Role of Ground Forces in Land Warfare

by Takenori YASUMURA

Member of Research Committee, DRC

It has been very interesting to me as an old soldier to watch closely the war in Iraq. The ground operation named Operation Iraqi Freedom has been successful. Even so, there were difficulties and tough jobs to overcome, such as logistic support, collateral damage and asymmetrical attacks, like suicide bombers. In only three weeks from the opening shot, the US-led forces have brought down Saddam Hussein's regime.

This war is the first that makes use of the newest US Army doctrine. The doctrine, which is called "Full Spectrum Operations", is outlined in the new version FM 3-0, Operations published in June of 2001. Though some have said that in many ways the changes to this key manual were more in words than in actual change, there are some good reasons for success and also interesting points that the new doctrine greatly emphasizes. In this regard, this article raises some interesting points and provides a small perspective on the war.

First, the series of ground operations in Iraq has been conducted based on the new Army Doctrine, which is characterized as the following expression indicates. "To a greater degree than almost any doctrine since the Korean War, this doctrine is offensive, stressing operations that are more nonlinear and simultaneous."

The importance of the offensive nature of war is highlighted in the new doctrine. To that end, General Shinseki wrote about offensive operations in FM 3-0, and the ground campaign of the war, and in fact the entire campaign mirror his words. "Warfighting, and by extension less violent actions, depends on a few 'rules of thumb.' First, we win on the offense; we must be able to defend well, but you win on the offense. Next we want to initiate combat on our terms – at a time, in a place, and with a method of our choosing. Third, we want to gain the initiative and retain it – never surrender it if possible. Fourth, we want to build momentum quickly. And finally we want to win – decisively."

Second, it became clear that the ground forces are the key to the termination of the war. The US Army Doctrine describes the role of the ground forces as follows. "All tactical actions inevitably require seizing or securing terrain as a means to an end or an end in itself. Close combat is necessary if the enemy is skilled and resolute; fires alone will neither drive him from his position nor convince him to abandon his cause. Ultimately the outcome of battles, major operations, and campaigns depends on the ability of Army forces to close with and destroy the enemy."

While many had foreseen trouble with fighting in urban areas, it was surprising to see that the 3rd Division entered Baghdad without having heavy close combat. This proved to us the role of the ground forces as key to war termination. Air power saved the day for the US forces during the pause phase, but air power could not have won the war alone. It was the ground force that seized the key centers of gravity – the oil fields and the cities.

The FM 3-0 also has a quote about this point from T. R. Fehrenbach, as follows. "You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life. But if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud."

Third, while it may have been the ground forces role to lead the campaign toward Baghdad to ensure success, all the operations were fought in Unified Action. The newest manuals reflect that the Army will always fight as part of a Joint Force, either as the supporting or supported component, but in either case, as a member of a unified team, not alone.

While there is much to learn from the Iraq campaign, one of the reasons why the US-led forces were successful is in part because of the inflexible nature of the Iraqi armed forces. They were very slow to take any initiative. It is not difficult to imagine that their field commanders were not allowed, or had no information, to make decisions on their own, and also that a large number of them were overwhelmed by the shock of air power and lost the will to fight.

On the contrary, the US forces were able to deploy a relatively small ground force because of their overwhelming situational awareness. The new manual adds “information” as an element of combat power -- joining leadership, firepower, maneuver, and protection. Information is both a powerful enabler and a tool that creates the conditions for decisive action. Information superiority, then, becomes a vital objective of operations.

In the war in Iraq, satellites, J-STARS, U2s, UAVs and manned reconnaissance flights gave the US forces commanders an almost complete view of the disposition of Iraqi forces. They always knew where the enemy divisions were. If they moved, they were easy targets for attack aircraft. In many cases it was the ground forces that caused them to move. A Marine commander was relieved from command because he was not aggressive enough in drawing the enemy into the open.

Fourth, the US forces are well trained to accomplish their mission with minimum casualties. They always emphasize the importance of people and leadership. In this concern, there were some interesting words as follows in an article on the new US Army Doctrine in the magazine Military Review. "The Army views land warfare as intensely human, and FM 3-0 emphasizes the art of operations throughout. Soldiers execute operations. Commanders provide the impetus for planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. Their ability to successfully command land forces depends on how well they master the art and apply the science of war."

A friend of mine who is a retired General in the US Army once told me his perspective on leadership as follows. “The key to our leadership is the mutual trust that exists among the soldiers and leaders. Soldiers know that the US will use overwhelming firepower to overcome the enemy. They know their lives are valued highly, and that they will always be well paid, well fed, given the quickest and best medical care if wounded. And if captured, the US will do all it can to get them to safety. We always want to win with the soccer score: US - 100, Enemy - 0. Leadership extends down to the lowest levels with all encouraged to take the initiative.”

Concerning training, an active duty LTC wrote to me of his experiences. ”We continue to stress in the new doctrine and manuals, the idea of tough, realistic training, under all conditions, in a manner that closely resembles wartime conditions. From my experience in the last Gulf War, I can tell you that the training conducted at our National Training Center, in the Mohave Desert of California, was at times more difficult than the war fought in Iraq. What this ensures is that though war is horrifying and difficult, when a young soldier does experience it for the first time – it really isn't – because he has done the same kind of offensive operation before – at night, in a rainstorm or snowstorm, etc., with live ammunition, in the deserts of California. The Army is continuing to push this kind of training as critical to wartime success.” Then, at the end he also noted, “Ultimately you must put a soldier on the ground to win; if he is well trained and ready, and given the proper equipment and support, he will win.”

The ground operations in the war on Iraq were conducted based on the doctrine for an Army in the midst of transformation. The US Army transformation is now on-going, but the Objective Force and the Future Combat Systems (FCS) are just starting in their development. Even the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), the Interim Force in the Army’s transformation plan, was not used in the war. The forces operating in Iraq are all legacy forces, with the weapon systems produced during the 1980s, such as Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk, Patriot and MLRS. But they were used much more effectively and efficiently because of better communications, better sensors, and the joint training that is constantly done.

During the Cold War, Army doctrine moved from Active Defense to Air Land Battle, with operations that were more offensive in nature. Based on this doctrine, the US Army developed major weapon systems, and trained its mechanized and armored forces to fight against Soviet forces in defense of Central Europe. After the Cold War, the Army developed new doctrine which was then revised into the current doctrine.　The developments of the idea of operational – and even strategic – level concepts to support joint contingency operations represent a profound change with enormous implications for every facet of Army operations.

Thus, US Army doctrine is dynamic and has been changed drastically, playing a key role in supporting the change of the Army during the Cold War and afterwards. But, there is something that has not changed and that is the basic role of ground forces in land warfare. In that the true nature of war does not change, the role of the ground forces and their importance will never change – in any complex operational environment and for full-spectrum missions during peace, conflict, or war. This also recognizes that Army forces are an indispensable component of joint forces and will be the decisive component in sustained land warfare. Army forces depend on the other services for enablers necessary to conduct full-spectrum operations just as the other services require Army forces to realize the full potential of joint operations.

References

1. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (14 June 2001)

2. FM1, The Army (14 June 2001)

3. Military Review (March – April 2002)

4. RIKUSENN KENNKYU (Staff College, JGSDF, November 2001 – April 2002)