A
Study of Defense Improvement in IT Revolution Era
by
Kazumasa KOBAYASHII
Member of Research Committee,
1. IT Revolution and National Security of
(1)
Overview of IT Revolution
a. IT Revolution and Its Features
IT revolution may be defined as “emerging
revolutionary changes in human activities based on rapid development of IT(information technology) using computers and
communications.” While the question whether this tendency maybe called
‘revolution’ would be evaluated later, it is inevitable that the role of
military power in the national security will be greatly impacted by this trend,
which also ought to be considered to continue for sometime. Its features include: (i) Capability
to share high-volume information simultaneously by great many people; (ii)
Rapid penetration into the international communities ahead of national
controls; (iii) Sooner progress in the fields closely related to the public
life; and (iv) Those who do not aspire will be left
behind.
b. Development of IT Revolution and Present Status in
IT revolution is still expanding. While the
In
(2)
IT Revolution and
a. Influence on National
Security Policies of
IT revolution is
significantly affecting
(i) It is required to review size of forces, their
structure, equipment and operation, since the mere traditional military power
can hardly address emerging threats, such new threats as terrorism and cyber
attacks brought about by IT revolution.
(ii)
Responding to accelerating operations and a variety of unpredictable situations
requires the nation to make decisions more rapidly, and to build and improve,
in close cooperation with related governmental agencies and US Forces, the
C4ISR which will be capable to support more accurate actions by appropriate
military power.
(iii)
Furthermore, collaborative efforts with other agencies, local governments and
private communities are essential to counter asymmetrical threats, to which
only limited actions can be taken by JDA/SDF. It should be accelerated to build up
robust domestic IT infrastructure necessary to enable those proper activities.
(iv) It is vital to hold fast to the Japan-U.S. security framework to cope with
new threats, and interoperability between the systems as well as between
Japanese and
(v)
In order adequately to carry out the security policies in the IT revolution
era, together with promotion of international cooperation, close attention is
required to international and domestic public opinion trends; in some cases,
with aggressive efforts to build up public opinion.
(vi) One of security policies in IT era not to be neglected is the efforts to
stabilize and improve people’s living basis. In that event, given the
progressed IT revolution, it should be kept in mind that improvement of the
nation’s living basis should come along with improved level of world living
standards.
b. Influence on Japanese
Defense Policies
In laying down
Japanese national defense policies, it is required to be deeply aware of IT
revolution being under way and, in particular, to focus on the following:
(i) Establishing missions, organizations, and procedures of
forces, in consideration of complicated and expanded situations, and
accelerated situational changes.
(ii)
Clear legislative assignment of JDA/JSDF’s is shared
missions to counter asymmetrical threats as a prerequisite to close and essential
solidarity with related agencies, local governments and others.
(iii) Organic utilization of commercial technologies, and outsourcing of
personnel where specific experience and knowledge in the specialized areas and
services are available and do not necessarily require JSDF personnel.
(iv) Promoting uses of sea and space, and establishment of defense systems.
In
preparing defense policies, items on which more attention will be needed
are: [1] Degree of development in
Chinese IT revolution; [2] Quantitative and qualitative changes in
2. Development of IT and
RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs).
IT revolution has been spreading
not only in military affairs but also in overall social life such as economic
activities, social activities, and mass media. RMA, recently being developed mainly in
the
(1)
What is RMA?
According to the FY99 U.S.
Annual Defense Report, RMA is “the situation in which significant advances in
technologies produce drastic development in military capabilities, combining
with organizational and doctrine reforms,” and it should be understood that
there are important factors in the background, such as revolutionary changes in
social and economic activities, limited defense budget, and respect for human
life.
(2)
Features of Armed Forces with Well-Pursued RMA.
When RMA progresses,
Command, Control, and Intelligence functions essential for every situation will
be rapidly and flexibly systemized in any “time and place” to allow commanders
through ranks to share information, and all persons concerned will be able to
get large amount of necessary information simultaneously. That is the
completion of modernization in C4ISR. In armed forces evolved in such a state,
only such elements as necessary for operational objectives would be chosen by
the mission purpose out of widely dispersed Ground, Maritime, and Air units,
which could be systemized to operate jointly and flexibly concentrating the
power in necessary area and time.
Furthermore, information superiority would be constantly secured,
long-range rapid precision attacks would be made possible, and battlefield and
airspace control would be facilitated.
Associated with such epoch-making changes in the operation of forces,
required quantity of weapons can be reduced, while rigorously pursuing the
followings: [1] Multi-layered
protection of warriors and equipment by missile defense and others; [2] Rapid,
adaptable, and precise combat service supports by fusing of intelligence,
logistics and transportation technologies; [3] Seeking for significant
reduction in attrition rates: [4] Expedited and efficiency-increased
acquisition and procurement. And we
must take it to heart that much increased effect in safety and efficiency of
human power can be expected as well.
(3)
Aspect of Future War
a. Forms of Warfighting Will Vary Greatly
Warfighting by armed forces evolved in
RMA will change, from the war of exhaustion between armed forces, to the fights
of obtaining superiorities in infrastructure such as space-based and undersea
information communications and reconnaissance, to the shock-projecting battles
to national and military centers, and to the network-centric warfare with vital
information networks of highly information-oriented national systems. That is,
information war with full use of high-tech will play an important role. Also, available precision attacks would
greatly speed up theater movement and expansion, and operations. Moreover, development in mass media
would force any combat always to consider international and domestic public
opinion, and the requirement for more respect for human life would accelerate
less-manned and unmanned operations
b. Targeting Will Shift Away
from Enemy Military Centers
At the outbreak of war,
establishment of information superiority will be pursued by destroying and
neutralizing enemy’s C4ISR systems, air defense systems, including
satellites. In other words, focus
would be on cyber attack against essential national infrastructures and
military centers, or precision attacks will make full use of guided precision
munitions and others, or preemptive covert attacks with computer virus. Infrastructure related to commercial
information communications and broadcasts, including those in space, will be
important attack targets.
c. Attacking Means Will Be
Diversified
While traditional attacking
means of weapons such as aircraft and missiles will be maintained, in addition
to those, various types of attacks will be conducted in cyber attacks, with CB
weapons, laser weapons, and the like.
d.
Protection Efforts Will Become Important
In association with
diversified attacking ways, it will be essential to enhance warning postures
continuously with full use of various C4ISR systems including reconnaissance
satellites, and therefore, it would be strongly required to secure robustness
of the C4ISR systems and the important infrastructures, and to sustain strong
and sturdy countering capabilities against enemy’s precision attacks to
military centers.
(4)
Limits of RMA
a. Discussions on the
Direction of RMA
With
further progress in IT revolution and more distinct reforms in economic
activities, several ideas could be seen regarding how and in what forms the RMA
would evolve in the future. First
is so-called “IT technology for IT technology’s sake.” The idea is to promote
systems networking, focused not on traditional platforms such as aircraft and
ships, but on development of electronic technologies, sensors, computers and
the like, and primarily thinking of military equipment in these terms. Network-centric warfare in the U.S.
Forces is considered as a good example. Second is what is called as “air power
preference.” This idea asserts that
air power such as stealth fighters/ bombers and missile defense systems must be
the one which leads RMA. Thirdly, RMA is believed to evolve as phenomena
accompanying with information-orienting of society. In other word, regarding only the
high-tech information warfare, and reducing relative necessity of offensive
weapons and others.
b. Skepticism as to
Realization of RMA
Although we ought to think that
progress in IT revolution will necessarily result in progress of RMA, will it
not be natural, since technologies provide the basis of RMA, to regard that
revolutionary changes is not be expected, but only continual development? In the near future, possibility of
large-scale conflicts is very low, and larger is the possibility of
disturbances involving asymmetrical threats such as terrorist attacks, so RMA
may be said to advance steadily in such fields. However, it would be too early to expect
innovatory changes throughout military powers. Because the progress of
information-orienting could lead to overflow of information, confusion of
people’s minds, and great impacts in case of the information systems neutralization,
the traditional weapon systems including nuclear weapons will remain more
effective for territorial occupations as primary military role and presence.
3. Handling of Issue in
Asian Nations
(1)
The Chinese Defense White
Paper of 1998 has shown their recognition of RMA, saying “Changes in military
fields leading to the development of high-tech weapons is now emerging all over
the world. This reform is rapidly evolving,” and definitely stating that they will “aim at
readiness for defense operations under the condition of current technologies,
especially of high-techs, in conformity with the significant change in global
military communities.” Actually,
they have started a long-term modernization plan that intends to expand equipment
and training while cutting the personnel down by 500,000. That is, they have changed operational
conditions from “under general conditions” to “under high-tech conditions,” as
well as organizations and trainings from “quantity/size-based” to “quality/function-
based.”
(2)
Based on lessons learned from
the Gulf War, classification of strategic, tactical and operational divisions
by the battlefield depth was abandoned, and being aware of advantages of
preemptive attacks and lessened roles of land power, they have focused for the
directions toward military modernization on: [1] Corps d’elite
formed by volunteers; [2] Emergency deployment capability of ground forces; [3]
Investment in high-tech air power; [4] Review of air defense networks; [5]
Automated C3I systems and improved guidance capabilities of weapons; and
others. Progress has been seen in
trials for applying information technologies into service unification. However, with their economic troubles,
the official concept for information RMA seems to be undetermined.
(3)
Based on lessons learned from
the Gulf War, they have stated that “the improved defense power focusing only
on countering the current North Korean threats and weapon systems will soon
become outmoded and is insufficient to counter future uncertain threats.” Also emphasized is the transformation to
“the advanced-technology-dominant weapon systems surviving in the future
high-tech wars, while taking countermeasures against the existing North Korean
threats.” In 1996, they
created a “Revolution in Military Affairs project team (RMA)” in the Defense
Ministry to propel the transformation.
4. RMA and National Security of
(1)
Understanding of RMA and Aspects of Future War
a. Awareness of present Status
The Defense Agency has been
highly concerned with RMA, and has carried out studies, such as the “Concerning
Information RMA” report released in September, 12th year of Heisei (2000) by
the Office of Research, Defense Policy Department, reflecting their researches
and findings. Those are from desks
and armchairs, however; JDA may be noted insufficient to have a unified
understanding and definite policies on the issue. In the “National Defense Program
Outline” and “Mid-Term Defense Buildup Program (1996-2000),” they do not refer
to dynamic reforms in JSDF’s equipment and
organization, but only adding some flavors of fund saving factors to the legacy
line of policies.
b. Possibility of RMA
Occurrence
In rising expectation to JSDF
for responses against large-scale disasters and asymmetrical threats, RMA is
believed to evolve partially and gradually in association with advances in IT
revolution. In our country, because
RMA will require the background of social and economic activities, the severe
degree of shortage of defense budget and human resource as well as the degrees
of evolution in IT technologies, will be the key to the rate of progress of
RMA. We must understand that the
possibility would be low of booming evolution of RMA throughout the areas of
military power, even if continued efforts will take places for RMA in all those
areas. As for the
directions of RMA described in the section 2. (4), it would be sound to
view that composite-type RMA fusing those three ideas mentioned would
obtain. Because of difficulty in
confirming the results from RMA through actual combats, every nation appears to
observe the progress in the
However, it is shocking to
examine the present status of JSDF to find that RMA has progressed only too
little. Today, in face of
diversified mission requirements for JSDF, it is so doubtful whether we should
leave them with the current organization and equipment, and operational
procedures without any change. With
significant changes in the post-Cold War security environment, and as IT
revolution progresses, do we not have the need to propel RMA? I believe what the people expect is that
JDA/JSDF must promote RMA without waiting for any external factors and exert
early efforts to realize the Japanese-style RMA. Where there is a strong will to propel
RMA, there will be 100% possibility of occurrence of RMA, and we should never
spare efforts.
(2)
Our Ways to Pursue RMA
a. Premises for RMA Promotion
(i) In the studies of course of our defense systems, the
worst case analysis which was the mainstream of Cold War should give way to the
focus on the responses to more likely scenarios. At that time, looking straight at the
real world with our geographical environment and its changing implication,
determined courage is needed to cut off the past fetters.
(ii)
For the detail and substantial discussions of defense power to be secured,
considering our own peculiar realities such as the spirit of the Constitution,
the national consensus, youth population decrease and aging society, and the
geographical environment, it is necessary to pursue our unique and original RMA
while trying to harmonize with RMA in the U.S. Forces (USF).
(iii)
It is important to have the fundamental attitude holding fast to the Japan-U.S.
Security Framework now and in the future.
b.
Items to be Focused in Pursuing RMA.
(i) Effort is required to increase effectiveness of the
Japan-U.S. Security Framework in the national interest of
(ii)
Interoperability is extremely important effectively to conduct the combined
operations. In addition to current
interoperability among platforms and various systems, that of networks is
important. This has to be taken
into consideration for its COE which JDA is currently improving.
(iii)
A system facilitating flexible responses for diversified defense roles should
be established, and more emphasis needs to be on securing the capabilities to
respond against asymmetrical threats.
(iv)
R&D should be positively furthered on necessary advanced military
technologies. Out- sourcing needs
to be promoted extensively as well as international cooperation on R&D.
(v)
Carefully observing changes in the social structure and trends of people’s
consciousness, we should build up a system capable of efficiently carrying out
the JSDF activities together with other agencies, local governments, industry,
and so forth, while defining the functions that are possible only by JDA/JSDF.
(vi) Carefully observing the actualities of decreasing social tolerance for damages in
association with the development of decreasing youth population and mass media
influence, and taking still more care of the lives of JSDF personnel, policies
are required to enhance human lives security. Consideration is essential to include
personal expenses in the life-cycle costs, in the examination of equipment
acquisition.
(3) A
Consideration on RMA for JDA/JSDF
a. Basic Understanding.
(i) JSDF will be positively used for defense of
(ii)
JSDF will be also used more positively to respond to intrusion by suspicious
vessels, guerrilla and special forces, attacks by
biological weapons and various disasters.
(iii)
Increase in defense budget will not be expected, nor personnel increase.
b. Consideration for
Japanese-style RMA
The strategic environment
surrounding
(a)
Posture for Warning and Surveillance
We have to keep the capable
posture to detect, analyze, and report in extensively broad situations
including indications of terrorism, suspicious vessels and guerrilla as well as
disasters. The urgent task is to
establish a consolidated information network integrated with not only JSDF but also
USF, related agencies, diplomatic establishments abroad, local governments,
etc., as well as to build up a system capable to take proper actions with quick
decision making in response to situational changes. And I believe we must completely fulfill
the posture to counter new threats, even if we would, instead, have to cut down
significantly the former information structure meant for full-size military
intrusions.
(b)
Operational Procedures of Defense Power
(i) Regarding the homeland defense operations, we need to
convert the system from countering limited and small-size landing invasions in
the Cold War era, to being focused on power concentration against specific
threats. In particular, fulfillment
of the joint operational system of forces essential to the defense of southern
sea lanes and islands is needed.
(ii)
For the situations in the surrounding areas, it will be vital to secure the
structure capable to conduct combined operations with USF, and to fulfill
logistic support systems.
(iii)
For missile defense, harmonious cooperation with
(iv)
For the risk management for terrorism, disasters and such, it is necessary to
clarify the role assignment with related ministries and agencies, as well as to
secure the system capable of taking quick and accurate actions. At that time, we should be rid of the
idea that JSDF alone must respond to all, and should adopt the idea of role
sharing to be complementarily responsible for specific areas.
(c)
To Secure Human Power
(i) The land power needs to be transformed mainly with corps
d’elite high-tech divisions. Accordingly, the uniformed personnel
allotment to each service needs to be reviewed.
(ii)
The review is needed on the jobs currently assigned to uniformed personnel, and
those assignments should be limited to the jobs specifically required for
uniformed personnel. In other
words, the job areas with high risks to life are for the uniformed. Therefore,
it is indispensable to improve status and treatment of the military personnel,
and to increase civilians’ capacity of military knowledge.
(iii)
Simulations should be utilized for analyses and estimates required for
headquarters activities and for the functions needing high experience and
knowledge, outsourcing, mainly to veterans (so-called
(d)
Acquisition and Procurement of Equipment
The acquisition and
procurement reform that has been done for several years in JDA only remained in
contract procedures, leaving itself far behind that of Western countries that
have pushed it forward aggressively.
We should seek for acquiring “items of higher quality, at lower cost,
more rapidly, and more efficiently.”
In
Conclusion,
RMA in JDA/JSDF has only just
started. Highly original outcome is
expected to be introduced without any past fetters. This study,
although limited by the author’s insufficient capacity and may well be
unrefined, I would be happy to offer this for the readers’ information.
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