Japanese Space Policy Revision and Future of National Security

　

by Tetsuo TAMAMA

Senior Researcher, DRC

 

Introduction 

Inseparably treated mostly in international arena, the relation of space and national security in Japan has been surrounded by a peculiar sensitivity, resulting in procrastination of basic issues.  Since its early days the DRC kept close interest in this aspect, to which also many of this author's overseas studies and conference participations have been related. On one hand the national security issues have come to surface in recent years, triggered by the Taepo Dong shot and terrorism, among others; on the other hand the entire Japanese science and technology policy including space is in the midst of revision due to the government structure reorganization:  the Japanese space policy is in an important stage of transition. 

　　This author has offered a few recent comments on the space policy revision and how the issues were being treated, with the 'Expert Panel on Space Development and Utilization' at its focal point 1) 2). At a time when the Expert Panel Report was submitted in June2002, he would like further to study and comment on the treatment of three basic issues, including and in addition to the national security: 

o　Funding:  future of space funding that now is undergoing budget cuts.

o　Organization:  future organ to deliberate and implement space policy. 

　　In conclusion the following two points are stated. 

�@　All of basic issues are only vaguely treated;  the Japanese space policy is in confusion.

�A　【Appendix】  The entire process seems to endorse what this author discussed in the last year's issue of this DRC Annual Report:  'Absence of Long-Term Strategic Policy Thinking' 3) .

 

1. Space, National Security and Peculiar Japanese Sensitivity 　

Mostly inseparable is the relation of space and national security in the international arena, stemmed as it has from the satellite launching race between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. in the fifties.  In Japan however, a peculiar sensitivity has long pervaded between space and national security, as is briefly summarized below. 

(1) 'Peaceful Use of Space Resolution' 

The 'Peaceful Use of Space' Diet resolution 4) has long governed the relation of Japanese space and national security.  At the establishment of the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) in 1969, the Plenary Session of House of Representatives, as a guard against the military use of space in the wake of post-war contrition, passed on Friday, 9 May a resolution that the development and use of space is to be limited to 'peaceful purposes'  . 

Earlier, the 17th U.N. General Assembly in 1962 had adopted the 'Resolution on Peaceful Use of Outer Space' (Resolution 1802 (XVII)) 5). Whereas, however, the U.N. meaning of 'peaceful' was 'non-aggressive', the Japanese Diet during the interpellation prior to its own resolution, with the knowledge of international meaning of 'non-aggressive' but further expanding it, made it to mean 'non-military' 6) , thereby severely restricting the use of space by the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) and Self-Defense Forces (SDFs). 

(2) 'Common Use Principle' 

　　16 years later, on occasion of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)'s plan to equip itself with receivers for the U.S. military communication satellites, a government view 7) was announced on Wednesday, 6 February 1985, that 'use of satellites by the SDFs does not violate the Resolution's "peaceful purposes" if those satellites are used commonly, or of the equivalent function with them', thus finally providing grounds for the use of space by the SDFs, within the bounds of this so-called 'Common Use Principle'. 

(3) Taepo Dong Shot and Information Gathering Satellites

　　The Monday, 31 May 1998 shot of the Taepo Dong missile into the Pacific by North Korea (the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, PDRK) has given extensive impact on Japan and her general public and lead to a rapid political decision to introduce the information gathering satellites. Triggered by such a plainly national security- and defense-oriented incident, however, the related documents do not clearly refer to the national securityaspect, nor to the JDA and SDFs' involvement. 

　　The Cabinet Decision of Tuesday, 22 December 1998 8) cites the chief object of the introduction as 'to gather information needed for national security, such as diplomacy and defense and crisis management', but this is the sole reference to national security;  the JDA is not so much as mentioned in the list of related ministries and agencies.  The JDA itself, in the annual Defense of Japan, has only this to say about its use of the information gathering satellites:  'If (the satellite's) functions are deemed to be used commonly, then it will not be considered to be in violation of the aim of the Resolution of the Peaceful Use of Space, even if the SDF also use it.' 9) . 

　　Thus, in the case of information gathering satellites triggered by the Taepo Dong shot, the position of the JDA and SDFs has not stepped outside the 17-year old 'Common Use Principle'; the basic issue of space and national security is still left in procrastination. 

 

2. Japanese Space Policy and Its Current Revision　

　　The Japanese space policy as such is in an important stage of revision, alongside with the government structure reorganization of January 2001.  Course of change of the former space policy, with the Space Activities Commission that used to be at its focal point, is summarized below, together with the treatment therein of basic issues including national security. 

(1) Space Activities Commission

　　The following three have long formed the main framework of Japanese space policy until the January 2001 government reorganization:  the Space Activities Commission, the Fundamental Policy of Japan's Space Activities ('Taiko') and the Space Development Plan. 

　　The Space Activities Commission (SAC) was established by the Space Activities Commission Act of May 1968 within the Prime Minister's Office, and came into office the following August, the Director-General of Science and Technology Agency, a Cabinet member, serving as its Chairman.  It was for the purpose of 'conducting collectively and comprehensively under a unified plan' the space development of various organs;  thus the Commission was the highest organ of Japanese space policy deliberations and implementation. 

(2) 'Taiko' and Other Documents

a. 'Taiko'

　　Japanese space development was to be conducted 'in a unified manner under the cooperation of related ministries and agencies', in accordance with the Fundamental Policy of Japan's Space Activities ('Taiko') and the annual Space Development Plan that the Space Activities Commission authorized. The 'Taiko''s first version was drawn up in March 1978, and in response to changes in domestic and international situations, was successively revised in February 1984 and June 1989, until the latest version in 24 January 1996.  Reflecting the 'Peaceful Use of Space Resolution', it was stated that Japan would conduct space development 'within a scope of peaceful purposes';  this was the sole reference to the relation between space and national security. 

b. Space Development Plan and Effect of Accidents

　　The effect of recently repeated satellite accidents and launch failures is manifest in the latest of annual Space Development Plan dated 31 May 2000;  especially the two following launch failures had gravely affected the whole space development activities: 

　�@ Failure of H-II Rocket No. 8 and loss of Multifunctional Transport Satellite (MTSAT), the planned successor to Weather Satellite 'Himawari 5' and intended to provide the first air traffic control support services:  Monday, 15 November 1999.

　�A Failure of M-V Rocket No. 4 and loss of 'ASTRO-E', the X-ray astronomical satellite:  Thursday, 10 February 2000. 

As a result, the 2000 Space Development Plan was severely affected, resulting in termination of the H-II development (to be modified to H-IIA) and postponement of most of the planned satellite launches to later dates.  The space budgets also were adversely affected, leveling off or undergoing cuts (except the Information Gathering Satellites budget in the Cabinet Office, by adding which the overall figure exceeds the last year's, but this is a temporary phenomenon). 

c. Mid/Long-Term Vision of Japan's Space Activities

　　In replacement of the 1996 'Taiko', the Space Activities Commission authorized the 'Mid/Long-Term Vision of Japan's Space Activities' dated 14 December 2000, as 'a guideline of Japan's space development for sometime to come' even after the government structure reorganization of January 2001; it may be regarded as the 'will' of the SAC that was bound to be downgraded by the reorganization.  Here again, the sole reference to the relation of space and security is preserved:  'only for peaceful purposes'. 

(3)  Space Policy Revision after 2001 Reorganization

　　The former framework of Japanese space policy reviewed above is now undergoing a major revision, prompted by the launch and satellite failures on one hand and the government reorganization on the other. 

　　The January 2001 reorganization has brought in major changes including:

o the merger of two main branches of space activities:  Ministry of Education (MoE), and the Science and Technology Agency (STA) into the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT),

o upgrading of former organ of science and technology policy, the Science and Technology Council, to the Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP), 

o planned merger of three space-related organs formerly under the MoE and the STA, and

o downgrading of SAC to supervise the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) activities only, its chairman no longer a cabinet rank. 

　　The process of current Japanese space policy revision will be reviewed here, with special attention to the following three basic and long-term issues: 

�@　long-procrastinated relation of space and national security,

�A　future of space funding that now is undergoing budget cuts, and

�B　future organ to deliberate and implement space policy, after the downgrading of SAC. 

(4)  Council for Science and Technology Policy 10) 

　　Whereas the purpose of the former Science and Technology Council was recommendation to the prime minister, with the STA acting as its secretariat, the newly established Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) within the new Cabinet Office has been upgraded to cover social sciences and humanities as well and to express opinions at its discretion without being asked, with about 100 staff members of its own.  It has been in monthly session since January 2001 presided by the Prime Minister Mr. MORI, and then Mr. KOIZUMI. 

(5) Expert Panel on Space Development and Utilization 11) 

The eleventh CSTP meeting of Tuesday, 30 October 2001 established the Expert Panel on Space Development and Utilization (hereafter the Expert Panel), for the purpose of reporting to the CSTP on the 'reconsideration of basic framework for space development and utilization, both to strengthen international competitiveness of Japan's space industry and to upgrade quality-of-life using space-related technology'.  Since the Expert Panel is thus at the focal point of Japanese space policy revision, its deliberations are worth close study. 

 

3.  Deliberations at Expert Panel　

　　The process of deliberations only is studied in this chapter;  the implications and the author's comments will be dealt with in the next chapter 4. 

(1)  Purpose and Structure of Expert Panel

　　The purpose of the Expert Panel, as stated above, is the 'reconsideration of basic framework for space development and utilization'.  It consisted of ten members:  two from the CSTP (one of whom Mr. Hiroshi KUWAHARA former Deputy Chairman of Hitachi, Ltd. chairing) and eight experts (four from academia, two from public institutes, one from industry and one from media), and 'opinions of other experts from industry, academia and government will be heard as necessary'. 

　　For its time schedule, a draft plan was submitted to the Panel's first meeting of Thursday, 22 November 2001 that there would be 9 meetings, once or twice monthly, until the ninth meeting of late May 2002 when the Panel report would be ready.  As it turned out, the schedule was slightly extended to the eleventh meeting on Tuesday, 11 June when the report was completed, which then was reported to the CSTP to the termination of the Expert Panel's existence.  The Expert Panel is thus a time-limited organ, unlike the former SAC that was a permanent institution continually to implement the space policy. 

(2)  Deliberations at Expert Panel

　　Deliberations at the Panel, together with its documents and discussions, are promptly on display at its homepage 10) 11) to reveal the exchange of opinion with fair fidelity:  a commendable model of transparency.  What follows is its excerpts, with special attention to the issues of this article's interest. 

a. First Meeting, Thursday, 22 November 2001

o  Presentation of space activities and budgets of related ministries and agencies.

　o Members raise fundamental questions:  the object of the Panel, whether to increase or decrease the space budget, to which Mr. Koji OMI the Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy replies, 'Discuss everything Gara-Pon style' 12) .

　o In response to ministries and agencies' presentations, the members argue the need for a higher national space strategy. 

b. Third Meeting, Thursday 24 January 2002 

　o Three experts were invited for hearing, one of whom was Dr. Toshiyuki SHIKATA, LTG Ground Self-Defense Force (ret.), the first appearance of a defense-related person. 

　o He advocated the Japanese need for 'sharp eyes and good ears' for more gathering, transmission and analysis of information and for the number of satellites to permit one observation in at most two hours, in view of Japan's heavy restrictions to defend herself:  non-nuclear, exclusively defense-oriented, non-bio-chemical, non-anti-people mine and non-weapons export. 

　o Some members argue 'We cannot bypass the defense issues'.

c. Fourth Meeting, Monday, 25 February 2002

　o Members argue 'Not official views only, but talk real issues', 'Constraints felt to refrain from being long-term.  Should discuss in fifty- and hundred-year terms', 'A national strategy is required upon studying the U.S., European and Russian moves,', etc. 

d. Fifth Meeting, Monday, 25 February 2002

　　The Chairman  KUWAHARA states that, while fifty- and hundred-year term issues may be discussed further, the secretariat's draft will be presented for near future;  members express opinions on this point. 

e. Sixth Meeting, Tuesday, 26 March 2002

　Secretariat presents documents for drafting final report:  'Viewpoints for report'. 'Present status and draft objects in next ten years', etc.  Discussions lead to 'peaceful purposes' and national security aspects:  some members argue 'Write clearly about security' and 'The atmosphere has changed since 1969 (= Peaceful Use Resolution)', but others retort 'Better avoid confusion by not referring to peace', 'Security only carries negative connotation, should be kept locked up', and 'To disengage "peaceful purposes" would be construed that we would go military', etc., and it looked like ending up with a consensus something like 'In view of previous circumstances, security in broad sense should be kept in mind'. 

f. Seventh Meeting, Thursday, 18 April 2002, and Later

　　The rest of meetings was mostly concerned with the wording of secretariat's report draft, but the eighth meeting (Wednesday, 24 April 2002) saw sporadic references to security aspect.  'Refer to securing safety, and no need to "security"' was retorted by 'Do not remove wording of "security"', but there were negative responses like 'The general public will disagree', 'To win maximum support do not repeat them both', etc.  Most of later discussions was related to the draft wording, until the eleventh meeting (Tuesday, 11 June 2002) when the final wording was left to the Chairman  KUWAHARA's discretion, and the Expert Penal was terminated by a concluding remark of Minister OMI. 

(3) Expert Panel Report

　　The completed Expert Panel Report 'Reconsideration of Basic Framework for Space Development and Utilization' 13) consists of five chapters in concise 12 pages and attached13-page materials.  Apart from publicized references to H-II rocket privatization and development of quasi-zenith satellite system, the three basic issues of this article's interest are treated as follows. 

a. Security

Among the three important areas 'in next ten years or so', references are made to 'securing safety (security and crisis management)' by proceeding with the information gathering satellite project and with effective use of obtained information, and to timely and appropriate grasp of domestic and international information needed for 'security including diplomacy and defense, and crisis management such as large-scale disasters' (page 7). 

b. Funding

　　Government-wide efforts will be made to promote utilization and commercialization of space.  'In addition to existing means, necessary funding will be secured by positive efforts of related ministries and agencies and of private sectors' (page 6). 

c. Organization 

　　'The Council for Science and Technology Policy will continue its study and follow-up of basic framework for space development and utilization, in coordination with the Space Activities Commission and with an overall and panoramic view of Japan including the private sector activities' (page 12). 

(4) Reporting to CSTP

　　The Expert Panel Report was reported by Chairman KUWAHARA to the two meetings of CSTP, 18th (Wednesday, 29 May) and 19th (Wednesday, 19 June), the former by an 'Outline' (7 pages) and the latter by the full report (12 pages plus materials). 

a. Reporting to 18th Meeting, Wednesday, 29 May, 2002

　　A second of five agenda, the 'Outline' was presented by Chairman KUWAHARA.  Brief comments came from Mr. Takeo HIRAYAMA the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Mr. Toranosuke KATAYAMA the Minister of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications (MPHPT), Ms. Atsuko TOYAMA the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Mr. Jin MURAI the Minister of State for Disaster Management, and Mr. Masajuro SHIOKAWA the Minister of Finance (MoF). Mr. Koji OMI the CSTP Moderator and Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy stated that the comments would be reflected to the final draft in June. 

 b. Reporting to 19th Meeting, Wednesday, 19 June, 2002

　　A third of four agenda, the full report draft was presented by Chairman  KUWAHARA.  Brief comments came from Ms. Atsuko TOYAMA the Minister of MEXT and Mr. Takeo HIRAYAMA the Minister of METI.  Mr. Koji OMI the Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy stated that the draft would be finalized to be expressed as an opinion to Mr. KOIZUMI the Prime Minister and to other related Ministers.  Here ended the mission of the Expert Panel whose purpose it was to 'reconsider basic framework for space development and utilization'. 

 

4.  Place of Basic Issues in Future Japanese Space Policy　

　　On the process, as reviewed above, of Japanese space policy revision, several comments of this author are offered below, mainly on the three basic issues of this articles's interest, with further comments in the Appendix on its implication over whole process of the Japanese policy formulation.

(1) Security

　　Some discussions on national security did take place in the Sixth and the Eighth Meeting, which however ended up in the Report's vague expression like 'timely and appropriate grasp of information';  nor did it seem to have taken any specific heed of what Dr. Shikata stated as the first  defense-related expert.  It may be a credit to the report that the very wording of 'security' and 'defense' was so much as preserved despite some members' negative opinions, but the basic pending issue since the 'Peaceful Use of Space Resolution' has again been made subject to procrastination.

(2) Funding

　　Some members raised fundamental questions like 'whether to increase or decrease the space budget'(the First Meeting), but the Report states only vaguely that 'In addition to existing means, necessary funding will be secured by positive efforts of related ministries and agencies and of private sectors.'  The secretariat claimed that this was 'a clear message for increased funding' (the Eleventh Meeting minutes, page 5), but is this specific enough to assure more funds? 

(3) Organization

　　 In the absence of a permanent organ like the former SAC continually to deliberate and implement space policy, the Report only vaguely say that 'The CSTP will continue its study and follow-up of basic framework for space development and utilization, in coordination with the SAC.'

(4) 'Vertical Turfs' and 'Gara-Pon' Discussion

　　'Stove pipes', or 'vertical turfs' of related ministries and agencies in space activities have long been a problem:  the 1968 establishment of Space Activities Commission itself was for the very purpose of 'conducting collectively and comprehensively under a unified plan' the space development of various organs.  It looked therefore promising that, in face of presentations by ministries and agencies, the Expert Panel members raised such issues as the need for 'a higher national space strategy' 'in fifty- and hundred-year terms', and the Minister in charge responded them to 'discuss everything Gara-Pon style'. It seemed to warrant an expectation for a really long-term strategy discussion to transcend the vertical turfs.  What has resulted in the Report, however, was in the scope of only 'next ten years or so', without clear picture of the organization to coordinate and unify the turfs;  at the reporting to the CSTP, each Minister seemed to have successively expressed the turf opinion in terms of 'to the view of so-and-so Ministry, etc.', a far cry from the long-term strategic discussion in 'Gara-Pon style'. 

(5) Apprehensions about Future Japanese Space Policy

　　After the submission of the Expert Panel Report and in the absence of a permanent organ to implement it, what will become of the future of Japanese space policy?  Will the fundamental policy documents be made, in place of the former 'Fundamental Policy ('Taiko') ?  What organ is to coordinate the vertical turfs?  What will the funding be ?  In short, who and what are going to take care of the future of Japanese space, and how?

　　The answers to all these questions are uncertain.  The Japanese space policy as a whole must be termed, not only in transition, but also in confusion. 

 

Appendix:  Problems Common to Japanese Policy Formulation　

　　On conclusion of this article the author is reminded of his own work in the last year's DRC Annual Report 2001:  'Absence in Japan of Long-Term Strategic Policy Thinking' 3) .  There he presented instinctive hypotheses and supporting cases common to the process of Japanese policy formulation in general;  much of the current process of space policy revision seems to endorse them.  Comparison is made below, quoting the last year's work in double quotation marks:  " " . 

(1) "Japanese Policy Thinking is Left to 'Councils';  There Are no Experts"

　　In Japan where "comments are heard that 'the bureaucrats are the largest think tank', it is often seen that policy-making is left to so-called 'Councils', 'Study Groups' or '"Private" Advisory Groups', listing, presumably under arrangements by the bureaucrats, the names of noted opinion leaders and people of erudition." 

　　〔Comment 1〕The Expert Panel on Space Development and Utilization exactly fits this description.  The members are people of erudition indeed, raising fundamental issues 'in fifty- and hundred-year terms', but the documents around the Sixth Meeting seem to suggest that the bureaucrat secretariat is already bent only on drafting up the final report a quick way.  The final Report ended up, as has been noted, in the scope of only 'next ten years or so'. 

　　〔Comment 2 〕The Expert Panel has come to the end of its existence after eleven meetings in seven months, each meeting taking two hours according to the minutes.  Concerns are felt as to what depths of study and discussion were to be expected of 'reconsideration of basic framework for space development and utilization' in twenty-two hours in total. 

　　Incidentally the each meeting of the CSTP, to which the Expert Panel reported, takes exactly one hour.  To what depth the discussions there can reach, as an organ to deliberate and formulate the entire Japanese Science and Technology policy? 

(2) "Limitations in Japanese Policy Thinking"

　　"The (Japanese) strategic studies were initiated by the Government exclusively and there were no organized research institute privately.  Another big problem in the political system is the blocking the way to absorb various policy alternatives as references in an effort to formulate a better way for the future." 14)

　　〔Comment 3〕 In a meeting under arrangements by the bureaucrats, little can be expected of probing controversial issues in depth, boldly to present the future strategy, undaunted by possible complications.  Just such was the security issue in the Expert Panel:  a bare minimum seems to have been adopted as a consensus from among the positive and negative opinions.  Is a policy to be determined only as a common denominator by consensus ?

 

References　

1)   Tetsuo TAMAMA:  Present Status and Issues of Japanese Space Policy, DRC, A Quarterly Review, February 2002, pp. 18 〜 19 [in Japanese, quoted in this author's translation], and p.35, summary in English

2)   Tetsuo TAMAMA:  Japanese Space Policy and National Security, Bouei Gijutsu Jaanaru (Defense Technology Journal), June 2002, pp. 22 〜 28 [in Japanese]

3)  Tetsuo TAMAMA:  Absence in Japan of Long-Term Strategic Policy Thinking, DRC Annual Report AR-5, September 2001, pp. 107 〜 116

4)  Resolution on the Basics of Space Development and Use, Friday, 9 May 1969, House of Representatives

5)  Setsuko Aoki:  Legal Regulations on the Operation of Commercial Satellites:  Space Law at  Crossroads, Eisei Tsuushin Kenkyuu (Satellite Communication Studies) No. 97, May 2002, KDDI Engineering and Consulting [in Japanese]

6)  The Statement of the Minister of State concerning the meaning of the term "peace" in the principal session of the House of Representatives of 13 July 1969, as quoted in Space Law, www.nasda.go.jp/lib/space_law/ [Unlike the Japanese original the parallel English version shows title only, devoid of content]

7)  Government View on 'Peaceful Use' in Diet Resolution and Use of Satellites by Self-Defense Forces, Wednesday, 6 February 1985

8)  On Introduction of Information Gathering Satellites, Cabinet Decision, Tuesday, 22 December 1998

9)  Response of the Defense Agency to the Missile Launch by North Korea, Introduction of Information Gathering Satellites, Defense of Japan 1999, Chapter VI, Section 2, p. 207

10)  www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/ [Council for Science and Technology Policy homepage, in Japanese]

11)  www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/tyosakai/cosmo/ [Expert Panel on Space Development and Utilization homepage, in Japanese]

12)  The Japanese slang 'Gara-Pon' (derived from mahjong game, the author thinks) means something like 'afresh from bottom up', 'all scrap-and-build way'. 

13)  Official English version not being published, the quotations are in this author's translation. 

14)  Naruhiko UEDA:  The Think Tank for National Defense in Japan, DRC Annual Report AR-4, September 2000, pp. 49 〜 57 [amended in part by this author better to conform to the Japanese original]

 

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