Problems about Defense Technical Research and Development

by Sadao KOBAYASHI
Member of Research Committee, DRC


Introduction

A new Mid-Term Defense Program (2001-2005) has been adopted, and the Program, on a budget of \ 25.16 trillion in total, has been put into action from this year. When we take a close look at the budget for Technical Research and Development of Defense Capabilities in the Program, the expenditure for the trial products, which brings the total up to \ 82.65 billion (contract-based), is included in the budget. As we reflect on a hard-pressed situation of national economy, national finance, and the business setback, the news of the huge budget for the technical R&D should be greatly appreciated.

The Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) have developed steadily under the slogan “The SDF to Be Trusted by, and Open to, the Citizens”, and today the SDF actively participate in the domestic and international activities. In recent years, many people argue that defense capabilities of the SDF should be strengthened, and at the same time vigorous discussion is going on about the following topics: the newer role of Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) of the Defense Agency, the procedures of military procurement, and the basic policy for the maintenance and development of the defense technical system. In this complicated situation, a set of “Guidelines for Research and Development—for the Purpose of Defense Technical Structure Build-up” has been set and released in June 2001. The Guidelines legislation is meant to formulate a “basic policy”, which “aims at the establishment of the Defense Technical System by carrying on the R&D of military equipment more effectively and efficiently.” Yet there is a serious flaw in the Guidelines; in other words, the Guidelines fail to express the practical plans explicitly.

In what follows, I will consider what is at stake and what is required for the promotion of technical R&D of defense capability; in my argument, I will examine the “Guidelines”, occasionally turning my experience in the SDF to account.

1. Preface to the Understanding of Problems

(1) Changing Nature of Threat

The year 1989, with the memorable scenes of people tearing down the Berlin Wall, marked the end of the Cold War, and it was followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union and by the democratizing movements of the Eastern European countries. Since then, the politics of international community has changed dramatically. The role of military might has also changed markedly in the changing world order. The military rivalry between the Warsaw Treaty Organization Forces led by the former Soviet Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Forces has become a thing of the past. In June 2001, President Bush Jr. proudly delivered a speech at the Warsaw University in Poland, “Russia is no longer the enemy of America, nor is America the enemy of Russia.” Nevertheless, even now, most countries are not free from international military threat. Japan, in particular, is put in a difficult situation; the Japanese government, at the time of the establishment of the SDF, failed to define the nature of external threat in strict and explicit senses, and up until the end of the Cold War, the government has planned its own strategy according to the policy to “support the U. S. centered-Western power blocs”. In the international situation today, though, unpredictability and uncertainty persist; for instance, in improving our defense capabilities, we have lost the concrete image of our potential enemy such as “Far Eastern Soviet Red Army”. Consequently, we seem to have lost as well the definite sense of national military objective and goal that we should attain. In the areas surrounding Japan, however, there still remain many unpredictable factors that make the political situations unstable. Therefore, we need to realize that we are actually pressed to consider seriously what problems are impending and by when those problems need to be solved, and decide what kinds of plan and strategy we should have for our national security.

(2) Increasing Duties of the Defense Agency and the SDF

Since the time when the National Police Reserve was established, the defense capabilities of Japan have been expected to work as deterrent, that is, we just needed to “show” the military capabilities we possessed. But since 1992 when the Peace Keeping Operation Cooperation Act was passed, the duties of the SDF have increased dramatically. For instance, today the cabinet discusses that the SDF should be assigned a mission to operate and guard the territorial ground and sea, as the Air SDF carries out the duty of taking the “actions against the trespass of the territorial air”; in other words, the international situation and the nature of military defense are changing more rapidly than expected. Therefore, what counts in this situation is that Japan should possess military capabilities to make an effective response to critical situations within a limited time, and in doing so, the SDF are expected to take flexible yet affirmative actions. Moreover, today’s military equipment is getting larger in size, systemize and more complicated in kind. Furthermore, as regards the needs to prepare for the information battle and the soft-attack against national information network such as cyber-terrorism, the current level of Japan’s military capabilities is far from satisfactory. Seen in this light, what the Defense Agency needs to do urgently is to restructure the system of Defense Technical R&D as well as reconsider the studies conducted in the TRDI.

(3) Technical Development of the Private Enterprises

Although the former Japanese Imperial Army and Navy, which were disintegrated after WWⅡ, maintained a high level of achievement in the production of military equipment and the promotion of military technology. When the defense industry revived after a short blank period, its technology turned out to be inferior to the industrial technology of the U. S. and the European countries. With the establishment of the SDF, though, the domestic military equipment was gradually developed, but the technical level of the private enterprises in those days did not fulfill the expectation and demands of the SDF. Therefore, Japanese industrial technology has strived to develop its own technology by adopting the latest technology through the order of the license products of the U. S. weapons. At the same time, Japanese defense industry has improved its own technology by applying it to products for civilian use and going through the severe evaluation of the consumers. As a result of such contrivance and efforts of Japanese private enterprises, the level of today’s Japanese technology is highly evaluated; though there still remain some problems concerning the application standard/criteria and the differences in lifecycle assessment, the time is ripe for the application of Japanese technology to the military equipment and systems.

2. Defense Technical Research and Development and Its Problems

(1) Problems about Japan’s Defense Policy

Despite the fact that the Defense Agency and the SDF are the organizations that perform the most important duties of the country, national security, they haven’t succeeded in passing “the National Security Act” (provisional name) and thereby haven’t established a definite policy about national security. The problems about Japan’s national defense, including those concerning technical R&D, consist precisely in this point, that is, a sense of uncertainty attached to the establishment of “the National Security Act.” The establishment of national security requires the introduction of the advanced and sophisticated technology as well as the development of military technology; however, the Japanese government and the authorities concerned do not realize the points I mentioned above, nor do they have the will to break the current impasse. For example, as regards nuclear technology, it is certainly important for Japanese, as the only nation that has experienced the destructive power of the atomic bomb, to alert the public to its terror. More important thing, however, is that we should be engaged in studies of national defense and that we put them to practical use. But unfortunately we Japanese tend to hold back when it comes to the issues concerning nuclear arms. To raise a good example, recall the admirable performance of the Ground SDF at the sarin-related incident in the Tokyo subway provoked by the AUM Shinrikyo members; it seems natural for the Defense Agency to conduct research into the biological and chemical as well as nuclear weapons.

There are also other major problems that need to be solved urgently. Geographically speaking, Japan neighbors the countries that pose a potential threat to our national security; therefore, the Japanese have been fully aware of the need to get reliable information. Artificial satellite, for example, is an effective and dependable means of gathering information, and it seems quite natural, from the financial as well as practical point of view, to constantly monitor areas/spots concerned from an artificial satellite which stays somewhere in space. However, emphasizing the principle to leave outer space in peace, the Diet has repeatedly declined the use and possession of artificial satellites for the purpose of national defense (May 9, 1969, at the Main Conference of the House of Representatives). It was only after the North Korean missile had been blasted off that the Diet gave its consent to the launch of domestic artificial satellite in order to obtain information.

From the examples above, it is clear that the government does not take any action, nor does it take any decisive measures unless our country is faced with an impending, grave menace. Who are to blame? The “happy-go-lucky” who think that they can maintain world peace as long as they continue calling for the importance of peace might be the ones, and there are also some Diet members who think the problems can be solved by “revising” the “interpretation” of the texts of the Constitution and never try to accomplish a radical reform of them. These are some of the barriers we should break through to improve Japan’s defense policy and systems of defense technical R&D.

(2) Problems within the Systems of the Defense Agency and the SDF

As I discussed above, after WWⅡ, followed by a short blank period, Japanese technology and weapon production lagged far behind other countries. During the initial period in the history of the SDF, the Defense Agency has set taking orders of the U. S. license products (military equipment provided by MAP) as the goal and thereby aimed at introducing the latest defense technology from the U. S. to our country. It can be easily assumed, therefore, that each SDF had no choice but to determine which military equipment to use, according to the quality and characteristics of the U. S. military equipment. Moreover, Japan has received the full support of the U. S. and the U. S. Forces (USF) in all technical fields; following the U. S. model, the Defense Agency decided most of the matters concerning the adoption of equipment, technology, systems, and operating rules of the USF. The USF also gave us technical instruction whenever necessary, and sold or provided the products whenever we requested. Therefore, even today, Japan’s dependence on the U. S. and the USF still persists; Japan’s dependence seems quite inevitable when we reflect on the history of the SDF. That may be why the Defense Agency does not expect the TRDI to be attentive to the changing needs from Japanese society and from the new world order as long as the TRDI plays a modest and subsidiary role within the systems of the Defense Agency and the SDF.

Closer collaboration between technical R&D and the unit operation should be promoted more seriously, for they play a key role in the most important fields for the maintenance of national security. Unless the Defense Agency and the TRDI put more emphasis on the distribution of resources to limited essential subjects and become alert to the changing practical needs from each SDF, in the near future there should emerge a gravely critical situation in which technical R&D projects performed at the TRDI do not satisfy, nor will they be related to, each SDF’s practical demands.

(3) Problems within the System of Technical Development

The TRDI, was established in August 1952, the only research institution of the Defense Agency, as the research center approved by the Security Agency Act, and after going through restructuring stage by stage, we have the TRDI of today.

The TRDI consists of three administrative departments, four departments in charge of R&D programs, five research centers and five test centers. The four departments (in charge of ground, naval, air and guided weapon systems respectively) are engaged mainly in each R&D activities as planning, designing and prototype production.

When the TRDI was first established, each SDF was probably busy studying how to use the U.S. military equipment for the performance of its own duties. Fifty years have passed since then, and now the duties of the SDF are increasing as I discussed above; for the performance of the increasing duties of the SDF, it has become essential to increase and train personnel and to increase the supply of military equipment. Thus the Ground, Maritime and Air SDF, just as many foreign military organizations, has become a rather self-enclosed organization, always paying keen attention primarily to strengthening its own systems.

When we turn to the technical R&D carried on in the TRDI, the TRDI has worked on the build-up of its own research systems so that high-tech products can be managed on its own. For example, the Ground SDF restructured Ground Research and Development Center in 2000; it unified the research institutions of each special vocational school and the Ground Test and Evaluation Command that used to be placed under the direct control of the Director of the Defense Agency. As a result, the research center of the GSDF developed into a large-scale R&D institution, constituted by 550 staff (2000). The Maritime SDF does not have an institution solely intended for R&D, but the MSDF has the Fleet Training and Development Command (for naval vessels) and the Air Development Squadron 51 in Atsugi (for aircraft) that exercise the function of R&D. The Air SDF, when it was radically restructured in 1989 on the function basis, organized the Air Development and Test Command; it has developed into a large-scale organization for development and testing that carries out the extensive, high-tech functions that cover the fields of aeromedicine, human engineering and missiles.

In “the Guidelines for Research and Development”, the present function of the TRDI seems “significant”, while the task of the SDF is regarded as “acquiring know-how about how to accumulate, utilize, and distribute the resources for R&D, aircraft, guided weapons more effectively and efficiently.” This view, however, is quite superficial. Nowadays each SDF is placing a higher demand for technical R&D every year, and the TRDI is consequently obliged to limit the number of R&D projects to be carried on each year. As a result, it frequently happens that the requested R&D projects are not completed on time. To put it differently, the timing of the completion of the requested R&D projects, that should be carried out in accordance with the requests and the plan for the maintenance of military power on the requestor’s side, fails. Although the Defense Agency recognizes the fact that each SDF may strengthen its own for R&D activities and intends to further “discuss and determine how the R&D System of the Defense Agency should function,” in reality the Defense Agency is not willing to introduce drastic reform into the principle, “the TRDI should play a central, key role in technical development”. In this way, while the SDF are in the process of carrying out the radical reforms of their own R&D systems, the Defense Agency and the TRDI, though expected to take action accordingly, actually do not undertake the reforms urged by the SDF. This way of thinking seen in the attitudes of the Defense Agency and the TRDI is apparently out of date, and the fact that they fail to meet the demands of the units may cause a serious problem.

(4) Problems about the Budget Distribution

R&D spending of Defense Agency generally refers to prototype manufacturing, study and research by contracts. R&D spending is kept at around 3 % of the total defense budget, and to attain the goal to raise R&D spending up to 5 % of the total defense budget, we still have a long way to go. The prototype products spending, which takes the most of R&D spending and the spending is around \110 billion per year in past few years, is spent on the military equipment development project requested by the SDF. In cases where such a large-scale project as the development of aircraft is newly carried out, this spending increases; yet when we take a close look at each item-based spending, a great amount of consignment spending is supposed to be spent on the large-scale project mentioned above. For instance, when the ASDF requested the budget for the development of F-2 support fighter, the requested development required 20% of the fiscal test products spending. As a result, only a small amount of the budget was allowed for the rest of R&D items until the requested development was completed. In the above circumstances, even the ASDF itself was forced to give up requests other than the F-2 project. In the Mid-Term Defense Program adopted lately, for the first time in the history of the Defense Agency, the requests for two large-scale projects, that is, the MSDF’s MPA and the ASDF’s C-X, were accepted. A part of each SDF’s budget shall be transferred to R&D spending, but it seems inevitable that the competition for the R&D spending will heat up inside each SDF. To put it differently, from 2001 to 2005, 46 % (average) of the TRDI’s prototype products spending will be spent on the development of MPA and C-X mentioned above, and as a consequence, the plan for R&D in other areas such as aircraft will be gravely affected. Furthermore, the budget deficit may accordingly cause difficulties in putting the military operation program and the Defense Program into practice.

3. Policy for Improvement

(1) Establishment of Defense Policy in Concert with National System

Japan’s status in international society has risen prominently for the past decade, and the SDF started to actively participate in international peace keeping activities. At the same time, what has come to the fore is the fact that the SDF, though they deserve it, have not achieved recognition as the most important organization in Japan that possesses the largest military capabilities. The lack of recognition has occasionally caused some inconvenience to the actual operation of the units; as a result, wide-ranging debate on defense, including discussion over the revision of the Constitution of Japan, is conducted heatedly.

Up until the end of the Cold War, defense capability worked as deterrent, and it was not supposed to manifest itself outwardly. Yet as the duties of the SDF increase, defense capability is now expected to play an important role in international as well as domestic contribution; today the SDF discharge manifold duties such as military combat, humanitarian support, and the dispatch of rescue corps to the locations of disasters. And because of the national fiscal setback, the defense budget has stopped being treated as “untouchable”; the Defense Agency is expected to structure defense capabilities efficiently and effectively by cutting down various costs. Structuring of defense capabilities, however, should be considered as a national project that can be carried on with the support of all the branches within the national system. As the expectation for and the range of activities of the SDF increase, the definition of national security and the whole defense policy should be reconsidered and reestablished. The development of defense technology should be especially promoted, for it has much in common with the technology of private enterprises; it should be counted as a part of national technical program. Related legal matters should be structured as well, so that public institutions, private industry, and academic institutions could collaborate in order to structure defense capabilities as the Guideline rightly says, “Efforts should be made for the promotion of R&D from a national strategic point of view.” Only when the collaboration among various institutions mentioned above is accomplished, can the Defense Program develop into a national project aiming at the enhancement of national technology.

(2) Technical R&D and Improvement upon the Division of Responsibility

Today the TRDI is the only institution where technical R&D is carried on exclusively; each SDF is in charge of the less advanced part of R&D business that does not entail risk, such as technical improvement upon each own military equipment. However, as I discussed earlier, the duties of the SDF are dramatically changing in nature, and it is becoming increasingly important that the SDF promote the R&D that match closely with the speed and content of the unit operation. The best way to do this is that each SDF take the responsibility for the maintenance and management of own equipment through its lifecycle. That can be successfully achieved when the R&D staff “dispatched” from each SDF to the TRDI (300 persons = 24 % of the TRDI members) is transferred back to each SDF, and they can help each SDF expand its potential to carry on R&D; they can also help the SDF officials with the operation of military equipment. To attain the goal I argued for above, there still remains a problem concerning the budget; it is necessary to let each SDF prepare a budget on its own as the TRDI does; that is, each SDF should be able to determine the management of its own spending such as the test products spending and the evaluation of test products. In this way, it will be possible for the SDF to maintain a more flexible system in which they can make a budget according to their own defense plans, their own speed of operation, and their own R&D activities.

(3) Promotion of Basic Defense Study and Positivistic Study of Technology

As the basic policy for the defense program was looked over again, a new idea called “technical demonstration” was introduced. The definition of the new term is rather unclear; also, the new idea, though introduced with hopeful future prospects, does not seem to have been conducted in a swift manner. A large number of projects that were supposed to be examined from the perspective of the “technical demonstration” are left unfinished. A project called “technical, positivistic airplane” is one such example. This project is an ambitious and serious attempt to prepare for the next fighter-type plane plan, though whether Japan will produce exclusively domestic fighter plane is open to question. Even if Japan were to import foreign fighter, the presence of this project could function as bargaining power when the government negotiates with foreign countries. And if the time comes when fighter can be developed domestically, this project will make an important contribution to its development by shortening the terms required for the development and reducing the spending and some risks. It may take long for this project to bring adequate results; the result of the research may not contribute to the production of test products in a direct sense. However, this project, though seemingly unprofitable, has to be maintained and supported continuously. After WWⅡ Japanese universities and colleges completely abolished the military science department, and now studies related to military science can be conducted only within the system of the Defense Agency. In this closed circumstance, what the TRDI should do is to steadily promote such projects and research, evaluate their results, database useful information obtained from the project and research, and organize the evaluation system required therein.
(4) Needs for Dialogue with Defense-Related Private Enterprises and the Reconstruction of Cooperative Relationship

As is analyzed in “the Guidelines for R&D”, the Defense Agency is confronted with a number of domestic and international problems arising out of the changing international situation. To raise a few examples, defense spending tends to be curtailed, and more importantly, the Defense Agency lacks a definite vision of what defense technology should be. Furthermore, it is said that in some private enterprises that used to have business connections with the Defense Agency and the SDF, withdrawal from the defense industry is under study because investment in the defense field is regarded as unprofitable. Their withdrawal from the defense industry, if it is true, means a serious loss to the country as well as the Defense Agency. The Defense Agency, though, will have to depend on the technology and productivity of private enterprises more heavily in the future, since in the present situation the Defense Agency is obliged to spend most of its budget on the large-scale aircraft R&D and cannot afford to invest in R&D of other fields. It is highly recommendable, therefore, to urge private enterprises that have the capabilities to carry on the applicable research, development, and production to enter into the technical R&D in the defense industry. In that case, the Defense Agency has to organize a system (such as competitive system in the test products production introduced in the next battleship DD-21 project for the U.S. Navy) in which both the public sector and the private sector could profit.

Recently the Ethics Act has been passed because of a marked deterioration in public servants’ sense of ethics. As a result, the relation between the public sector and the private sectors in the defense industry came to be severely regulated, but the necessary dialogue and cooperative relationship are unregulated. Important national enterprises must not be ruined by the unethical conduct of some offenders. The Defense Agency should build up trust by establishing a fruitful dialogue with, and strengthening the cooperative relationship with, the private enterprises. The key to the thoughtful, useful defense technical R&D lies in the Defense Agency’s thorough understanding of the demands from the units and of the capabilities of private enterprises.


Conclusion

The “Guidelines for Research and Development” is a manifestation of its policy on defense technical R&D, and setting of the Guidelines legislation should be highly appreciated for its epoch-making attempt. The Guidelines assign high priority to certain fields, call for the needs to promote the interchanges of personnel and technology with foreign countries as well as private enterprises, and thereby diversify the R&D systems; the Guidelines will be followed in the future. Nevertheless, there are some serious problems with the Guidelines. The scope and depth of the study in the Guidelines are not thorough enough, and their idea of technical R&D focuses only on the TRDI, that is, the defense technical R&D is not considered in terms of its relation with the unit operation of the SDF and their capabilities to perform duties. In other words, the Defense Agency does not recognize that the development of military equipment should be carried on with due consideration for the unit operation of each SDF. There is also a certain tendency in the Guidelines to attempt to defend the structure and system of the Defense Agency. Most importantly, the Guidelines do not take into consideration that the SDF’s duties and their speed of operation are changing as the international situation is undergoing significant changes, and the Defense Agency fails to take measures to adapt to the changes. The system of the Defense Agency should turn into a more dynamic, flexible one. Yet the Defense Agency does not seem to be aware of it, nor does it attempt to deal with the fact that the SDF are not satisfied with the way the technical R&D projects are carried out. Furthermore, the Guidelines only vaguely discuss by when certain reforms should be accomplished; therefore, it is feared that the same Guidelines will continue to be applicable for ten or more years. In that case, the R&D projects pursued in the TRDI will be more and more alienated from the actual operations taking place in the SDF.

The domestically developed military equipment used to be considered “poor in quality and expensive”; today it is “good in quality but expensive”. It may be inevitable that the development cost and production cost of the domestic products tend to be high compared to the similar foreign military equipment. However, the quality level of defense technical R&D attained through the continual efforts of these fifty years should not be underrated; it should be put to practical use. The Defense Agency should explicate measures for the improvement of the current situation and carry them out as soon as possible.