A Study of Defense Technical
Research and Development
--To Perform Important Roles within Big
Environmental Changes—
by Sadao
KOBAYASHI
Member of Research Committee, DRC
Introduction
On the last DRC annual report, I surveyed
the various environmental changes around the Defense Agency (JDA) and the Self
Defense Forces (SDF) since their origination, and pointed out some problems of
the defense technical research and development (R&D),
such as ① Problems about Japan’s defense
policy, ② Problems within the systems of
the JDA and SDF, ③ Problems within the systems of
technical development, and ④ Problems about the budget
distribution. And also, referring to the “Guideline for Research and
Development—for the Purpose of Defense Technical Structure Build-up” set and
released in 2001, I proposed the policy for improvement to strengthen the
capabilities of the defense technical R&D such as ① Establishment of defense policy in concert
with national system, ② Technical R&D and improvement
upon the division of responsibility, ③ Promotion
of basic defense study and technology demonstration and ④ Needs for dialogue with defense industry and
the reconstruction of cooperative relationship. And I suggested the urgent and
investigation action to be taken.
Based on the Mid-term Defense
Build-up Program (2001-2005), new large prototype production programs such as
new main battle tank, next fixed-wing patrol aircraft (PX) and new transport
aircraft (CX), requested by the Ground SDF, the Maritime SDF and the Air SDF
respectively, were already kicked off at the Technical Research and Development
Institute (TRDI). It is gratifying that by these projects we would get and
maintain not only the workload for related industries but most important and
valuable measures to promote the basis of the defense industries and related
technologies. But unfortunately it is estimated that the TRDI budget for the
prototype product spending only of next financial year will exceed the average
budgetary framework, which is expected approximately $10 billion every year,
and it comes whether to request for more budget to perform the two big projects
and CX, or to reconsider the whole development plan, or to cutback in the
budget for other projects excluding PX and CX. It was clear in advance that
such a situation will arrive, however, it will be necessary to reform widely
the contents of the R&D requested by the SDF and it will result some
serious troubles for the operations commanded by each forces in future.
On the other hand, the 21st
century-type threat appeared actually by the attack on September 11th
in
In these days,
For the reasons mentioned above, I
want to propose some ideas and opinions focusing on the defense technical
R&D issues again, to the effective and efficient R&D activities in line
with the SDF operations.
1. Change of National Security Environment
Since the cold-war structure
collapsed, which had lasted so long after the WW II, new era has come; the
I heard that the discussion for
the basic study to settle on the new National Defense Program Outline already
started. And we know that now it is the era of selection and concentration, not
the era of the please-everybody policy. Under these circumstances and also
under the severe national financial situation, it is necessary to inform the
people more clear intentions how we should judge the realities and what
directions or ways we should choose to reply the national expectations on
homeland defense. Also from the defense R&D point of view, the main theme
of this report, it will be our heavy responsibility to give adequate messages
and to establish the communication linkage for more lasting, strong and
friendly relationship with our Japanese defense industries. We can’t waste time
only for waiting the approval of the emergency bills at the Diet.
2. Actions for Vigorous Defense R&D Activities (1)
As we know well, the defense
R&D is the necessary activity to develop, produce, modify and repair the
weapons, which protect persons and/or objects and also wound, kill and destroy
enemies. For this reason, we have to do such activities based on discreet and
careful preparations and procedures; that is the supreme arrangements. Only
after these arrangements, we could achieve the highest technological level, and
get most advanced and powerful weapons in the world. But in actuality, it is
impossible to do so, and normally in compliance with the national interest,
national power and surrounding various situations, a nation’s defense build-up level
or standard will be decided after some severe trade-off studies between the
defense spending and the national risks, placing a big bet on the country’s
destiny. And for the study, the important factor first is “Needs”. The clear
and strong needs well mixed both ideas of the operators and engineers based on
the enough analyzed experiences and the sharp insight, are always the first
step of the long-lasting R&D activities. If the coordination between the
operators and engineers isn’t good enough or the daily duties are performed
aimlessly, the effective and definite needs couldn’t be created at all. In the
case of almost of all our defense R&D activities, the weakest point is the
shortage of studying the needs. To develop the useful and excellent equipments
for the SDF, we can say that it is always the minimum necessity to discuss with
each other frankly and hotly between the operators and the engineers,
government and private companies concerned. At a restaurant for example, it
will be a good order system for dishes “to leave it to the chef” and probably
we could have the tastiest foods of the restaurant. The R&D activities,
however, the system “to leave it to engineer” will not make any production and
we say it is irresponsibility.
At the recent DRC research trip to
The idea described above seems to
be common nowadays among the Western countries, and I think the Japanese
government should refer to it too. Unfortunately in
The studies and discussions across
and unifying each force, the decision making of the policy with overriding
priority based on the outcome and the concentrated execution, those are very
important to make various plans. However, liberal-minded talking about the
general good and sacrificing one’s own interests for it is only accepted in
logic and resisted in practice. For
3. Actions for Vigorous Defense R&D Activities (2)
Like the study on needs, another
important factor for planning the defense R&D activities is the decision of
the “Specifications”.
As we know well, the specifications are some kind of documents to specialize the characteristics and performances of the equipment that we want to acquire. The main equipments, such as a tank, an aircraft and a battleship, are systematically in big scale and it is normally difficult to define the detail specification in advance. However, we should describe it as definitely and quantitatively as possible taking into consideration the service life, the operational configuration, the maturity and the skills of applied technologies for the equipment. And on the step for studying specifications, we should pay strong attentions to avoid such factors as to affect the duration and costs for the development and make efforts to reduce the development risk. We have not so many chances to develop weapons, therefore I can understand the stance that always wants to make the equipment at the highest level at any cost. But the more the pre-stage of research activity for the technology applied is long and the technology is unique, the more the people concerned will be particular about applying the technology to it, and at last the portion of risk accompanying the development increase. The development schedule also always has no time to spare because the JDA normally doesn’t make great effort to explain logically and understandably to the Ministry of Finance that the project has to kick off on time; this means we are not allowed to fail absolutely on our planning. If we estimate even small risk or probability of failure, the authority concerned doesn’t permit to set it to work for the development. In my sense, it is necessary to challenge to establish the development by taking all possible measures, and also to suck to the very marrow even if the development will end up with success or not. I think it is the real spirit of the R&D.
With regard to failure, the experimental flight in
Even now, I feel something wrong with the high success rate at the
JDA; the atmosphere and silent pressure saying “Failure is shame”, and in
addition the regulations and rules describing no failure. But the failures
after taking the heated discussions, the enough preparations and careful
executions teach us new and effective processes and the experiences tasted with
the deep chagrin would surely be utilized next chance. These thinking are the
core spirit of the R&D activity and lead us to the progress and
development. There are lots of moving dramas and examples in the case of the
R&D processes for the commercial products, but why we can’t produce such a excellent and moving drama by our scenario? Maybe it comes
from the long lasting and misunderstanding pacifism after WW II, I think, and
it is not so easy for my country to adjust the direction taken by the policy.
And not only the operators of the equipments but also engineers never really
think that the “Made in
4. Reform of
Defense R&D Systems
I am sure that it is very important for the R&D system to act
continuously like a live mechanism, despite various problems just mentioned
above. After WW II,
①It is essential to bring up the key persons
who understand well the importance of the defense R&D for the weapon
production and plan, to act and to lead various projects.
Recently, one of the councils
belonging to the Ministry of Education and Science announced the research
proposal saying “Lithe brains, leadership, and education including the humane
studies and persons of noble character with extensive knowledge, those are
necessary to establish the scientific technological creative country.” I’m
sure, though, that the modesty and high-minded personality also are
indispensable to carry out the defense R&D. Also, there are some
difficulties to educate and train the engineers in uniform: it is to the
individual’s disadvantage to be engaged in R&D for a long period, due to
the present regulations and/or rules on the personnel management. In addition,
the term for the technical education is normally too long to send an officer to
an appropriate post just in time. The engineer of the SDF officer, however,
will be especially more necessary near in future, because he knows the military
operations, he can work always and everywhere in the world and also he has a
strong character not only physically but also mentally.
②The step of the defense R&D system reform
seems very slow in spite of the increasing speed of the SDF operation, and at
the same time, the spread of the SDF activity area is
making it difficult to keep in step with the operations speed and the speed of
the R&D activity. The TRDI is now the unified defense R&D organization
of the JDA mainly due to the effective achievement of the duties and common use
of the research data. But in my feeling and as I discussed last year, the time
has come to reform the related organizations of the TRDI and the SDF as soon as
possible to avoid the complicated and troublesome document exchanges and
negotiations between the SDF and the TRDI for the establishment of the R&D,
to manage efficiently the limited personnel resources: I recommend the more
preferable form of the defense R&D of the era as a self-closed type within
each SDF, and this makes possible to control the configuration of the
equipments and to clarify the responsibilities for the development continuously
at all steps from the cradle to the brave. And one more important item to do is
to increase the speed of the R&D activity; it means the time reduction of
the development phase by applying the following policies.
・By the preparedness and strengthening of the
fundamental/basic studies and the thorough assessment before development phase,
to minimize failures or risks on the development stage.
・By the detailed investigations of the
requirement contents, to exclude the unnecessary items.
・With the right partnership, co-develop a
project under the perfect risk and cost shares.
③Today, it is almost impossible to operate the
military equipments by the operators alone due to the high, detailed and
systematic technologies applied to them. Especially for the main weapon, a
matter of course, the full support of the civil power (that is, the defense
industry) is necessary at all the phases for development, production and
maintenance. And if we take into consideration the difficulty to increase the
manpower for the JDA and the SDF, I think that it will be very important to
establish the coordinative and collaborative systems with the private technical
manpowers for big development projects, such as the SETA (System Engineering
Technical Assistant). The good relationship and the coordination system between
the government and the private sectors make it possible to acquire and procure
equipments in good quality and to perform duties smoothly. The free-hand
competitive theory, which is one of the main objectives for the acquisition
reforms carried out by the JDA today, sometimes brings confusions to the
essential directions for the reform and improvement due to the specialty of the
defense equipment. So we need to promote the people is awareness in the
distinct nature of the defense acquisition and procurement system and also to
start to revise the defectiveness as soon as possible.
5. Triggers for System Reforms
The
If it were so, what is the best
way for
Firstly, from the education and
training point of view, the training simulated the actual fighting and the
U.S.-Japan joint training comes to mind. According to these methods, it becomes
possible to develop the tactics and strategy within the
well-coupled Man-Machine system. In these cases, however, the trainees are
necessary to learn not only the outcome of the battle operations but also the
scenario setting method, the outline of the M&S used for the pre-study of
the training, the various data used for the M&S model, the contents of the
data-bases and even the meanings of each figures. Of course, the outcome of the
battle operation itself is very important, but we have to investigate it as
scientifically and quantitatively as possible and also we have to pigeonhole
and input the data so as to utilize for all purposes from the educations and
trainings to the defense build-up programs. The point is whether we have the
real actual fighting mind or not. From the defense R&D point of view, the
data is very useful too and we should make full use of them. And more
pragmatically, we have some benefits to make training with the domestic-made
weapons at the area outside
Secondly, especially about the defense R&D, the most effective
way is the expansion and activation of the technical exchange and the joint
research, and the joint development program with the
Conclusion
“The
The U.S. Department of Defense started
to reexamine widely the existing weapons development programs aiming to
entirely new reformed armed forces which will have enough fighting abilities
against the terrorism too. The main purpose for the reexamination is to invest
budget for the developing and procurement of the unmanned weapons such as the
UAV and the remote-controlled tank, which showed sufficient and satisfactory
combat abilities at the cleanup operations in Afghanistan and, as the first
step, intends to stop developing of the next field artillery system (Crusader
self-propelled howitzer); the estimated total developing cost has been $11
billion.” (The gist article of the Nikkei dated
I was very astonished with the news not only by the speed of the
security environment change in the world but also by the reaction speed of the
And in addition, we have to notice and destroy immediately the
present Japanese status where the government-made frivolous and easy-going
logics are making resistance power rather than the lift and/or thrust for all
functions including the defense R&D. The security policy should not be
followed by fashion, and we have to exclude the assumptions, evaluate surely
each time and perform daily duties dynamically for the best future operations.
In
“In spite of the government decision that IT should be the main
subject of Japanese policies, the strong expectation and deep participation of
the government that IT should take position as the driving power of Japanese
economy after the destruction of the bubble economy, as the days passed, the
situation was contrary to the initial hope, without recovery of the competitive
power utilizing IT and also without realizing the continuous recovery of the
Japanese economy. Far from it, unfortunately, the business setback of the big
IT companies and the big cooperations thwarted an
economic recovery at the recession phase since the summer in 2001. And, the IT
still remains only as the means of making a living for many information
equipments manufacturers and communication enterprises, and as a result, it
couldn’t get the widely supported understanding; IT failed to receive the
understanding that it presses for wide range revolution for the method of
company management for all industrial fields, and/or the competitive rules for
the market and to the daily life of the people. In addition, with the collapse
of the IT bubble in the
“After all, this basic policy (see foot note) was used only for the reasons of getting annual budget for the ministries and agencies concerned, and not for the ideals what a economical society we should construct with IT.”
(Kobayashi’s note) This indicates the action plan for the IT nation decided by the headquarter of the promotion for the advanced intelligence and communication society in February 1995
References:
1. Risaburo Nezu, “The Warring States Period of IT”, Chuokoron- Shinsha, April 2002
2.
3. Some articles of the Nikkei and Yomiuri Shinbun
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