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Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements and

Mutual Exchanges of Equipment and Technology

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by Masahiro SHIGEMURA
Member of Research Committee, DRC

1. The History of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements

On 8 September 1951 Japan and the Allied Countries made the San Francisco Peace Treaty and declared the termination of hostilities. At the same time Japan and the United States of America made the security arrangement (Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America), thus Japan established the bases of national security. But this pact was made under the special condition of the post-war confusion; it had some defects on the viewpoint of the autonomy as the independence country. Therefore, in 1957 Prime Minister Kishi visited to U.S.A. and started the negotiation for the revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. And after three years negotiation Japan and U.S.A. reached to the agreement of the new pact (the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America). Since then this pact is in automatic continuation.

In April 1996, The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security summing up the achievements of the relationship between two countries was issued by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan and President Bill Clinton of the United States as the relationship between the two countries was one of the most successful alliance in the world. In this Joint Declaration the two leaders announced that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty had been contributing to not only the world peace and the stability of the Asia-Pacific region but also the prosperous environment of this region.

The National Defense Program Outline which was adopted in November 1995 describes that the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement is indispensable to ensuring the security of Japan, and they will continuously play an important role in ensuring peace and stability of the region surrounding Japan, in building a more stable security environment. In order to enhance the credibility of the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement and to improve the effectiveness of their functions, the Outline states that it is necessary to implement various policy measures such as �@Exchanges of information and policy consultation, �AEstablishment of effective cooperation posture in operation area including joint study, joint exercise and training, and mutual support, �BStrengthening of mutual exchange in the area of technology and equipment, �CMaking appropriate contribution to the maintenance of U.S. Force in Japan.

Related to �@Exchange of information and policy consultation, there are many channels such as the Security Consultative Committee(SCC), the Security Subcommittee(SSC), Security Consultative Group(SCG) and Sub-committee for Defense Cooperation(SDC). Concerning to �AEffective cooperation posture, the Japan Self Defense Forces(JSDF) and the U.S. Forces have conducted for many years various joint exercises. The Joint Staff Council, the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF), the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), and the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) have been training their units for various actions necessary for taking coordinated actions with their U.S. counterparts for the defense of Japan, and have been carrying out coordinated joint exercises with the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) each year since 1985 for the purpose of improving their capability of carrying out coordinated joint operations. And saying to �CMaking appropriate contribution to maintenance of USFJ, the facilities and area provided to USFJ are bases for their activities, and the smooth and stable use of such facilities and areas are elements essential to the maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement, and to enhancement of their credibility. So, Government of Japan has been trying to provide with funds more than 20 billion dollars every year for USFJ.

In the area of �BMutual exchanges of technology and equipment, “The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States” provides the framework for the mutual cooperation between two countries. Pursuant to the principle of the mutual cooperation, Japan should positively promote the cooperation with the United States in matter relating to the equipment and the technology, while paying due attentions to the maintenance of its technological and production bases. But in this area the cooperation is not so active compared to other areas.

2. The History of Mutual Cooperation in the Area of Equipment and Technology

In June 1950, following to the outbreak of the Korean War, the Headquarter of Allied Nation ordered to organize the Police Reserve Force of 75,000 personnel and provided with many weapons to the forces. And then in 1952 the Maritime Force was organized, in 1954 the Air Force was organized too, and many battle ships and fighting aircrafts were provided to those forces. Therefore, JSDF were equipped with U.S. weapons from the start point.

Those supports from U.S. Government was provided as free loans through the Special Far East Command Reserve Program by U.S. Far East Army, and then they were succeeded to the Military Assistance Program based on “The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States”. The battleships were transferred to Japan based on the loan agreement on ships between Japan and the United States, which was succeeded to the agreement of US battleships loan between Japan and the United States. The total of those supports came to 44.9% for the free loan and 2.2% for the charged loan in the total procurement of the equipment from 1950 to 1961 in Japan. This fact showed that Japanese weapons supply was relied on the United States.

This Military Assistance was decreased gradually as the Japanese defense production systems were established. At the US policy change of dollar defense the free loan assistance had been decreased rapidly and the system of the assistance was transferred to the new system which was called “Foreign Military Sale” (FMS). In December 1963, the United States decided to close “Military Assistance Program” to advanced nations, so, the assistance to Japan ended too, and Japan received the last weapons of U.S. Military Assistance in 1965.

On the other hand Japan had begun to produce battleships in 1953, and aircrafts in 1954. So Japan could procure the domestic produced weapons. In 1970 the Government of Japan adopted “The Basic Policy for the Production and the Development of Equipment in the Domestic Industries”, and owing to this policy they had accelerated to research, develop and produce defense equipments by own self inside Japan, that were suitable for JSDF doctoring and Japanese terrain. Moreover in 1976, JSDF established a “National Defense Program Outline” (Old Taikou) which described to promote the domestic production of equipments with the overall consideration for the performance and the cost, the expanded procurement capability at the emergency and the easiness for the training. But the real circumstances of the domestic production were the licensed production from the United States such as fighters ( F-104, F-4, F-15 ), anti-aircraft missiles (Hawk, Patriot), helicopters (OH-6, UH-1, UH-60, AH-1S, AH-64) and battleships (Azis System). Thus, Japan has relied the defense technology on the United States.

On the other hand Japan had not transferred any weapons and any military technology to the United States, because GOJ has adopted the Three Principles on Arms Export.

3. The History of the Arms Export Prohibition

(1) The Three Principles on Arms Export

After the WW�U, Japanese industries could export military equipment to any country under the permission of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) according to the Exchange Control Low and the Export Control Low. But following to the intension of the Cold War they were going to prohibit exporting the weapons to the Communist Block.

In this circumstances Prime Minister Sato declared the Three Principles on Arms Export at the House of Representatives, namely, GOJ does not permit to export any weapons to the countries as follow.

�@The Communist Block

�AThe country which the United Nations is prohibiting to export weapons

�BThe country which is under or in danger of international conflict

This Three Principles on Arms Export itself does not prohibit exporting weapons to other countries except the countries as mentioned above.

(2) The United View of the Cabinet on Arms Export

The United View of the Cabinet concerning to the mentioned-above Three Principles on Arms Export was announced by Prime Minister Miki on 27 February 1976 at the House of the Representatives. The contents of the announcement were as follow.

Japan as the peace nation has dealt carefully with the export of weapons to avoid the progress of the international conflicts, and from now on Japan will deal with the export of weapons according to the following policy and does not accelerate to export weapons.
�@GOJ will not permit to export weapons to the countries described in the Three Principles on Arms Export.
�ATo other countries GOJ will refrain from exporting weapons related to the spirit of the Constitution and the Exchange Low.
�BThe machineries and facilities of producing weapons is treated as same as weapons.

By this United Views of the Cabinet Japan cannot export any weapons and related items to any countries. And after the case that one company violated this policy Japanese Diet accused strongly the case, and made the new Resolution on Arms Export.

(3) The Diet Resolution on Arms Export Ban

The Resolution on Arms Export that was adopted at the House of Representatives on 20 March 1981, and at the House of Councilors on 31 March 1981 were as following.

“On the concept of the Japanese Constitution as the Peace Nation, Japan has dealt with the Arms Export to other country carefully, but it has occurred a regrettable case that they violated this policy. Therefore GOJ should take appropriate measures to accomplish the policy.”

So, the arms export to other countries was prohibited completely by the United View of the Cabinet and the Diet Resolution on Arms Export.

4. The Transfer of Military Technology to the United States

According to the rapid progress of the Japanese science and technology in the sector of steel, electronics, automobile and semiconductor, the Japanese products had been exceeded the U.S. products in the U.S. market, so, the trade friction and the technology friction have occurred between Japan and the United States.

And the criticism had appeared that Japan has transferred the U.S. military technology, which Japan has learned through the licensed productions of weapons from the United States, to the civil production sector. That criticism was reasonable because the flow of weapons and military technology was one way from the United States to Japan. So, the United States began to restrict the transfer of weapons and military technology to Japan. At the same time the United States demanded to transfer the Japanese military and related production technology to U.S.

In June 1982 the Government of United States requested the mutual exchange of military technology between Japan and U.S., and in January 1983 GOJ decided to transfer the military technology to U.S. as the exception of the Three Principles and the Diet Resolution on Arms Export, to make the Japan-U.S. security relationship more effective.

On 8 November 1983, the governments of the two countries concluded the Agreement for the Transfer of the Military Technology to U.S. Based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and in November 1984, the Joint Military Technology Committee was established as the consulting organization of the two countries.

But this decision is regulating only the military technology transfer, so it makes much issues for the effective mutual military technology transfer and further more co-development, co- production in advance.

5. The Issues Related to Keiko SAM and FSX

As the first case of the military technology transfer, the portable SAM (Keiko SAM) was nominated to the candidate of the transfer. The U.S. Army has the STINGER as the portable SAM, but this missile chases the infrared ray which the jet engine generate, so this missile does not engage to the front of the fighter. On the other hand Keiko SAM has the ability of image homing created by CCD, so this missile can engage the fighter to the front.

The United States requested this image homing technology transfer to U.S., and after the tuff negotiation related to the partial charge of the development cost, the technological know-how fee and the production cost of the prototype, the governments of the two countries reached to the detail agreement.

But, in 1987 the Toshiba Machinery Company Scandal, which violated the COCOM Cord, came out to public and the Government of the United States prohibited the procurement of all Toshiba products. And the transfer of the Keiko SAM technology which Toshiba developed and produced was forbidden too. So the first case of the military technology transfer did not realize.

The development of the Japanese Next Generation Fighter (FSX) became the controversial issue between two countries because of the Japan-U.S. trade friction.

The United States aerospace industry felt the technology threat to the Japanese developed fighter, so, the U.S. government and U.S. aerospace industry opposed to develop the Japanese own fighter. After the several negotiations Japan compromised to give up development of the fighter on Japanese own self, and Japan decided to co-develop the fighter with U.S. based on the U.S. fighter F-16.

But there were many problems such as the work-share of the development and the production and the technology transfer between two countries. One of the biggest problems was the releasability of the F-16 newest source-code.

Basically this project was abnormal that U.S. had no intention to adopt this co-developed fighter to the U.S. Air Force, and U.S. had cooperated with Japan to develop and produce Japanese FSX by Japanese Fund, so this project was deferent to the pure co-development. But this is the first case of Japan-U.S. co-development and at the same time it has remained many problems afterwards.

Having many problems, following military technologies were transferred to U.S.

�@Technology for the construction of U.S. Naval vessels and for remodeling ships

�ATechnology related to the co-operative research and production in FSX 

�BTechnology related to the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) to be installed on the P-3C

�CTechnology related to the joint research on a “Ducted Rocket Engine”

�DTechnology related to the joint research in “Advanced Steel Technology”

�ETechnology related to the “Ceramic Engine” for the fighting vehicle

�FTechnology related to the “Eye-Safe Laser Radar”

�GTechnology related to the co-operative modification of ACES�UEjection Seat

�HAdvanced Hybrid Propulsion Technology

�IAcoustic technology in shallow sea water

�JJoint Research on Theater Missile Defense (TMD)

�KTechnology related to the High Safety Propulsion

Essentially the military technology is developed on the assumption that the technology is utilized to develop and produce military equipments. But under the present condition that the transfer is limited to the technology exceptional for the Three Principles on Arms Export, there are many restrictions to carry out the technology transfer.

For instance U.S. can not export the weapons to other countries which are produced using the transferred technology from Japan, and U.S. can not use the co-developed technology on Theater Missile Defense to produce the equipment for the National Missile Defense (NMD), because it is incompatible with the Japanese Policy related to the ban of the collective defense. So, there are many issues which two countries have to solve.

6. The Present Condition of Japanese Defense Industry

Over the ten years, there has been the opacity and uncertainty lingered in the international situation after the end of the East-West Cold War, the rigidity of the national finances after the collapse of the Economic Bubble, the suppression of the procurement fund for equipments and the prolonged economic depression, these factors have caused to consume the strength of the defense industries, and this trend will continue for a while.

Japan has forbidden the export of weapons and defense technology, so the customer of the defense industry is limited to Japan Defense Agency (JDA) only. Therefore The Japanese defense industry has been producing many items but small amount with low productivity, and these amounts of the production are swayed by the defense budget.

Moreover, JDA is now promoting the procurement reforms, and one of the reforms is to request the 10% reduction of production cost to the defense industries.

And the unlimited introduction of the competitive bid system has caused the price race that they disregard the performance of the equipments, so-called “lower cost, but lower performance”. At the same time those excessively competitive price races is exhausting the bases of the defense industries, and some of them will retire from defense business.

(In U.S. the defense industries make the severe competitive race, but they compete not the Price but the Performance.)

JDA does not retain the bases of military technology and the production facilities such as the arsenal in its organization, so JDA relies those “military industrial power” on the private enterprises. And the fact that those “military industrial power” becomes weak and is in the critical condition shows the weak point for Japanese total security policy.

Getting rid of these critical situations it is necessary to improve the strength of the “military industrial power” and soundness of the private enterprises. So, GOJ has to execute such policy as the tax exemption, the financial support, the lease of government facilities, the maintenance of the technical expert for defense industries and assistances for the merger. And it is important to open the co-development and co-production with allied countries.

7. The U.S. Strategy for Co-development and Co-production

The U.S. Army has been pursuing the science and technology strategy for co-development and co-production with allied countries in six categories as follow.

�@The data exchange program

�AThe exchange program for the technical experts

�BThe standardization effort of weapon systems for the allied countries

�CThe international cooperation for the co-development and the co-production

�DThe co-development of the new technology, equipments and weapon systems

�EThe test and evaluation of foreign country’s weapons

And after the success of the co-development, the U.S. Army moves to the co-production.

JDA is now conducting the co-development and joint research in several categories, but JDA is behind compare with other allied countries, so it is important to promote these policy more aggressively.

8.The Revision of the Policy for the Ban of the Weapon Export

The defense industries are in the severe conditions by the increase of the research and development cost, and the rise of the weapon price because of the high performance of the weapon and small amount of production. Those trends are similar in the world, and they are trying to resolve those problems by the reduction of the R&D cost, the shortening the R&D term, the cost down of the unit price and the introduction of the high performance weapon systems from foreign countries. And they are trying to pursue the co-development and co-production with allied countries.

Japan has to activate the co-development and co-production with U.S. to equip the high performance weapons effectively under the severe budget restriction. So, Japan can shorten the R&D term, cut down the cost, reduce the unit price by increase of the production amount and standardize the parts by sharing the development and production areas which each countries have the strong points just as the commercial aircraft areas. These methods will increase the interoperability of the two countries and will contribute to strengthen the credibility of Japan-U.S. security arrangement.

Moreover Japanese defense industries can retain the stable customers and keep the amounts of production. And Japan can expect to improve the performance of the weapons through using and evaluating them by the foreign forces, and then the Japanese weapon systems will become more high performance and Japanese defense industries will become more active.

To activate the co-development and the co-production, Japan should revise the policy of the Arms Export Ban. It was reported that the North Korea submarine wrecked at South Korean ashore was equipped with many electric parts made in Japan. Those parts were exported to North Korea as the civil use equipments. Thus, there are no distinctions between the military use and civil use, and the Arms Export Ban Policy become nominal today but become harmful to the credibility for Japan-U.S. security arrangement. So it is very important that Japan should adopt the new policy that Japan can put the co-development and co-production with U.S. in operation. This new policy will correspond to the Japanese National Interest and increase the credibility of Japan-U.S. security arrangement.

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