US Navy Strategic Planning and Its Process of Thinking

US Navy Strategic Planning and Its Process of Thinking

by Mutsuyosi GOMI

Member of Research Committee, DRC

Introduction

During the Cold War, The US Navy Strategy was the “ Maritime Strategy” to maintain the initiative with 600 combatants concept and not to fix the operational area in the vicinity of the conflicts and to choose the appropriate operational area and sea for the US Navy’s advantage and then to defeat the enemy ; after the Cold War, it shifted to the “ littoral operational strategy “ due to the disappearance of any Navy able to cope with the US Navy.

This shift was made clear by the document “ From the Sea” in 1992, “ Forward…. From the sea” in 1994 and recent “ Power and Access…From the Sea”.

The fundamental concept of this new Strategy is based on the “ the Sea Control” aiming at the superiority at the desired time, in the desired area, for the desired duration and rapidly to proceed to the littoral area, where 80% of the world economic activities are being conducted and use the US influence and project US naval power if necessary to protect US interest and that of allies and friendly nations.

The contents of these strategies have been dramatically changing by the progress of the RMA and the Network Centric Warfare. I have been interested in through what kind of way of thinking and studying this kind of change and progress has been published. This time I have obtained the NSPD (Navy Strategic Planning Guidance) version 2. 2000.4, so I would like to introduce the US Navy Strategic Planning and the process of the way of thinking.

1. Strategic Environment

(1) Strategic Environment at Turn of Century

Regarding this issue, US Navy analyzes that no one can predict with certainty the future security environment, but there are emerging trends that make it imperative for the US navy to focus on the littorals and land beyond. The Navy assumes that no peer competitor on a global scale will arise prior to 2020. Potential adversaries will obtain technologically advanced weapon systems and access to sensor system to employ these weapons in effort to thwart our efforts in geographically limited regions and establish the regional hegemony that may be hostile to the US or its presence. This strategy of the potential adversely is called as the “ Denial Strategy” and seems to recognize the Chinese naval power expansion.

In addition to preparing for the high intensity end of conflict, not only nations but also non-nation organization gives often strong influence to the regional conflict and area relations. Moreover, in coordination with the globalization in company with network and systems, strategic environment will be much complicated. So US Navy engagement process also encompass the spectrum of military operations other than war (MOOTW). The spectrum of challenges to the US Naval Forces will be broad, ranging from information attack operations, piracy by small fast boats to fully modernized regional combat fleet of surface combatants, aircraft and submarines. Also the potential adversary will use the various kind of weapons from the WMD(Weapon Mass Destruction) to terrorism, so the US Navy has to have information warfare superiority in cyber war to cope with this challenge.　

(2) Naval Environment

In this article, the potential adversary trends are described, regarding TBM, submarines, ASCM (Anti Ship Cruise Missile), mines; SAM and surface combatants are described. Particularly as for ASCM, it is expected that significant increases in missile terminal velocity from the now predominant subsonic to supersonic speeds in the next ten years and to the hypersonic by 2020. As for submarines, the fuel cell technology will allow submerged operation for up to thirty days with acoustic signature comparable to current battery operations.　

As for the North Korea, development of ballistic missile technology capable of attacking US facilities and allies in the region utilizing a sizable chem-bio stockpile affords the North Koreans an avenue for attack.

As for China, Heavy emphasis is being placed on modernizing both naval and air forces. China seeks to develop or purchase effective electronic countermeasures, low observable technologies, laser targeting, satellite navigation technology, improved space surveillance and tracking capability, anti-satellite weapons and advanced surface to air missile systems. At present time, C4ISR systems are poor to good with limited range　but technology globalization offers the ready ability to improve this area. Mine warfare offers China a means of area denial. In addition, China is trying to jump several generations ahead in technology by purchasing submarines, surface ships, and cruise missiles.

As for Russia, Military readiness and modernization has suffered greatly due to economic difficulties, but Russia retains strategic and tactical capabilities, including extensive NBC arsenals.

As for Iran, since one of the Iran’s most important goals is the eventual elimination of the US presence from what Iran considers its sphere of influence, there are bound to be periods of increased tension, especially with US naval forces that are centerpiece of US presence in the Gulf.

As for Iraq, Iraq suffers from continued isolation and international sanctions. Iraq continues to attempt to improve its ability for asymmetric attacks principally with ballistic missiles and WMD.

As for asymmetric warfare, it is described that asymmetric warfare is not limited to nation states; sub-national and transnational groups will also use asymmetric means as the only from of military action available to influence and attack the US or any other nation.

2. Maritime Concept

The Navy –Marine Corps Vision: ”From the Sea” steered us from blue water into the littorals where most of the world’s population resides and where most conflicts occur. The strategic concept “Forward…From the Sea“ refined this course. The vast majority of America’s trade will continue to move by sea and freedom of the seas remains the enduring responsibility of the Naval Service. However, the ultimate objective of our nation’s overall maritime strategy has always been to impact political, military and economic interests ashore, where US interests predominantly lie. Until recently, the Naval Service could only pursue this strategy indirectly by first winning or denying command of the seas; naval forces were therefore only available to directly affect a land campaign on a sequential, or secondary, basis. But the Navy –Marine Corps contribution to national security has broadened since end of the Cold War. Operations during the past decade—from humanitarian and evacuation missions to a contingency response against coastal and landlocked countries—affirm that the Naval Service is steering the proper course by emphasizing the ability to influence, directly and decisively, events ashore… from the sea. So finally, it is emphasized that the Navy will play main role in the future, that is, we must recognize that assuring naval access forward will remain a prerequisite for continuing this strategic heading landward in the future.

(1) Maritime Power Projection-Shaping and Responding

Projecting US power and influence from the sea is heart of the Navy and Marine Corps contribution to a national security. Sea- based, self- contained, and self –sustaining naval forces are relatively unconstrained by regional infrastructure requirements and uniquely suited to exploit the access afforded by the seas to respond to the full spectrum of contingencies. In the Cold War Age, the heart of the naval forces was destroying enemy fleet at sea. It is emphasized the strategic change to the transformation to the From The Sea, that is, littoral warfare.

(2) Our Means

In order to enable maritime power, two means, forward presence and knowledge superiority, are needed. Acting through the international media of the seas and cyberspace, naval forces assure access and project both power and influence in peacetime and crisis and war. It is remarkable that knowledge superiority through the international medium of Cyberspaces is positioned as one of two wheels with forward presence, in the meaning of recognition of transformation to information age.

a. Forward Presence

Forward Presence is being physically present with credible combat forces to deter aggression, enhance regional stability, protect and promote US interest, improve interoperability and provide timely initial crisis response where our national interests dictate. In order to pursue this, sea control will remain the cardinal prerequisite that guarantees access forward for naval forces as well as for our sister Services that increasingly rely both on movement of assets by the sea and their pre-positioning on the sea.

b. Knowledge Superiority

Knowledge superiority will allow us to know what is occurring and to act quickly. Through our access to cyberspace, naval forces will achieve an unprecedented awareness of the battlespace. Information, however, will not improve understanding unless it provides commanders the real time knowledge required to make timely and informed decisions. Therefore, it is emphasized that improvement in networking and communications technology matched by agile and adaptive organizations, will dramatically accelerate the operations of dispersed and maneuvering naval forces. Knowledge superiority will also provide naval forces the speed of command to operate faster than those adversaries—inside their decision timelines. Ultimately, networked operations will improve our operational tempo and provide the knowledge to maneuver or produce effects that “lock out” an opponent’s intended actions and defeat his over all strategy. Just as forward presence has become a way of life for the Navy and Marine Corps, so too will knowledge superiority become a part of our naval character. The ability to master this new domain in warfare—cyberspace—must become a core competency across all warfare specialties.

The Defense Agency and Self- Defense Forces have made effort to make prominent result in this area; however, it is far behind the position of the US Navy.

The biggest reason is due to the budget item of cyberspace; that is in the rear support item, not front item of budget like vehicles and ammunition. Forward presence and knowledge superiority are like two side of the same coin. We must recognize that we cannot gain the victory at the conflict in 21st century without knowledge superiority. So we should shift it from rear support item to front budget item as soon as possible.

(3) Our Ways

The ways we use the “means” can be described through the three components of maritime combat area; battlespace control, battlespace attack and battlespace sustainment.

a. Battlespace Control

Battlespace control encompasses the range of actions required to assure our access and shape the battlespace for naval, joint and combined forces. Sea control remains both a cardinal prerequisite for and a unique naval contribution. However, it is no longer sufficient to think only in terms of sea or area control. Naval forces must therefore control the entire battlespace—sea, air, land, space and cyberspace—in order to defend against, defeat, deny or negate these capabilities.

b. Battlespace Attack

Attack operation such as precision strike and ship-to-objective maneuver exploit the advantages of maneuver and firepower from the sea. Battlespace attack capability afforded by forward presence and knowledge superiority will deter would –be aggressors in peacetime and permit the decisive application of combat power in crisis or conflict.

c. Battlespace Sustainment

Mobile, dispersed forces require an equally agile and tailored logistics system to support their dynamic operations. Logistics from the sea that are focused to arrive where and when needed, without a large footprint requiring significant protection, will support sustained maneuver in an expanded battleplace.

As in this description, US Navy will not lift the large amount materials to land in the future and is thinking the logistic support from the big barge such as mega float.

(4) Ends

The navy and Marine Corps support America’ s security objectives by promoting regional stability, deterring aggression, providing timely crisis response, and defeating the enemy—any time, anywhere. In the future, regional disturbances will have a more immediate and disproportionate effect on the global community.

3. Long Range Planning

This section is intended to steer planning efforts for 2002 –2025. The objective is not to provide specific programming guidance, but rather to provide strategic planning guidance, which identifies force attributes and capabilities required--and the priorities among them—to provide a fleet trained, organized and equipped in accordance with concept. To provide a framework for prioritization, the following criteria will be used.

Priority 1: Core competencies without which severe strategic risk would be incurred.

Priority2: Core competencies without which significant strategic risk would be incurred

Priority3: Core competencies without which moderate strategic risk would be incurred.

Priority4: Core competencies without which marginal strategic risk would be incurred.

Priority5: Core competencies without which minimal strategic risk would be incurred.

According to these criteria, following items are classified. Due to the limitation of page of paper, I introduce the description of the Priority 1 issue only.

(1) Maritime Power Projection

The paramount objective of the Navy and Marine Corps will remain the global projection of American power and influence—anytime, anywhere. For this objective, people will always be top priority. So, the capability to recruit and to meet established retention goals is positioned at Priority 1. Last January, I participated in the conference at San Diego. The biggest agenda and hottest discussion was the securing sufficient manpower.

(2) Forward Presence

a. Operational Concept for Forward Presence

The Carrier Battle Group, the Amphibious Ready Group and Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance are the core of the forward –deployed naval force.

b. Force Posture Capabilities

Following two items are prioritized as 1. First, the capability to deploy the CVBG and ARG fully combat ready as the core naval combat force package, directly augmented and supported by other maritime, air, and logistic forces. Second, the capability for forward deployed forces to maintain survivability must be a design characteristic of all future platforms. Survivability in the 21st century will integrate a combination of reduced detectability, improved defensive systems and sensor improved recoverability that allows platforms to fight while hurt or exposed to chemical or biological contamination.

(3) Knowledge Superiority

a. Operational Concept for Knowledge Superiority

The Navy of the future will conduct all operations based on the concept of Network Centric Operations. NCO derives power from the robust, rapid, networking of well informed, geographically dispersed warfighters to create a precise, agile style of maneuver warfare and overpowering tempo.

As for IT-21, it will provide wide band information exchange; video, data, tactical data and imagery availability to shipboard local area network; enable ship-shore tactical data exchange and so on.

As for Information Operation, defensive IO includes information assurance, operations security, counter-deception, counterintelligence, electronic warfare and special information operations.

b. Long Range Planning Objectives for Knowledge Superiority

(a) Command and Control

Next two items are prioritized as Priority 1; First, the capability to direct Naval, Joint and Task Force operations afloat. Second, the capability to link shooters, sensors and command nodes with an open-architecture integrated information grid that leverages commercial off-the shelf technology wherever possible.

(b) Communication/Data Link

Ultimately, networked operations will improve our operational tempo and provide the knowledge to maneuver or produce effects that lock out an opponent’s intended actions and defeat his overall strategy. Next two items are priority 1. First, The capability for all combatants and tactical aviation platforms to operate a common tactical data link system. Second the capability to produce and sustain a single integrated air picture.

Following three items are prioritized as priority 1. First, the capability to conduct covert surveillance in the littoral battlespace. Second, the capability to conduct armed maritime and littoral ISR. Third, the capability to provide the shooters with near-real time attack on moving targets in littoral area.

(d) Sensors

The capability to operate in an environment in which the Global Positioning System is jammed or degraded.

(e) Satellites

The capability to dynamically manage and assign bandwidth for maximum efficiency.

(4) Battlespace Control

a. Concept

Battlespace control for forward forces will require a combination of strategic, surface, subsurface and air superiority.

・Ballistic missile submarines provide the Navy’s contribution to nuclear deterrence at the strategic level.

・The primary force enabler for air superiority is the carrier air wing.

・Force protection consists of a layered defense concept of shipboard, aircraft and submarine systems. The Theater Ballistic Missile Defense system on Aegis will be the Navy’s primary theater defense. Surface combatants, submarines, MPR aircraft, helicopters and IUSS assets combine forces to counter the undersea warfare threat. Protection against mines will be accomplished through the use of organic and dedicated mine countermeasures to include detection, avoidance, marking and neutralization.

b. Long Range Planning Objectives for Battlespace Control

(a) Strategic Deterrence

The capability to maintain current sea-based strategic nuclear deterrence is Priority 1.

(b) Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Defense

First, The fleet-wide, point defense capability to achieve high-probability hard kill against sub-and super-sonic cruise missile. Second, the capability to develop and deploy advanced active countermeasure and expendable decoy. Third, the capability to integrate self defense stand-alone sensors and hard/ soft-kill system.

First, the capability for naval air forces to maintain air superiority over potential adversaries. Second, the capability to provide area air and missile defense against emerging threats, including advanced cruise missiles.

(d) Undersea Warfare

The capability to conduct undersea surveillance in littoral waters.

(e) Anti-Submarine Warfare

The capability to deploy undersea sensor networks that can detect nuclear and conventional submarines in a littoral waters.

(f) Mine Warfare

The organic capability of surface forces to detect, avoid and /or neutralize mines within operationally acceptable timelines and with acceptable levels of operational risk.

(g) Theater Missile Defense

The capability for command and control in theater ballistic missile environment.

(h) Surface Warfare

The capability to detect, identify, track and destroy high numbers of small craft in the littorals.

(5) Battlespace Attack

a. Operational Concepts

・To shape the battlespace with massed, precision guided munitions launched from numerous platforms aimed at enemy’s center of gravity and critical nodes.

・Carrier air wings are launched to provide tactical air power, achieve air dominance and strike at critical targets while providing support to ground forces ashore.

・Submarine provides covert intelligence, surveillance and recovering special operation forces.

・Marine Expeditionary Forces project power ashore.

・MPR aircraft augment the air wing to conduct C2, ISR, SUW, and USW and land attack missions to the operation.

・USV will be launched to gain critical ISR.

・To conduct sea strike. sea strike is a future capability of forward deployed naval forces firing thousands of munitions per hour, with extended range, using fully integrated and simultaneous fires from distributed netted forces, with precision at target.

・Information Operation will be conducted against adversary.

b. Long Range Planning Objectives For Battlespace Attack

(a) Long Range Strike and Interdiction

First, the capability for aircraft carriers to conduct all-weather precision strike operation. Second, the capability to direct responsive, precision lethal naval fire against a wide range. Third, the capability to provide sea-based suppression of enemy air defenses. Fourth, the capability to conduct non-cooperative target identification equally well in the active or passive mode.

(b) Amphibious Operation

The capability for improved day, night and all-weather close air support for amphibious operations ashore.

(5) Battlespace Sustainment

a. Operational Concept

・Ships of the Combat Logistic Forces provide the organic support that will allow naval forces to maintain a forward presence in any location.

・The Maritime Prepositioning Squadron is key element of the Marine Corps expeditionary sustainment capabilities.

・Ships of the Military Sealift Command provide the Navy with the capability to move and sustain US forces overseas by strategic sealift.

b. Long Range Planning Objectives For Battlespace Sustainment

(a) Replenishment

The capability for a day and night connected and vertical replenishment and transfer of personnel and cargo at sea.

(b) Weapons Handling and Loading

The capability to sustain forward deployed precision guided munitions levels in support of rotational deployment requirements, contingency operations.

The Capability to determine the physical condition of ship, amphibious vehicle, ground vehicle and aircraft system.

Conclusion

In short, the US Navy strategy is to deploy forces to the vicinity of the theater where conflicts are predicted, and when the indication of the occurrence of conflict becomes high, rapidly to deploy and to concentrate the forces to that area to dissuade the adversary not to escalate to the conflict stage. In the event these actions do not produce effective results, the next step is to demonstrate the naval action and present the warning to deter the conflict. In the event deterrence fails and conflict occur, or possibility of occurrence of conflicts is extremely high, the US Navy will geographically disperse the fleet to decrease the damage and conduct effective AAW, ASUW and AMW.

Moreover the Navy will attack the C4ISR facilities, missile launch bases and enemy airfields by networked concentration of fire, and decrease enemy attacking capability to control battlespace. Due to the networked operation, information regarding enemy will be rapidly collected, evaluated and distributed to the forces in order to have common situation awareness and understanding. Then, the enemy’s weak points, critical points and center of gravity will be identified and the forces will be employed precisely to the littoral and land area to conduct battlespace attack aiming to maintain initiative of fighting based on the effect-based operation. To do this kind of operation, the strong sea based logistic support posture is indispensable for battlespace sustainment. To conduct the type operation as mentioned, not only platform, but also knowledge superiority is also indispensable. In order to respond to such US forces movement and to maintain interoperability with the US forces and to cope with various conflicts in the 21st century, the JDA and JMSDF should establish the overall posture for the study, development and training-education, including those for cyber warfare. So, budget item regarding IT must be shifted from rear support item to front budget item like vehicles and ammunition.

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