Absence in Japan of Long-Term Strategic Policy Thinking

by Tetsuo TAMAMA
Senior Researcher, DRC


Introduction: How the Absence Has Come to Be Felt

That there is no long-term strategic policy thinking in Japan is a bold statement indeed, made in a considerable hesitation. A decade's experience of this author at the DRC, seven years of which as a full-time policy researcher at this fledgling think tank, however tend to drive him to this feeling.

An article of this kind should naturally provide proof for each statement, but it has not yet attained that status; several instinctive hypotheses will be supplied instead, then the cases that seem to support them will be cited. Instinctive yet endorsed by the author's experiences in his DRC years as well as those at the industry that precede them, the hypotheses hopefully are subject to readers' responses, pro or con, for the purpose of further refinements.

The subject will be treated in the following order.

Hypothesis 1: Japanese culture pays for goods but not for brains.
Hypothesis 2: Japanese policy thinking is left to 'councils'; there are no experts.
Hypothesis 3: In other countries there are many experts in government-sustained think tanks.
Hypothesis 4: Japanese views are often absent in international arena.
Hypothesis 5: Other countries incorrectly speculate that Japan cannot be without long-term thinking.
Hypothesis 6: Absence of long-term thinking results in regarding the future as mere extension of the past.
Hypothesis 7: Absence of long-term thinking sometimes results in impulsive grave decisions.
Conclusion: Ways must be found for Japan to pay for brains.

Note: Theycaseszare quoted with abridgments and excerptions as necessary.


1. Japanese Culture Pays for Goods but not for Brains

One essential part of the DRC activities is visits to and discussions at overseas think tanks, based on which Dr. Naruhiko Ueda the DRC Senior Executive Director has written 'The Think Tank for National Defense in Japan'1) in the DRC Annual Report 2000, with highly pertinent remarks for this present treatise which will be often quoted as supporting cases. From an early date this author has shared with him the views for the necessity, and the difficulty of realization, of real think tanks in Japan.

yCase 1: Pay for Goods, Pay for Brains: From DRC Quarterlyz

What think tanks are there (in Japan), not only in the security and defense fields but in general? True, there are so-and-so Research Institutes, but nothing to compare with the U.S. counterparts in number and scope; many have particular industry group names, leading this author to wonder about their independency and about whether enough government money goes into their studies. Often-heard remark that Japan is good at hardware but weak in software is correct, except that the wording is unfortunate in sounding like pertaining only to computers; it should mean more generally that Japan pays for Goods but not for Brains. My experience in industry endorses it: we made money by producing goods but hardly by using brains. The contract system echoes it: materials cost plus manpower cost, times one point certain proper profit factor, seem to be the norm for government contract accounts. Adequate for routine procurements, it ceases to make sense when any amount of unknown exists with room for brains. Use of your brains is actually penalized, because if you used your brains to save materials and manpower, all you get is reduced procurement price and nothing in reward. Let alone for think tank works where experienced brains should produce basic concepts. It often ends up in pitiful 'tear drop money', only so much per one sheet of paper, etc. At the root of Japanese limitation in think tank work lies this culture of paying for Goods but not for Brains. 2)

yCase 2: $ 10,000 Are Market Price for a Day's Work: Author's Experiencez

It has been the author's experience with the DRC as well as in his industry days that a typical amount of contract studies is in the order of one million yen or ten thousand U.S. dollars. On occasion of the DRC's 27th Research Trip (DRCT-27, June 1996) a German researcher was astounded at the author's comment to this effect and said, 'Ten thousand dollars are a market price for a single day's consultancy.' A similar response was obtained from a Japanese researcher resident in the U.S. whom the author met on the 6th DRC Personal Trip in JFY 97 (DRCP-97-6, October 1997).


2. Japanese Policy Thinking is Left to 'Councils'; There Are no Experts

With her difficulties for realizing real think tank expertise, comments are heard that 'the bureaucrats are the Japan's largest think tank'. And it is often seen that policy-making in Japan is left to so-called 'Councils', 'Study Groups' or '"Private" Advisory Groups', listing, presumably under the arrangements by the bureaucrats, the names of noted opinion leaders and people of erudition. A much-publicized case of 'IT Strategy Council' is examined here.

yCase 3: People of Erudition in the IT Strategy Councilz3)

The IT Strategy Council was established on 7 July 2000, with 20 members under the presidency of Mr. Nobuyuki IDEI the Sony Chairman, consisting of 12 industry leaders, 5 professors and 1 prefectural governor. People of noted eminence, it remained to be seen how much of time, energy and expertise they could bring to the subject, all being 'Chairmen', 'Presidents', 'CEOs', 'Supreme Advisors', 'Chief Directors', 'Honorary Professors', etc.

yCase 4: Fed up with Presidency: A News Reportz

Mr. Nobuyuki IDEI the Sony Chairman spoke on the 15th (December 2000) to a group of 400 industry leaders, telling them of his hardships as the President of IT Strategy Council in mediating the 'IT Basic Strategy': it failed to address the specific competition issues involving the high costs of communication and the future of NTT (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone), in the backdrops of 'variety of participants from the political, bureaucratic and industry circles representing the "guardian angels" of vested interests that prevented the group to work as a concerted whole.' 4)

Another news report of interest will be quoted here concerning the councils of this kind.

yCase 5: 70,000 a Month for an Advisory Member: A News Reportz

70,000 a month for discussing the basic concepts and future of Japanese economy and finance: The JFY 2001 budget request revealed the amount to be paid to each private circle member of the Advisory Group for Economy and Finance, to be established within the Cabinet Office: 70,000 a month. Not a heavy-weight amount indeed for deciding the nation's future, but the Ministry of Finance officials claim that even this is exceptionally generous in comparison to other groups: the president of the People's Lives Council is paid 26,000, each of its members 22,600 and an auxiliary member 20,300. Could this be a case of frugal spending in face of the nation's financial woes? 5)

yCase 6: Limitations in Japanese Policy Thinking (1): From DRC Annual Reportz

Efforts for national defense must be the greatest public assets. Under the present government system in Japan where the most of administration are carried out by stove piped system with the budget based on individual sectional interest, it is very difficult to declare the Japanese defense policy and posture clearly to the world with confidence and also it is hard to assert her national interest. In the past in Japan the strategic studies were initiated by the Government exclusively and there were no organized research institute privately before the end of the War and still today. Another big problem in the political system is the conservative habitual way of the Government to shun anything that deviates from the ongoing policy as harmful, blocking the way to absorb various policy alternatives as references in an effort to formulate a better way for the future. 1)

yCase 7: Limitations in Japanese Policy Thinking (2): From a Periodicalz

It has been asserted in the previous installment that there may be think tanks in Japan but hardly any case of their outcomes' being published to be talked about, presumably because the Japanese government does not pay for the brains so that the fruits are made available for the citizens. A question may be expected here: 'Aren't there many government "White Papers" made public?' Yes, but these White Papers leave something to be desired: they are all published yearly, by the same titles as routine affairs; some thematic variations do exist but with the same baseline, so much official statements of the ministries and agencies. And who writes them? Are outside brains and think tanks take part in them? So long as this author's limited scope of knowledge indicates, they do not: words are heard from bureaucrats to the effect that 'That White Paper is my brainchild when I worked in the so-and-so department.' It must be a benchmark within their career, an important one, but nonetheless only one step in their work rotating every a few years per a position. That must be why those White Papers do not compare well in the density, depth and timeliness with the reports by the U.S. DoD or the Congress. Famous for their brilliance are the Japanese bureaucrats: quickly taking command of one new position they proceed to another in a few years' time, leaving fair accomplishments behind including the authorship of a White Paper. But is expertise nurtured by all this? In the years to come will they be able to match the U.S. and Europe with the vast outside reservoir of brainpower under the keep of their governments? 6)


3. In Other Countries There Are Many Experts in Government-Sustained Think Tanks

In many other countries it is often found that many experts in think tanks are engaged in long-term strategic policy studies under the keep of government, which in turn is in a habit of often listening to their studies to reflect them in policy formulation. In some cases the experts even publish their criticism of government in a government-contracted studies.

yCase 8: Policy Think Tanks in the U.S.: From DRC Annual Reportz

In the USA there are many strategic institutes outside of Department of Defense which are supported by the Federal Government or organized by company or private. The Institute for Defense Analyses is one of the big think tanks for national defense supported by the OSD (Office of Secretary of Defense). It keeps neutral position politically and the head office is located in Alexandria, Virginia near the Pentagon. Total employees are 750 including 350 researchers. The budget of the IDA amounts to 12 billion yen every year which comes from the OSD and others, accounted for by the money for about 100 research items every year. The results of the research are reflected in the DoD policy formulation, some of which are published as DoD reports. Besides the IDA, there are many research institutes, for example the RAND, the MITRE, etc., which are engaged in a wide area of researches. 1)

yCase 9: U.S.Think Tank Criticizes Government on Government Money : From a Periodicalz

On Wednesday, 14 September 1995, almost every major Japanese daily paper carried a story of a U.S. RAND report whose content was to this effect: in the Japanese FSX fighter development the U.S.DoD prevailed over the Japanese complaints and made it an extended F-16, thereupon the DoC and the Congress opposed the supply of U.S.technology, taking advantage of which Japan ended up in acquiring indigenous technology by advancing its own design. The response of many Japanese readers may have been like: 'Serves them right! That's what comes of forcing U.S. will on Japan!', or 'Isn't Japan something to be reckoned with?', or 'Americans, aha!' But this author maintains that the real lesson of the RAND report is quite otherwise. The most notable of its contents are twofold:

‡@The U.S. government is most relentlessly criticized, indeed. There had been five fundamental mistakes: absence of integration in defense and economy policies, political pressure on Japan, insufficiency in execution of influence, underestimation of Japan and fault in technology transfer policy.

‡AThe preface states that this study was conducted under a USAF contract.

Let the readers understand: the government is heavily criticized in a study contract by the Air Force, a government organ. It's like shouting 'hey, the emperor's naked!' by the emperor's money. That's wholly permissible. Those Japanese who thought 'Americans, aha!' are cordially invited to reflect if it's ever possible in Japan flatly to criticize the government in a Japanese government-contracted study, to publish it for the public, to be widely reported overseas. 7)


4. Japanese Views Are often Absent in International Arena

The limitations of Japanese policy thinking, bureaucracy-centered and antipathetic to expose any argument that deviates from the ongoing policy, have another way of manifesting itself: namely the absence of Japanese views in many international conferences where Japan should most naturally be represented, when the conference organizers receive no response to the invitation to Japanese government and official organizations to express themselves. Even within the DRC's limited experience, with priority on international exchange of views in its very small way, there have been numerous cases in the international arena of 'representing Japan by default, because no one else has responded to the call'. The cases are given below.

yCase 10: FSX Discussions and Japanese 'No Talk Culture': From DRC Quarterlyz

The Japan-U.S. High-Tech Policy Conference attended on Tuesday, 8 June (1993) was an occasion to probe the Japanese and U.S. ways of high-tech policy formulation in the case of the FSX. The U.S. side was colorfully represented by many people closely involved in the program including the former DoD and Embassy members; on the Japanese side there were Dr. Ueda as a keynote speaker and Dr. Inoue and myself on the panel, all from the DRC but were not direct FSX participants. A fully symmetric Japanese participation would have included the former and present members of the Defense Agency, Ministries of International Trade and Industry and Foreign Affairs, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, all present and openly debating the FSX case in full view of the U.S. participants, but it is an inconceivable scene. Later I was in receipt of a letter of appreciation from the conference organizer who said he was pleased because we had helped to improve Japan's image by speaking up on the FSX; then he added a short sentence (I know of no better and more concise expression of American culture so different from the Japanese):

'"No talk" in America is always "No good".'

This is not a question of 'Japan and the U.S. mutually meeting halfway'; it should be noted that it is the Japanese 'No Talk Culture' that is an exception to the global rule.8)
yCase 11: Only DRC Represents Japan at International Acquisition Seminar: From DRC Quarterlyz

On invitation from the Defense Systems Management College of U.S. DoD, three researchers participated in the 2nd International Acquisition/Procurement Seminar-Pacific from Monday, September 13 to Friday, 17 (1999) for exchange of views on armaments and equipment research, development and procurement on the basis of national security policy, as an occasion to be mutually acquainted with the situations in various nations. Together with the three organizing countries (the U.S., Australia and the RoK), the twelve nations, either the government and/or private sides, were represented in all: Japan, Singapore, New Zealand, the U.K., Germany, France, Russia, Sweden and Poland.

It is to be desired that the Defense Agency, the Self-Defense Forces and the Japanese industry be represented there, when the Pacific nations are eagerly probing the possibility of international cooperation. This author has been firmly impressed by the seminar as an arena where Japan should not be too late to be present.9)

yCase 12: Repeated Patterns of 'DRC's Representing Japan by Default': From DRC Quarterlyz

Jointly organized by the U.S. RAND and the Israeli Fisher Institute, the 'Air and Space for Small and Middle Powers' Conference took place in a Tel-Aviv hotel between Monday, 19 March and Wednesday, 21 (2001) with the speakers from the U.S., Israel and nine other nations. This author was the sole participant from Japan except the partial attendance by the Japanese Embassy's Defense Attache. This marks the seventh report in this Quarterly of attendance at international conferences in a year and a half (since the February 2000 issue), in four of which the author was the sole speaker from Japan. The readers of previous issues will notice the pattern of 'DRC's representing Japan by default' repeated many times by other members also. This is certainly a motivation for the DRC, but does Japan not mind? 10)

5. Other Countries Incorrectly Speculates that Japan Cannot Be without Long-Term Thinking

It is not surprising if other countries supposed that Japan, the economic superpower and the linchpin of the Asia-Pacific economy and security through the Japan-U.S. alliance, should not be without long-term strategic policy thinking. And it would be all the more so when Japan is often absent in the international arena where she should most naturally be represented: it is no wonder if they kept speculating what strategy of hers is hidden behind all these. The cases are given below.
yCase 13: Nuclear Armament is the Object of Japanese Plutonium Policy: A Korean Speculation: From a Periodicalz

The Japanese 'energy policy' stipulates the vast accumulation of plutonium that is the exact material for nuclear arms. The one-ton of plutonium Japan imported aboard the SS Akatsuki-Maru suffices to make 120 nuclear bombs; it does not take much imagination to suppose that Japan with this huge stock of plutonium would be tempted to develop nuclear arms if she felt necessity. And Japan has not been clear and effective to dispel this concern, the unnecessary secrecy surrounding the Akatsuki-Maru's transportation of plutonium further fueling the suspicion. Many experts argue that the economic and environmental merits of plutonium have ceased to exist. Japanese position is contrary to the norm and inviting the international cost, when all the industrially developed nations are beginning to reduce the dependency on plutonium. Whatever case she may make for her inability for nuclear armament, only a minority will believe in it unless she foregoes her plutonium accumulation policy.11)
yCase 14: Information Satellites Have long Been in Japanese Space Policy: A German Speculation: From DRC Quarterlyz

The French and German space agencies and the Western European Union Satellite Centre were visited in the week of Monday 31 January (2000) on a short schedule with two nights each in Paris, Madrid and Bonn for exchange of views on the national strategy and space, including briefings on the Japanese scene. A surprise came at the DLR (German Space Centre) in the view that the Information Satellite Project had long been in the Japanese space policy, citing the passage at the end of 1996 Fundamental Policy of Japan's Space Activities ('Taiko') that reads in translation 'Taking into consideration our international responsibility as a result of changes in situations surrounding Japan, we will take appropriate measures to secure safe maintenance and to prevent intervention.' While completely unexpected, it reminded the author of a Korean researcher's view that the Information Satellite is a Japan's step toward a military power (Hasegawa: DRC Quarterly, February 2000); as had been noted there, no emotional plea of 'we have no such intentions' suffices in the international arena, unless logically explained in terms of reality behind the policy papers and decisions and national interest: a reminder of need to see ourselves as others see us.12)
yCase 15: Japan Complements Defense Budget Limit by Space Fund: A British Speculation: From a Periodicalz

@@@While the space research in many countries has turned swords into ploughshares, Japan has almost done the reverse. If it can ever be made to work, NASDA's spectacularly unsuccessful H-2 rocket could potentially have military uses. Cynics note that with its defence spending constitutionally capped at 1 % of GDP, Japan might wish to fund military research through indirect means.13)

Now seen from inside Japan it is crystal clear that these speculations remain just what they are; with the stove-piped administrations, the peculiar sensitivities on defense and national security and what-nots, there seems to be no room ever for the grand strategic policy transcending the energy, space and defense. But that is not the way the others see Japan.

6. Absence of Long-Term Thinking Results in Regarding the Future as Mere Extension of the Past

In the DRC Annual Report 2000 the author has reviewed how time-consuming it is for the Japanese defense policy to respond to new situations, and named it 'Inertia Element'.
yCase 16: Conspicuous 'Inertia Element' in Japanese Defense Policy: From DRC Annual Reportz

The marked "inertia element" of Japanese defense policy has been studied, in contrast to rapid changes in global situations, in cases of U.S.-Japan BMD cooperation and of the descriptions in the annual "Defense of Japan," with the "Operation against Landing Invasion" as an example. Conspicuously observed was Japan's extremely time-consuming behavior pattern, a huge inertia, to respond to situational changes. The author concludes that, due to the huge "inertia element" in her defense policy, Japan cannot be a threat to her neighbors.14)

The inertia element signifies that the future is regarded as a mere extension of the past. That Japan will not be a threat to her neighbors is more of a fluke than of an outcome of a policy.


7. Absence of Long-Term Thinking sometimes Results in Impulsive Grave Decisions

On Tuesday, 25 August 1998, Dr. Ichiro TANIGUCHI the president of Mitsubishi Electric presented an information satellite concept to a group of Liberal Democratic Party Diet Members, which concept seems to have been quickly turned into a government program in the aftermath of the North Korean Taepo Dong launch only six days later. This has been reviewed by the author also in the DRC Annual Report 2000, to suggest that there was another pattern of Japanese behavior different from the 'inertia element'.

yCase 1: Behavior of Impulsively Jumping at Whatever Conclusion: From DRC Annual Reportz

There seems to be another pattern of Japanese behavior: In a contingency requiring quick decision, jumping impulsively at whatever conclusion available and handy, not based on deliberation and well-prepared studies. This is because there is no incentive, encouragement or reward in Japan to think long-term, fundamentally and strategically, and no one is practicing that way of thinking.14)

In the absence of practicing long-term strategic policy thinking, one has to jump at any handy conclusion in a short-circuited manner. Introduction of information satellite system also was likely to have been a fluke.


Conclusion: Ways must Be Found for Japan to Pay for Brains

The absence of long-term strategic policy thinking may sometimes produce flukes, but only out of luck. The ending words of the author's article in the DRC Annual Report 2000 also apply as conclusion of the present article.

'If this state of affairs continues, the scenario is remote but not inconceivable, that an impulsive big decision should be made by Japan in an emergency to become a threat to her neighbors, which eventually causes her own downfall. We already have a precedent 55 years ago. It is necessary that Japan should become a nation that rewards the long-term, fundamental and strategic way of thinking. This is a matter of urgent concern for us at the DRC also.' 14)

Japan does not have a bright future if the above hypotheses are correct. There has been little incentive (encouragement, motivation and reward) to practice long-term thinking of fundamental and strategic issues. You are not paid for your brains, and cannot make your living with the amount in the order of $ 10,000. The first step should be to find the ways to pay for the brains, if not in the order of $ 1,000,000 as in cases of the U.S. The responses and suggestions of the readers are invited to bring about any change to the right direction.


References

1) Naruhiko UEDA: The Think Tank for National Defense in Japan, DRC Annual Report AR-4, September 2000, pp. 49`57 (amended in part by this author better to conform to the Japanese original)

2) Tetsuo TAMAMA: Pay for Goods, Pay for Brains, DRC, A Quarterly Review, February 1996, pp. 24`25 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation), and p. 38 (summary in English)

3) http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/it/000707/setti/2kaigisetti.html (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation)

4) IT Strategy Building: Fed up with Its Chairmanship, Says Sony Chairman IDEI, Asahi Shimbun, Saturday, 16 December 2000, page 14 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation)

5) 70,000 a Month for Deciding Nation's Future at Council for Economics and Finance, Budget Request for Private Circle Members Revealed, Asahi Shimbun, Thursday, 31 August 2000, page 11 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation)

6) Bureaucrats Are Japan's Largest Think Tank, Military Technology and Japanese Culture, 21st of a Series, Defense Electronic News No.021, Monday, 9 February 1998 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation), Bouei Nenkan Kankokai (Defense Yearbook Publishers)

7) The Case of Shouting 'The Emperor's Naked!', Military Technology and Japanese Culture, 13th of a Series, Defense Electronic News No. 013, Tuesday, 6 May 1997 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation), Bouei Nenkan Kankokai (Defense Yearbook Publishers)

8) Tetsuo TAMAMA: "No Talk Is No Good", A Cultural Experience, DRC, A Quarterly Review, November 1993, pp.11`12 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation), and p.38 (summary in English)

9) Naruhiko UEDA: The 51st DRC Research Trip: General, and Kazumasa KOBAYASHI: Acquisition Reform in the Pacific, DRC, A Quarterly Review, November 1999, pp.4`7 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation), and p. 30 (summary in English)

10) Tetsuo TAMAMA: Japan Introduced at 'Small-Middle Powers' Aerospace, DRC, A Quarterly Review, May 2001, pp.33`34 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation), and p.40 (summary in English)

11) KIM, Yun-Gon: That's Why Japan Is Suspected of Nuclear Arming, Sekai Shuho (World Weekly), 9 August 1994, pp.26`31 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation)

12) Tetsuo TAMAMA: European Views of Japanese Space and Security, DRC, A Quarterly Review, May 2000, pp.35 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation), and p.40 (summary in English)

13) Runners-up in the Space Race, Economist, 14 April 2001, Science and Technology, pp.77`78

14) Tetsuo TAMAMA: Is Japan a Threat to Her Neighbors?, DRC Annual Report AR-4, September 2000, pp.119`128

15) Taepo Dong Shock Leads to Info Sat Decision: Blueprint by MELCO?, Asahi Shimbun, Tuesday, 10 November 1998, page 4 (in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation)