The U.S. Army Doctrine

 

by Takenori YASUMURA

Member of Research Committee

 

Foreword

There are some interesting articles on the doctrine of the U.S. Army in Military Review, March-April 2002, published by the U.S. Army Command and Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. On the top page of the articles, it says, “Doctrine is dynamic. It is the engine of change that provides a common language for our profession.”

Doctrine is, indeed, dynamic. It is also the engine of transformation, the term used to describe the dramatic changes the U.S. Army is currently undergoing. It also provides a common language for all professionals throughout the Army.  U.S. Army doctrine has been playing a key role in changing the Army since the Cold War.

As an example, the 1993 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, developed the concept of operational and strategic levels to support joint contingency operations and by doing so presented a profound change with enormous implications for every fact of Army operations. The 1993 edition also codified the basis for changing Army organizations, procurement policies, and training.

However, it is also said that by including operational and strategic discussions, as well as Operations Other Than War (OOTW), in the 1993 edition, it left less space for the traditional discussion of the tactical art.  The previous edition provided the keystone definitions for tactical concepts, terminology, and control measures for the Army’s subordinate doctrinal manuals.

In order to solve this problem, FM 100-40, Tactics, (Draft), was published in 1995. Over a 6-month period, the three-man writing team for this manual researched the development of tactical concepts from the 1940s to the present. The team reviewed about 150 obsolete manuals assisted by Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Research Library, and also checked selected British, German, and Russian tactical concept and doctrinal publications.  Moreover, the draft manual incorporated and integrated staffing comments from more than 100 organizations including the Army’s Major Commands, TRADOC service schools, and Active and Reserve troop units that responded to the staffing of the draft manual.

This shows us that tremendous efforts were needed to ensure a common understanding of tactical concepts and terminology.  It is also obvious that great efforts should be taken for us clearly to understand the U.S. Army Doctrine.

On 14 June 2001, the U.S. Army released its new operations manual, U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations.  This edition supersedes the 1993 edition of FM 100-5.  It is fourteenth in a series of Army field service regulations, dating back to 1905, that provide basic operational doctrine for Army forces.

FM 3-0 complements and expands on Army doctrine contained in FM 1, The Army, also released on 14 June 2001. As the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual, FM 3-0 establishes a foundation for developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in other Army manuals.

Publishing both of the Army’s top-end doctrinal manuals at the same time is not only unusual but also unique.  Typically, the revision and publication of FM 1 and FM 3-0 proceeded independently and out of cycle, as was the case with publishing FM 100-5 in June 1993 and FM 100-1 in June 1994.  This time, however, the coincidence of Army transformation, on-going joint doctrine revisions and the decision to rewrite FM 100-5 precipitated a major doctrinal shift.

Considering the magnitude of doctrinal shift under way, this article places FM 3-0 in context and provides some insights into not only the doctrine contained in FM 3-0 but also why it has changed and the significance of the change. It examines the major conceptual changes in the doctrine.

 

1. Cold War Doctrine

To fully understand the changes of Army keystone doctrine, it is useful to compare the new manual with previous editions.  This reveals a major shift in Army doctrine.　The doctrine in the 1982 version was called "Air Land Battle". It introduced the operational framework of Deep, Close and Rear Operations, furthered the new focus on Operational Art.

The previous doctrine, on the other hand, named “Active Defense,” was more oriented on the science of war.  The operational concept of the Active Defense came out from a study of ground weapon systems.  The U.S. Army wanted to find out the right distance, or the most effective range for the exchange of fires, when they fought against the Soviet Union in Central Europe.  As a result of the study, fighting over 2,000m was most favorable for the U.S. Army, while distances less than 1,500m was more favorable for the Soviet Union.

For this reason, the U.S. developed a doctrine of defense in depth; moving army forces from one defensive position to another in order to maintain the right distance.  With this concept of Active Defense, the Army enjoyed  “honey moon” under the Reagan Administration, where they received sufficient budgets to reconstruct the Army with greater strength after the Vietnam War.

But there were some questions that arose. That is, by changing from one defensive position to another while the enemy advanced their attack, how can the initiative, the key to win the battle, be gained and retained?

To find the answer to this question, U.S. doctrinal writers studied the operational art of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, etc., and examined the operational concept of the Soviet Union. The U.S. Army recognized that the Soviet Army conducted operations by echelons; initiating the close battle with a first echelon, then committing the second echelon to the battle at a decisive time and place to achieve victory.

In this context, distraction of the second echelon and forcing the enemy commander’s hand is the key to gaining the initiative.  Thus, the “Deep Operations” is the most significant piece of the operational concept in the Air Land Battle.

Based on the doctrine of “Air Land Battle”, the U.S. Army developed major weapon systems, such as the Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Black Hawk, Patriot and MLRS.  This is called the Concept Based Requirement System (CBRS), that is, the operational concept leads to the weapon systems, while in the “Active Defense” the weapon systems lead to the concept.

During the Cold War, these doctrines were developed to fight against Soviet forces in defense of Central Europe, and provided the basis for Army organizations, procurement and training.  Since the U.S. Army quantitatively inferior to the Soviet Union (who had the largest number of ground forces in the world), the U.S. Army developed and intensely trained its highly mechanized and modern heavy forces in the Air Land Battle doctrine in the hope to cope with this opponent qualitatively. 

 

2. Post-Cold War Doctrine

The doctrine in the 1993 version was known as the "Full Dimension Operations". It was the first operations manual published after the end of the Cold War so it took the Army from the principles of Containment to the new concept of Engagement, including the distinction between War and the Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).

The 1993 FM also increased the direction, and provided information, to Army Forces on Joint Operations, adding the focus as a Force Projection Army. It also described the importance of Battle Command, the idea of operational and tactical level leadership.

The doctrine in the new 2000 version is called the "Full Spectrum Operations". An article from the Military Review, describes it as the following, quoting one of the U.S. Army historians who characterized the 1993 manual as “doctrine for the post-Cold War world.”

“The new FM 3-0 is not Cold War doctrine, nor is it even post-Cold War doctrine. It is new! This is doctrine for an Army in the midst of transforming to a strategically responsive, full-spectrum force; one that is meeting today’s deterrence, engagement, and support missions; and one that is ready, when necessary, to fight and win - decisively.”

The manual retains and restates hard-won lessons from 226 years of Army experience, revising and reapplying them in old and new ways.  It is illuminating to review where the Army has been since the 1993 version of FM 100-5.

Following Operation Desert Storm, force projection and major regional contingencies against conventional threats were the paramount strategic planning considerations. The Soviet Union dissolved itself in late 1991 and early 1992, but the extent to which its military power would devolve remained unknown. In late 1992, Operation Restore Hope, in Somalia, had yet to deteriorate.  The Army, in the meantime, was in the midst of a massive reduction from its peak cold war strength.

While the 1993 version was prescient in its emphasis on force projection and battle command, it could not envision the events in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, central Africa, and other contingencies. Nor could the doctrine authors foresee the astonishing advances in information technology or the degree to which U.S. conventional forces would dominate the military environment following the Soviet Union’s collapse.  Clearly, the doctrine developed to fight against Soviet forces or surrogates was obsolete, at best, and completely outdated at worst.

On 12 October 1999, the Army leadership unveiled The Army Vision, defining how the Army will meet the Nation’s requirements today and into the future. The Army’s transformation into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant at every point on the spectrum of conflict was outlined in The Transformation Campaign Plan.

In June 2001, the Army published FM 1, The Army, which describes what the U.S. Army is, what it does and how it intends to do it.  It delineates the purpose, role and functions of the U.S. Army as established by the Constitution, the Congress and the Department of Defense.

FM 3-0, Operations, also published in June of 2001, is the Army’s keystone doctrine for full spectrum operations.  It explains the role and contributions of the Army at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and as a member of joint, interagency and multinational teams.  FM 3-0 also describes the impacts of technology on Army operations, its soldiers and their leaders.

FM l and FM 3-0 heralds a top-to-bottom revision of Army doctrine to better support Army transformation.  This revision is already well under way with the first of the supporting doctrinal publications, FM 3-90, Tactics, appearing in July 2001.  Additional supporting publications, such as FM 6-0, Command and Control, and FM 3-13, Information Operations, are nearing completion. FM 3-06, Urban Operations, FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production and FM 7-15, Army Universal Task List, are in draft and undergoing Army wide staffing.

 

3. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations

The new Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, is the Army’s keystone doctrinal manual that establishes a foundation for developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures detailed in other Army manuals. This is the first edition of the operations manual to appear under the aegis of a mature and authoritative joint body of doctrine.  For the first time, it defines Army mission-essential tasks lists (METLs), the operational expression of the Amy’s core competencies found in FM 1.

Additionally, FM 3-0 recognizes a profound shift in the operational environment and examines the increased complexity of modern operations from that perspective. In consonance with Army transformation, FM 3-0 recognizes that Army forces must be strategically responsive, meaning not just capable of deploying faster.

To a greater degree than almost any doctrinal change since the Korean War, this doctrine is offensive, stressing operations that are more nonlinear and simultaneous. It discusses and illustrates operations conducted throughout expanded and noncontiguous areas of operations (AOs).

Army operations are full spectrum, spanning decisive action in a major theater war, peacetime military engagement, and domestic support activities.  FM 3-0 is commander-focused and expands the importance of battle command, the ability to visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess operations.

(1) Army Mission-Essential Tasks Lists (METL)

The Army METL provides the operational expression of the Army’s core competencies as discussed in FM 1.  The Army METL includes shaping the security environment, responding promptly to crises, mobilizing the Army, conducting forcible entry operations, dominating land operations, and providing support to civil authorities.  Framing the Army’s fundamental contributions to national security as mission-essential tasks permits FM 3-0 to establish the link from operations to Army force responsiveness and hence to training.  For the first time, the operations manual states that units focus their training on war fighting tasks unless a senior commander, three-star or higher, directs otherwise.

A theme initiated while discussing Army METL and continued forward is the Army’s need to close with and destroy the enemy. FM 3-0 emphasizes the complementary nature of fires and maneuver and reiterates that relationship. It contains an interesting discussion of the element of combat power: “All tactical actions inevitably require seizing or securing terrain as a means to an end or an end in itself.  Close combat is necessary if the enemy is skilled and resolute; fires alone wil1 neither drive him from his position nor convince him to abandon his cause. Ultimately, the outcome of battles, major operations, and campaigns depends on the ability of Army forces to close with and destroy the enemy. During offensive and defensive operations, the certainty of destruction may persuade the enemy to yield. In stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence adversary actions.  In all cases, the ability of Army forces to engage in close combat, combined with their willingness to do so, is the decisive factor in defeating an enemy or controlling a situation.”

(2) Full-Spectrum Operations

The new operations manual postulates no single threat.  Rather, it describes a range of threat characteristics and likely modus operandi.  Thus, FM 3-0 discusses asymmetry, urban operations, the continued threat of weapons of mass destruction, and the two-way street of technology.  These ideas will drive the way we present potential adversaries in exercises and training.

FM 3-0 moves beyond war and military operations other than war (MOOTW) to the complex challenges of today’s operating environment.  It establishes full-spectrum operations as a flexible means of conceptualizing what the Army does during peace, conflict, and war. Every operation is a combination of the following types of military operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and support.

Offensive operations are decisive; they destroy or defeat an enemy.  Their purpose is to impose U.S. will on the enemy and win - decisively.  Defensive operations defeat an attack, buy time, economize forces, and/or develop favorable conditions for offensive operations.

Stability operations include such activities as peace operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and foreign internal defense.  Stability operations also address the vital role that Army forces play in peacetime military engagement to improve international relationships and moderate factors that could explode into crises.  Support operations describe how Army forces respond to disaster and domestic requirements, the latter in support of civil authorities.

Examined individually, these types of operations are not new.  What is new is recognizing that, increasingly, these operations are interrelated and make up land operations.  Versatile, adaptive Army forces combine and transition between and among these operations throughout a campaign, major operation, or other mission.

Offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations are not intended to supplant war and MOOTW at the operational level.  Rather, FM 3-0 defines a range of operations that Army forces conduct to support a Joint Campaign. It captures the requirements of today’s land operations where there is no clear demarcation between war and MOOTW.

Army doctrine addresses full-spectrum operations across the spectrum of conflict. Army commanders at all echelons may combine different types of operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish missions in war and MOOTW.  For each mission, the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) and Army Component Commander determine the emphasis Army forces place on each operation. Offensive and defensive operations normally dominate military operations in war and some smaller-scale contingencies (SSCs). Stability operations and support operations (SASO) predominate in MOOTW that include certain SSCs and peacetime military engagements (PMEs).

(3) Battlefield Organization

The complex nature of ground operations today requires a more flexible battlefield organization than the cold war construct of close, deep, and rear operations.  FM 3-0 provides a purpose-based battlefield organization that uses decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations.

This permits the view of operations to accommodate the increasingly simultaneous and nonlinear operations conducted in greater depth than ever before in noncontiguous AOs.  It also extends the battlefield organization down to lower echelons, which is necessary, given the range of Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs) that require Army forces.

In adapting a purpose-based framework, FM 3-0 retains the older deep, close, and rear organization but assigns them strictly spatial qualities in terms of areas. Deep, close, and rear areas help commanders describe where shaping, decisive and sustaining operations may occur, particularly in operations characterized by linear action and contiguous AOs.

(4) Strategic Responsiveness

Strategic responsiveness is a primary theme of FM 3-0. Strategic responsiveness is more than simply deploying faster. It includes generating, training, swiftly deploying, and simultaneously employing the right forces at the right time and place that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires them.  It is about giving the JFC options in using decisive land power while creating operational dilemmas for the adversary.  The message here is both internal and external.  Internally, it provides the doctrinal basis for changing the Army’s mind-set toward Army transformation.  Externally, it reinforces to JFCs the complementary nature of air, land, and sea operations.

(5) Information Superiority

Advances in information technology are changing the way Army forces operate, just as information technology continues to change every aspect of society.  FM 3-0 shifts Army doctrine forward through two related concepts.  First the manual adds information as an element of combat power - joining leadership, firepower, maneuver, and protection.  Information is both a powerful enabler and a tool that creates the conditions for decisive action.  Information superiority, then, becomes a vital objective of operations. Second commander need to develop command styles that exploit information technology.

(6) Battle Command

The Army views land warfare as intensely human, and FM 3-0 emphasizes the art of operations throughout.  Soldiers execute operations.  Commanders provide the impetus for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. Their ability to successfully command land forces depends on how well they master the art and apply the science of war.  Consequently, the battle command concept receives considerable attention.  FM 3-0 retains the emphasis on leadership while offering a new model for battle command - one that requires commanders to visualize operations, describe their vision to subordinates, and direct operations to conclusion.  Throughout, commanders lead soldiers and assess the situation.  The new model recognizes that in an increasingly simultaneous, noncontiguous environment, the commander must establish and update a mental picture of the battle space to truly communicate his intent.

 

4. The impact of Joint Doctrine

This is the first edition of the operations manual to appear under the aegis of a mature and authoritative body of joint doctrine.  Air Land Battle, and Army doctrine in general was "supportive" of Joint Doctrine, but relatively separate and distinct from it.  Current doctrine is very different.  FM 1 and FM 3-0 are directly linked to Joint Publications.  The renumbering of Army manuals was done to clearly reflect this link.

  In fact, in FM 3-0, Chap. 1, pg. 1-14, it outlines the role of Army doctrine: "Doctrine is the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified action in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements.  While it complements joint doctrine, Army doctrine also describes the Army’s approach and contributions to full spectrum operations on land.  Army doctrine is authoritative but not prescriptive. Where conflicts between Army and joint doctrine arise, joint doctrine takes precedence."

Joint Doctrine is based on the Joint Vision Statements, which prescribe how the military will fight.  Joint Doctrine has evolved through time and looks long range.  Joint Vision 2020 is the current, long-term doctrinal statement about how the U.S. military wants to fight.  It guides and directs doctrine of the services in order to ensure that Service Doctrine supports Joint Doctrine.

The biggest impact of Joint Doctrine on the Army has been the growing concept of Unified Action.  That is the idea that the Army fights as a component of a joint effort, instead of focusing on the ground fighting pieces alone.   In Air Land Battle, there was very little of this, basically only the mention of the other players (Air Force, Navy, Marines), but no coherent discussion of how the Army will work with them.

This changed in the 1993 version, but not enough.  The newest manuals reflect that the Army will always fight as part of a Joint Force, either as the supporting or supported component, as a member of a unified team, not alone.

 

Conclusion

Examining the U.S. Army Doctrine back to the Cold War, it is clear that the Doctrine is dynamic and has changed drastically.  But, there is something that has never changed the basic role of the ground forces in land warfare.  As long as the nature of war does not change, the role of ground forces and their importance will never change, in any complex operational environment and for full-spectrum missions during peace, conflict, and war.  The author of the article on FM3-0; Doctrine for a Transformation Force, who also worked on the new Field Manual FM3-0, wrote this at the end of his article. This tells us not only the importance of the doctrine itself but also that the revision and doctrinal shift is needed and based on changes in the operating environment and the requirements of both today and tomorrow.

 “FM 3-0 is transformation doctrine for a transforming force. It is a significant shift from its predecessors, although it would be wrong to label it as revolutionary. To use an analogy, FM 3-0 is like the howitzer, ship, or bomber that returns to the factory for a service life extension overhaul.  Every piece is disassembled and renewed, or it is replaced with something that is a generation ahead of the old system. What emerges from the factory retains the original’s appearance and basic function; however, the updated platform can perform its mission more effectively in changed operational conditions.  FM 3-0 is that kind of doctrine.  It contains much that is old and familiar but contains a great deal that is new.  It addresses the operating environment of today while anticipating the requirements of tomorrow.  It is a stepping-stone to the doctrine that will drive Objective Force operations.  FM 3-0 also provides a firm basis that Amy forces can use to conduct full-spectrum operations today. “  I think this is a perfect summary for my article.

 

References

1. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (14 June 2001)

2. FM 100-5, Operations (14 June 1993)

3. FM1, The Army (14 June 2001)

4. Military Review (March-April 2002)

5. RIKUSENN KENNKYU (Staff College, JGSDF, November 2001-April 2002)

 

○    Biographies of authors

○    Contents