Extra-Regional Military Cooperation in Southeast Asian Nations
Foreword
As Cambodia joined the ASEAN (Association of South-Eastern Asian Nations) on 30 April 1999 the "ASEAN 10" came into being as a framework for regional cooperation with the membership of entire nations of the region, thereby raising the expectations for enduring peace through the transformation of “antagonism and conflict” posture of Cold War days to that of “dialogue and collaboration”.
Many seeds of conflicts, however, remain in the region including the border disputes both inland and maritime, and minority population issues in border districts, causing these nations to continue their effort for armament modernization as a means to secure their own safety. And as the geopolitical importance of the region drives the U.S., China, Russia and European nations to seek expansion of their spheres of influence, the regional nations are trying to build up military cooperation with extra-regional powers.
The military situations in Southeast Asia being of direct and vital interest to Japan's survival and safety, depending as her fabric does on the international trade, it is worth careful observation how the regional nations deal with their domestic situations as well as with the military cooperation with the extra-regional powers.
1. Changes in Military Environments in National
Security
For the regional nations to develop extra-regional military cooperation, the changes in military environments in national security that commonly bear on it include: ①diversification of threats and dangers on national security, ②growing military influence of China, and ③increasing need for efficiency in military power maintenance.
(1) Diversification of Threats and Dangers
Excepting a limited number of regions, the danger of conventional nation-to-nation war has noticeably receded in the post-Cold War world. On the other hand the possibilities are increasing for the danger of domestic tumults overflowing to the surrounding nations and regions, and of so-called “transnational threats and dangers” that include criminal activities and challenges to the peace across the border. Particularly in this region the border and dominium disputes are inseparably entangled with the minority issue, like the Malaysia-Philippines dispute over the Sabah Province and the Moro independence problem in the Philippines, unable for any one nation to resolve. In addition the religious antagonism, including the recent widespread conflicts between the Indonesian Moslems and Christians, and the antipathy against the overseas Chinese, are among the concerns that may overflow to involve the people in adjacent nations.
The transnational dangers, brought to particular attention because they may involve the extra-regional nations also, include the illegal drug plantation, smuggling and piracy. The “Golden Triangle” across Thailand, Myanmar and Laos is now a production center of opium and stimulants. It is also an abode of Was, a mountain tribe of transnational movements, often a cause for nation-to-nation conflicts. The anti-government armed band of Was, the United Wa State Army (UWSA), is said to be twelve to twenty thousand strong with mortar and other armaments, causing Thailand to be in high alert deploying troops along the border, which sometimes open fire with the Myanmar troops in border districts.
According to a U.S. Heritage Foundation study of Summer of 2000, a three-fold increase was recorded in the piracy cases around Southeast Asia. International Maritime Board, an independent NPO in Kuala Lumpur, reports that the piracy around the world in 2000 number 469 including the attempted cases, of which 119 took place in Indonesian waters, 75 in the Malacca Strait and 21 in Malaysian waters. The increasing ferocity of piracy cases is of recent concern, some even suspected of coast guard members' involvement, calling for military action to counter.
(2) Growing Influence of China
The extra-regional powers with notable military moves are the U.S. and China. The 1997 resumption of Hong Kong has substantially upgraded the Chinese Naval operation capabilities in the South China Sea and is a cause for increased alarm in the adjacent nations. China has also agreed to conclude a treaty with Myanmar to use the Irrawaddy as its trade route into the Indian Ocean. While Myanmar emphasizes her intention to deny its military use, a broad suspicion pervades in the adjacent nations about the Chinese intention.
(3) Need for Efficiency in Military Power Maintenance
The globally increasing expense of high-tech military equipment is calling for efficiency in the military power maintenance, and this is particularly critical for the Southeast Asian nations that have recently embarked on the post-Cold war reform of the military from the internal security type to the “national defense” type. Although their economic and financial crises of 1997 to 1998 seem to have been largely overcome, another stagnation and downturn are being feared due to the turn of tides since around the Fall of 2000 in the developed nations' saturating economic growth including that of the U.S. Since this virtually rules out the Cold War-like military assistance from the developed nations in armament supply and other forms, the regional nations are in sore need for efficient and economical ways of armament procurement, and are attempting to find funds for modern equipment through personnel reduction and other means.
2. Intra-Regional Cooperation of ASEAN Nations
Non-interference with domestic problems and consensus formation being emphasized in resolution of regional issues, intra-regional cooperative mechanism among the ASEAN nations is not expected to be easy, and in military cooperation in particular; the multilateral cases have been especially slow to materialize.
(1) Bilateral Cooperation
Bilateral cooperation among the Southeast Asian nations, at a minimum necessity level in the Cold War days within the framework of national military security centered around the superpowers, have not seen much progress in post-Cold War days, except that a new weight is being attached to them as a measure for confidence building, with expanded participation and purposes. For instance, the Philippines and Malaysia that have had joint Army exercise from an early date have since 1995 expanded them to include Navy and Air Force, and Indonesia and Singapore jointly built in 1994 the Air Combat Maneuvering Range (ACMR) and expressed their intention to provide it for the use of other ASEAN members.
In addition to these conventional joint exercises, there are recent moves toward joint operation in response to transnational dangers, like the joint maritime patrol by Thailand and Vietnam to prevent fishing boat collisions and smuggling and other illegal activities in the Gulf of Thailand.
As a case of comprehensive defense cooperation, the Philippines and Malaysia concluded the defense cooperation treaty on 26 March 1994, as the first such event among the ASEAN members.
(2) Multilateral Cooperation
Under Thailand's initiative an ASEAN Army Commanders' conference was organized in November 2000 (with the absence of Myanmar and Laos) and was heralded as an attempt for specifically military dialogue and cooperation (Nippon Keizai Shimbun, 7 November 2000). There have been no reports of its concrete outcome however, and the mainline of cooperative activities still lies in those at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
a. Joint Exercises
While the recognition is commonly held of the increasing importance of ASEAN-wide multinational joint exercise as a means of building the regional security framework, it has not yet been brought to reality due to the complication of entwined national interests. There was however, organized by the Singaporean Navy, the first “Western Pacific Minesweeping Exercise” in June 2000, limited in scope as it was to minesweeping yet was heralded as the first multinational event of this size in the ASEAN region, with participation by 16 Asia-Pacific nations. The actual operation took place in the Malacca Strait area for three days starting 18 June, participants from the ASEAN being Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Burnei and Vietnam.
b. Joint Moves against Transnational Dangers
Three subgroups in the ARF were formed already in 1995 each dealing with: ①confidence building measure (CBM), ②peace keeping operation (PKO) and ③search and rescue cooperation, and another special group was formed in July 1996 on the roles of the military in disastrous situations, as a step forward to joint moves against regional conflict and dangers other than war.
On the police side the ASEAN Border Crime Prevention Centre already exists for moves against the transnational crimes including piracy, smuggling and drug traffic, for the purpose of case analysis, information collection and advice to the related nations on crime control measures (Nippon Keizai Shimbun, 10 July 1999). It is hoped that such cooperative means be accumulated until it come to include such areas as require military moves as well.
c. Coalition Forces for Peace Keeping
A wide range of differences among the ASEAN nations, in terms of geography, ethnological composition, history including that of colonization, mutual threat concept between neighbors and levels of economy, has long been a difficult barrier against the multilateral security framework. Still more difficult is the formulation of multinational coalition forces for readiness against contingencies.
Also a broad difference among the regional nations was observed in the participation in the 1995 International Forces for East Timor (INTERFET): Thailand and Malaysia were positive from the beginning while Singapore offered volunteer troops only, and other nations were negative, setting more store by the non-interference principle in domestic affairs. The final participants were Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines.
A similar trend is seen in the U.N. PKO: as of August 2000 the participants are only five: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (Military Balance, 2000-2001). A regional joint PKO training center has been on discussion agenda, with Malaysia in agreement on principle, but Indonesia advocates the priority of an intelligence center, while Thailand agrees to discuss the issue but without much recognition of priority.
3. Extra-Regional Cooperation
The backbone of ASEAN nations' security being said to reside in “resilience” and “balance of power”, external interference has been resisted by elaborately enlisting other external parties to create balance of power, in a “Like cures like” manner. The mutual defense cooperation and armament imports have also followed that line.
(1) Mutual Defense Cooperation
a. Furnishing of Bases and Services
(a) With the U.S.
The area has long been an object of grave interest to the U.S.; the regional nations also have relied much on the U.S. military security and contributed to the enhancement of U.S. military presence by furnishing of bases and conclusion of new agreements on the status of U.S. armed forces.
In the absence in the region of NATO-like multilateral security structure with military preparedness, reliance on the U.S. as the sole post-Cold War superpower would be a realistic alternative for many of the nations. The U.S. also seems to be inclined, by effectively binding together the existing bilateral defense structures centered on herself in a “hub and spokes” manner, to form an equivalent of collective security regime in this geopolitically important region, in order to secure national interest and safety of her people.
The much receded U.S. military presence after the complete withdrawal of Forces from the Philippines in 1992 is being reverted in the late 90's, based on a new strategy for the restructuring of military power projection capabilities in the region. The specific results include the May 1955 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the Philippines and the April 2000 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Malaysia. The U.S.-Indonesian military cooperation that the U.S. used to regard as the core of the Asian stability, had temporarily been suspended because of the U.S. dissatisfaction at the Indonesian behavior at the 1999 East Timor tumult. In the course of this year however, with the change of Indonesian regime, the U.S. expresses her will to resume military cooperation albeit in an intermittent manner.
(b) With China
Among the relations with China of ASEAN members, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar share borders with China, four members including Philippines and Malaysia are in antagonism with China over dominium disputes, and Indonesia and Malaysia have ethnological frictions concerning their Chinese populations.
While the ASEAN members have seen China as a military threat, they also regard her as an essential factor in the regional safety in the course of deepening political and economy relations. For China also, cooperation with the ASEAN members has increased its importance for creating stable environment for economy development. This lead to the first Vice Minister-level consultation in April 1995 in Hangzhou to discuss the regional conflict prevention and security issues with the ASEAN members. Specific Chinese efforts for improved relations include the establishment of borderline between Vietnam and liquidation with Cambodia of past support for Pol Pots, indicating forward movements to settle pending political and military problems. With this backdrop there is growing interest among the regional nations in military cooperation with China including the joint development of armament technology.
(c) With Russia
In the Cold War days the Soviets maintained military presence at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam to execute a military influence rivaling that of the U.S. over the regional nations. The financial difficulties, however, of the post-Cold War Russia forced the withdrawal of combat troops, reportedly leaving only 700 personnel for facility maintenance and electronic intelligence collection. Russia has an agreement with Vietnam for the use of the base until 2004 and, with the U.S. emphasis on the multinational military cooperation in Southeast Asia, has requested for its extension in view of the increased importance of its intelligence collection role. In the failure, however, of settling the terms of lease the Russian Minister of Defense Ivanov was reported to have declared in July 2000 that the lease would not be extended (Nippon Keizai Shimbun, 25 July 2000).
The base in Cam Ranh, being a good harbor centrally located in Southeast Asia, is strategically attractive to the U.S. also for the operation of armed forces in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. The then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen on his visit to Vietnam in March 2000 was reported to have expressed his intention to the Vietnamese to realize the U.S. fleets' visits to Vietnam ports in the future, with the Cam Ranh base in his mind (Nippon Keizai Shimbun, 12 April 2000).
(d) With Other Nations
Throughout their history of national, ethnological and societal developments, the nations in the region have had various and complicated relations with the European and other powers, with their vestiges still discernible everywhere. Among the suzerain nations the U.K. and France used to execute highly marked influence, which was at the ebb for sometime during the Cold War but is again on a gradually rising tide.
The Five Power Defence Agreement between the U.K, Malaysia, Singapore and others has an appearance of a mutual defense agreement but in essence is a defense security measure by the U.K. for the small nations. The U.K. further has a permanent army troop stationed in Burnei, 1,300 strong with a Gurkha battalion at its center; she is also positive in enhancing the military cooperation with the Philippines, coming to an agreement in 1996 in the defense cooperation including military exercises.
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, of former French Indochina and members of the French Language community, are in the process of advancing mutual defense cooperation under that framework. The “France Card” for these nations should be one of precious cards they can play in their policy dealings with the U.S., China and Russia.
Australia has for some years shown an initiative of positive engagement in the region, including an agreement with Indonesia for the preservation of security (1995) and a permanent stationing in Malaysia of a troop of 150 with two P-3C patrol aircraft. At the adverse response, however, of the regional nations to her advocacy of international forces deployment to East Timor, the Australian efforts had for a time to assume a subdued tone, which recently are again beginning to be pursued with vigor, including an attempt to repair the relation with Indonesia. Also there was a joint declaration of “New Partnership” with Singapore in the Spring of 1995, stating the cooperation of armed forces, a long-term cooperation of defense industry and the stationing of Singaporean Air Force in Australia, as a means to build a new cooperative relation.
Some of the ASEAN members have recently come to develop military cooperation with the Republic of Korea. For instance Vietnam, once an adversary of RoK, has agreed in October 1999 to enhance mutual military exchange, including that of military attache and visits of naval training ships.
b. Joint Exercises
As a part of restructuring the military basis the U.S. is attempting to build a multilateral cooperative relation in the whole region, by enlarging and connecting the existing bilateral joint exercise patterns with each other.
For the first time in 4 years and 3 months since the Fall of 1995, a joint U.S.-Philippines “Balikatan” exercise took place during January to March 2000 in Palawan Island facing the South China Sea, with participation of the Army, Navy and Air Force; this was seen to mark the beginning of revived U.S. presence in this crucial area that faces China across the sea.
Another important joint exercise this year (2001) was the “Team Challenge 01” in March by the U.S. Pacific Command, which consisted of two nearly simultaneous exercises in close coordination: the U.S.-Thai “Cobra Gold” and the U.S.-Australia “Tandem Thrust”, apparently aiming at a smooth execution of PKO around the U.S. Forces in case of a regional conflict. Singapore also participated in it, with observers from Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia. This exercise is scheduled to be annually repeated and expected to furnish a model for the future multinational joint exercises.
The generally favorable response of Southeast Asian nations to these joint exercises with the U.S. forces seems to reflect their expectation for the U.S. military power, in the complex and diversified prospect of regional conflicts as well as in their balance of power strategy against the potential threat of China.
(2) Armament Supply and Acquisition
Since many of the armaments among the ASEAN nations are aged and obsolescent, urgent needs exist for their modernization, which capability however, including that for the remodeling of old equipment, is not at hand except in rare cases. This situation is driving the nations, on one hand to make the best use of former cooperative relations, and on the other hand to seek and select the supplier with unprejudiced views for the acquisition of armament best suited for the new security environment and military strategy.
The U.S. equipment, standard in the Philippines and Thailand during the Cold War, is being introduced also in Indonesia and Malaysia in its new versions. The special relation enjoyed by Russia (former Soviet Union) and China with the regional nations in terms armament supply in the Cold War framework of the Eastern and Western blocs' antagonism is no longer at work, but a decade after the end of Cold War a new situation is shaping up for the armament export by these two powers.
Russia is less visible but is expanding her influence to the region through the export of new and custom-made armament, notably to the nations that used to be solely West-reliant in the Cold War days. An example is Malaysia, whose Air Force combat planes used to be wholly of U.S. and U.K. make, has now introduced the Russian Mig-29 fighters.
Introduction of Chinese armament has a notable example in Thailand where four new missile boats have been purchased since around 1994, and main battle tanks and armored vehicles are also procured from China.
European nations' remarkable recent advance into the ASEAN armament market includes, along with the U.K. and France as the suzerain powers, the German and Italian supply of small naval vessels like missile and patrol boats. The Military Balance 2000-2001 records that Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand are in possession of German vessels while the two of the six Malaysian patrol boats on order are being built in Germany; and the four Malaysian corvettes and five missile and other boats of Thailand are of Italian make.
Worth mentioning as the introduction of special equipment are the acquisition from Spain of a light aircraft carrier for Harrier VTOLs by Thailand in 1997, and purchases of German submarines by Indonesia and a Swedish submarine by Singapore.
A new element in the Asian armament supplier is the Republic of Korea, who attracted attention for the supply to Malaysia since around 1995 of 42 KIFV infantry combat vehicles for the PKO activities in Bosnia Herzegovina.
The geopolitical importance of Southeast Asia is likely to lead the region to become a field of intertwining interests of extra-regional powers including the U.S., China and Russia.
The U.S. will attempt to create a new long-term framework under her initiative with attention to the future advance of China; in response to which the ASEAN nations will continue, though not to the Cold War extent of inland presence of troops, but to offer the U.S. access to forward bases, in order to keep her engagement as a safeguard against possible future military advancement of China.
On the other hand there remains among the ASEAN nations deep-rooted cautiousness against leaning to the U.S. side only; in addition the future prospect also exists of Indian and Russian advancements. This can lead them to seek Japanese contribution to the regional security in one way or another, although in recognition of her constraints in military capabilities. In consideration of vital weight of this region's peace that bears on Japanese security, Japan should well to face the issue with a positive stance, in keeping correct assessment of regional situations and in evaluation of ways to contribute to the peace keeping including the military aspects.