Ministry of Finance to become a draft request. This process is followed by the formulation of a government draft request, which is then discussed in a Diet session for finalizing the annual budget to acquire and maintain equipment. With different types of threats before us, however, these procedures centered upon organizations do not seem effective any longer in this age when information carries weight in defense as well. As was mentioned earlier, a situation in which our total military forces must be mobilized to fight against an enemy is highly unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future. Operations will be more concentrated in time and space, so that results of action can be produced in a shorter period of time. They also need to be more effective in deterring asymmetrical threats. To respond to these requirements, defense capability should be developed as a package whose composition and component functions are subject to scrutiny and analysis on the basis of realistic scenarios, without giving much heed to the interest of individual organizations. In the ongoing development of C4ISR systems, organizational barriers prevent, for instance, the integrated installation of sensors, because they are independently procured by the MSDF, ASDF and GSDF. A shift in the mind set of the JSDF is a pre-condition for preparing for emerging threats, as well as for promoting joint operation with the U.S. forces which feature highly advanced information and communications technology.
(2) Measures Required in an Information-Dominated Society
The first measure pertains to the establishment of an organized body, probably under the supervision of the cabinet, and the development of human resources conversant with information technology. Neither JDA organizations nor fully equipped troops of the JSDF alone can counter the diversified and complex threats of the present day. In developing human resources, emphasis should be placed on the users’ perspective, as the IT is tightly linked to the daily activities of human beings. Engineers and technicians specializing in information and communications technology tend to lose sight of the goal, being interested more in the means than the end.
As the second measure, system networks should be extended to facilitate information sharing, while developing defense capability in terms of functions, not organizational interest, to eliminate duplications. As the example of the sensors and the shooters demonstrates, interrelationships between different pieces of equipment and the interconnection of systems are becoming increasingly close. In a scenario reflecting plausible situations in the real world, systems and equipment are expected to work together in a dynamic way, regardless of their ownership. This is possible only when systems and equipment are developed based on the assumption that they are not to be operated independently of others but to work as integral parts of a whole. Helpful though science and technology may be in solving problems, one cannot rely on them in tackling issues related to the mentality of people and institutions.
The third measure of urgency is
the modification of procedures for requesting a defense budget. Instead of
following the current process described above, the Internal Bureau of the JDA
should review and discuss requirements raised by the respective SDF groups to form
a preliminary request which is broken down according to the function.
Subsequent to this step, equipment and systems to be managed and operated by
each of the SDF groups can be determined for budget allocation accordingly.
This approach will not only help significantly reduce duplicate capabilities
but also eliminate unseemly contention among the SDF groups to get a larger
slice of the budget than others. Furthermore, IT-related systems should be
treated as part of frontal equipment that is reviewed by the Security Council,
thereupon unifying a flow to expend the budget and a contract involving the IT.
This will lead to the enhanced commonality of specifications and make it
possible to “link and develop”, instead of “build and link”, the systems.
Conclusion
The dominance of information technology has brought about pronounced changes to our society, which in turn demands corresponding changes in the way of building and structuring our defense capability, as well as a shift in the mental attitude of the people towards national security. While debates among the public on the issues of collective security and the amendment of the constitution are gaining momentum, the Japanese government is more concerned with the reform of economic and financial structures to reactivate the economy. Considering the importance of the economy as a foundation of Japan, the government’s inclination towards economic policies, vis-à-vis defense strategies, is understandable, but the issue of national defense and security is even more fundamental to the life of the Japanese. In light of the progress in the permeation of IT and the resultant changes in elements related to security, in-depth discussions involving the general public are considered essential. In concluding this paper, the author would like to reiterate the necessity of expediting a structural reform in the field of defense to establish a national security scheme geared to the IT era that allows timely formulation and execution of defense policies and strategies.
